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Censorship of Obscenity:
The Developing Constitutional
Standards
The authors discuss the constitutional criteria controlling
recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court in
the area of obscenity censorship and demonstrate that sub-
stantial protection has been given to published material
dealing with sex. In considering the development of a test
to identify "censorable obscenity," they examine the nature
of pornography and conclude that it provides a useful
guide. They find that "hard-core pornography" is the
foundation for the "constant" concept of obscenity cur-
rently applied by the Court; and they advocate a "variable"
concept which would make the validity of censorship de-
pend upon the particular material's primary audience and
upon the nature of the appeal to that audience. The
authors also discuss: (1) the requirement that material be
judged as a whole on the basis of its dominant theme, (2)
the weight to be given "redeeming social importance," (3)
the protection of "immoral" ideas and the "end of ideolog-
ical obscenity," (4) the requirement of scienter, (5) the
meaning and application of "contemporary community
standards," and (6) the need for independent judicial re-
view of obscenity findings.
William B. Lockhart* and
Robert C. McClure**
In 1957, for the first time in its history, the United States Su-
preme Court squarely faced the then unresolved problem' of the
constitutionality of official censorship of obscenity. It had been
presented the problem once before-almost ten years earlier-but
on that occasion aborted the case: in Doubleday & Co. v. New
York' an equally divided Court affirmed without opinion Dou-
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1. See Lockhart & McClure, Literature, The Lmv of Obscenity, and the
Constitution, 38 MINN. L. REv. 295, 352-58 (1954).
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bleday's conviction under a New York obscenity statute for pub-
lishing Edmund Wilson's Memoirs of Hecate County.3 But by
1957 the deadlock in the Court had been broken,4 and in that
year the Court began firmly, though not always unanimously, to
mark out constitutional standards governing the censorship of ob-
scenity. The process is not yet complete-perhaps it never will be
fully completed-but substantial progress has already been made
in setting up important safeguards to protect works of aesthetic or
other social value.' The extent of the progress may be measured
by the fact that an important publisher, justifiably confident of
the new constitutional protection, is undertaking the republication
of Memoirs of Hecate County and doing it, of all places, in Bos-
ton, Massachusetts.6
I. THE SETTING
The setting in which these developments took place changed
markedly between 1957 and 1960. Both the methods and the tar-
gets of the proponents of censorship shifted substantially.
In early 1957 the National Office for Decent Literature-popu-
larly known as the NODL-was still an effective force in the sup-
pression of magazines and paper-bound books it believed to be
objectionable.' In response to earlier criticism of some of its prac-
tices' the NODL had already changed its name from the "Na-
tional Organization for Decent Literature" to the "National Office
3. For an account of the case, see Lockhart & McClure, supra note 1,
at 295-301.
4. The deadlock was broken on Feb. 25, 1957, in Butler v. Michigan,
352 U.S. 380 (1957), followed shortly afterwards on June 24, 1957, by
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown,
354 U.S. 436 (1957), and Adams Newark Theater Co. v. City of Newark,
354 U.S. 931 (1957). For analyses of these and subsequent eases, see pp.
13-47 infra.
5. See DOUGLAS, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE 66 (1958). The new safe-
guards are discussed at pp. 47-120 infra. For an excellent analysis of the
Supreme Court cases from 1957-1960 see Kalven, The Metaphysics of the
Law of Obscenity, THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW 1 (1960).
6. Censorship Scoreboard, Jan. 1960, p. 8.
7. For a description of the NODL and its operations, see Lockhart &
McClure, supra note 1, at 304-05, 309-11, and 317-18. See also Rorty,
Harassed Pocket-Book Publishers, 15 ANTIOCH REV. 411 (1956).
8. The practices particularly criticized were its use of general boycotts
against retail dealers who refused to withdraw from sale the books and
magazines listed as objectionable by the NODL, and its tacit consent to the
use of its lists by policemen and prosecutors who threatened dealers with
criminal prosecution if they failed to withdraw the proscribed items from
sale. 10 RECORD OF THE Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 143
(1955); Bourke, Moral Problems Related to Censoring the Media of Mass
Communications, 40 MARQ. L. REV. 57 (1956); Murray, Literature and
Censorship, 14 BOOKS ON TRIAL 393 (1956); Fischer, The Harm Good Peo-
ple Do, Harpers, Oct. 1956, vol. 213, p. 14; Murray, The Bad Arguments
Intelligent Men Make, America. Nov. 3, 1956, vol. 96, p. 120.
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for Decent Literature" in an effort to disassociate itself from the
actions of local NODL extremists.' But it was not until May, 1957,
when the American Civil Liberties Union, in a statement signed
by 150 persons prominent in literature and the arts, blasted the
NODL's methods of operation that the NODL began to decline
as a potent force in the suppression of books and magazines."a
Since then the NODL has become more the "service organiza-
tion" its apologists have claimed it is and less the "action group"
its critics said it was1 and as such has removed itself from the
center of the controversy over the censorship of literature.'
The systematic use of lists by policemen and prosecutors threat-
ening dealers with criminal prosecution if they continued to sell the
listed publications13 also declined during this period. Detroit's
notorious censorship system,14 in full operation at the beginning
of 1957, ended before the year was out when the publishers of the
hard-cover and paper-bound editions of John O'Hara's Ten North
Frederick, one of the many books on the Detroit lists, secured in-
junctions restraining the City of Detroit and two of its police of-
ficials from making any threat of prosecution to any person selling
the book.'5 The prosecuting attorney of St. Clair County, Michi-
gan, who had been using the NODL lists, received the same treat-
ment 6-- as did the prosecuting attorney of Lake County, Indi-
9. Murray, The Bad Arguments Intelligent Men Make, supra note 8. The
change of name came as early as 1955. Fitzgerald, NODL States its Case,
America, June 1, 1957, vol. 97, pp. 280 & 281.
10. American Civil Liberties Union [ACLU] Statement on Censorship
Activity by Private Organizations and the National Organization for Decent
Literature (n.d.); ACLU, Civil Liberties, May 1957, p. 1. For the NODL's
reply to the ACLU statement, see Fitzgerald, NODL States Its Case, supra
note 9. And for the ACLU's rejoinder, see ACLU, Civil Liberties, Sept.
1957, p. 2.
11. Murray, The Bad Arguments Intelligent Men Make, supra note 8.
Despite the changes in the NODL's operations, the ACLU in its 1957 state-
ment failed to recognize that these changes had already taken place; and the
NODL, in response, ignored the fact that it had earlier encouraged the ac-
tivities criticized by the ACLU. See authorities cited note 10 supra.
12. By mid-1958, the ACLU reported: "Possibly as a result of consider-
able criticism of the NODL, many local communities engaged in a literay
'clean-up' campaign are now compiling their own lists of offending publi-
cations and relying less on the monthly NODL compilation." 38th ACLU
ANN. REP. 15 (1958).
. 13. For a discussion of this method of censorship and its legality, see 22
U. Cm. L. REv. 216 (1954).
14. The Detroit operation is described in Lockhart & McClure, supra
note 1, at 314-16. See also Lardner, Let 'enz Eat Newspapers, Newsweek,
Mar. 14, 1955, vol. 45, p. 92; The Smut Detective, Newsweek, Mar. 21,
1955, vol. 45, p. 95.
15. American Book Publishers Council [APBC] Censorship Bull., July
1957, p. 3; ABPC, Censorship Bull., Aug. 1958, p. 4.
16. ABPC, Censorship Bull., July 1957, p. 3.
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ana."7 The New York City commissioner of licenses, who had writ-
ten letters to news dealers threatening them with revocation of their
licenses if they continued to sell designated publications, was or-
dered to withdraw the letters and to instruct the news dealers to
disregard them.'
The injunctions against combining disapproved lists with threats
of prosecution 9 have not altogether stopped the practice; some of-
ficials still continue to issue orders or "requests" to dealers with
thinly veiled threats of prosecution. But these instances seem to oc-
cur sporadically and are often limited to a particular book or to a
single issue of a magazine.2" In only Rhode Island2' and King
17. H M H Publishing Co. v. Garrett, 151 F. Supp. 903 (N.D. Ind.
1957).
18. Sunshine Book Co. v. McCaffrey, 4 App. Div. 2d 643, 168 N.Y.S.2d
268 (1957). The Philadelphia district attorney received similar treatment
after threatening motion picture exhibitors with prosecution if they exhibit-
ed "And God Created Woman." Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Blanc, 396
Pa. 448, 153 A.2d 243 (1959). Another suit is pending in Jacksonville, Flori-
da, where publishers have sued the Duval County solicitor and sheriff. Cen-
sorship Scoreboard, Mar. 1960, p. 1.
19. See note 13 supra.
20. In Menlo Park, Palo Alto, San Mateo, and Mountain View, California,
the police "requested" dealers to withdraw from sale the November, 1959,
issue of Playboy magazine because it contained photographs from the
European version of the movie "Cry Tough." Palo Alto Times, Nov. 6, 1959,
p. 1, col. 4. In Evansville, Indiana, the county prosecutor pressured the lo-
cal wholesale distributor to drop 40 magazines. 38th ACLU ANN. REP. 12
(1958). And in Andersen, Indiana, law enforcement authorities served notice
that any dealer or distributor of 108 "obscene" publications faced arrest.
Hearings on Control of Obscene Material Before Subcommittee on Constitu-
tional Amendments and Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st & 2nd Sess. 18
(1960). The police chief of Rockport, Massachusetts, ordered Maxine Davis'
The Sexual Responsibility of Woman removed from newsstands and store
shelves. His action produced a sell-out of the book in nearby Gloucester.
N.Y. Times, July 25, 1959, p. 4, col. 8.
In Camden, New Jersey, the public safety director issued a list of 71
"lewd" publications, warning dealers that anyone who sold any of the pub-
lications would be prosecuted. ABPC, Censorship Bull., Nov. 1959, p. 5. But
in nearby Trenton, New Jersey, when police visited dealers telling them
that Grace Metalious' Peyton Place was banned, the city counsel ruled them
out of order and the public safety director then announced that no order
banning sale of the book would be issued. ABPC, Censorship Bull., April
1958, p. 8. In Houston, Texas, "the police department was first ordered to
remove from the newsstands 'every magazine that shows a bare leg.' How-
ever, this was quickly modified by the action of the Harris County News
Co. to include only 11 specific publications . . . ." Hearings, supra, at 18.
Similarly, in New Orleans the police department "declared war" on all
magazines containing "a picture showing 'bare breasts or bare buttocks.' "
In re Louisiana News Co., 187 F. Supp. 241, 243, 245 (E.D. La. 1960).
The court enjoined police officials from further seizures of or interference
with the magazines.
21. In Rhode Island a state Commission to Encourage Morality in Youth
was created April 26, 1956, by a legislative resolution authorizing the com-
mission to "educate the public concerning any book ... or other thing
containing obscene, indecent or impure language, or manifestly tending to
[Vol. 45:5
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County, Washington,22 do officials appear to make systematic
use of lists of proscribed publications.
With the retreat of the NODL and the decline in the systematic
use of lists of proscribed publications came a new type of organi-
zation and a sharp increase in the practice of abruptly prosecuting
news dealers on criminal charges without forewarning.'
The new type of organization began with the formation of Citi-
zens for Decent Literature in Cincinnati, Ohio. Carefully avoid-
ing the much-criticized practices of the NODL, CDL counsels
against telling any dealer what not to sell. Instead, CDL limits its
operations to stirring up public agitation against magazines
thought to be obscene, and to encouraging and assisting law en-
forcement officials in the prosecution of obscenity cases.24 En-
couraged by a number of successful prosecutions of wholesale
and retail news dealers in Cincinnati, interested individuals in other
the corruption of the youth. . ." and to "investigate and recommend the
prosecution of all violations .... " R.I. Acts & Resolves, Res. No. 73, at
1102. The commission prepares and circulates to dealers and police through-
out the state lists of proscribed books. ABPC, Censorship Bull., Nov. 1957,
p. 3; ABPC, Censorship Bull., April 1958, p. 3. At first the lists were con-
sidered "orders" to the police, but they are now called "guides for the po-
lice." ACLU, Feature Press Serv., Wkly Bull. 1940, Mar. 10, 1958, p. 3.
But whether "orders" or "guides," any dealer who refuses to comply faces
almost certain criminal prosecution. A Newport wholesaler who refused to
withdraw from sale Grace Metalious' Peyton Place after it had been black-
listed by the commission was promptly arrested and indicted for violating
the obscenity statute. 38th ACLU ANN. REp. 13 (1958); Censorship Score-
board, Jan. 1960, p. 6. See State v. Settle, 156 A.2d 921 (R.I. 1959). Ac-
cording to the ACLU, the secretary of the commission defends its "circu-
lation of blacklists to book dealers and police by saying that methods used
in the courts would only flood dockets and delay justice while more smut
was sold and read." 39th ACLU ANN. REP. 16 (1959). See generally, Re-
port of the New York State Joint Legislative Committee Studying the Pub-
lication and Dissemination of Offensive and Obscene Material, No. 85, pp.
22-23, 157-60 (1958).
22. In King County, Washington, the prosecuting attorney created a
'"King County Salacious Literature Committee" with representatives from
the bar association, American Legion, P.T.A., church groups and the vice
squad of the police department. It meets with a representative of the news
wholesalers in the Seattle area, examines magazines to determine whether
they are obscene, and requests the wholesaler to withdraw the offending
magazines from sale or to limit their sale to a certain percentage of retail
outlets away from schools, churches, and playgrounds. After each meeting
a letter-written on the prosecuting attorney's official stationery and
signed by a deputy-is mailed to the news wholesalers, listing the magazines
to be withdrawn from sale or restricted in retail distribution. ACLU, Wash-
ington Chapter, Freedom of Speech Committee, Report of Subcommittee on
Printed Matter, Dec. 16, 1957.
23. See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. King, 168 N.E.2d 633 (Cincinnati
Munic. Ct. 1960). Before 1957, criminal prosecutions of reputable news
dealers were relatively rare and seldom successful. See Lockhart & McClure,
supra note 1, at 309.
24. Sullivan, Cincinnati v. Pornography, 23 Catholic Digest, June 1959,
p. 12.
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Ohio cities formed similar local organizations. In 1958 a statewide
organization was formed,2" and it was not long before similar
groups began to spring up in other parts of the country. 0 A na-
tional organization was formed in February, 1960.7 So far, the
only serious criticism leveled at the CDL has centered on its or-
ganized campaigns to write letters to judges who have obscenity
cases pending before them.2 8
Perhaps as a result of the encouragement given to them by CDL
groups, law enforcement officials all over the country increasingly
resorted to swift police raids, followed by arrest and criminal
prosecution for selling obscene publications. For example, last
year in Indianapolis, Indiana, city police and sheriff's deputies
raided 16 drug stores, a wholesale news dealer's warehouse, a
variety store, and a book store, seizing 1,500 copies of more than
70 magazines.29 The manager of the wholesale news business, the
manager of a chain of drug stores, and 19 retailers were arrested
and charged with selling such allegedly "obscene" publications as
Playboy, National Enquirer, Police Gazette, and Tempo.3 0 After
the arrests some of the retailers closed out their magazine depart-
ments. 1 As might be expected, the local CDL group supported
the raids and arrests. 2
25. ABPC, Censorship Bull., Aug. 1958, p. 6; ACLU, Feature Prcss
Serv., Wkly Bull. 1963, Sept. 22, 1958, p. 1.
26. The Twin Cities Citizens for Decent Literature was organized in
Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota in 1959. Minneapolis Morning Tribune,
Sept. 23, 1959, p. 17, col. 6. For news of the organization of local groups
in other cities, see Citizens for Decent Literature of Greater Cleveland,
Newsnotes (Jan. 1960).
27. Hearings on Circulation of Obscene and Pornographic Material Before
the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, 86th Cong., 2d
Sess. 15 (1960); ABPC, Censorship Bull., June 1960, pp. 2-5.
28.
In some obscenity trials there were evidently CDL-organized cam-
paigns of letters addressed to presiding judges and CDL-"packing" of
courtroom audiences. This technique drew a judicial rebuke in 1958.
"Last April, Municipal Judge Clarence Denning withdrew from an
obscene literature case after an organized letter campaign bombarded
him . .. Judge Frank M. Gusweiler, who took over the case, vigor-
ously criticized pressure groups for attempting to influence the courts."
(Cincinnati Enquirer, 11/4/58)
In 1960, CDL in Indianapolis received a similar rebuke. Municipal
Court Judge Joseph N. Myers had been subject to a similar pressure
campaign and announced that such letters are in effect efforts to in-
timidate or coerce the court, and that their writers could be held in
contempt. Lady members of CDL and St. Agnes High School pupils
had jammed the courtroom; one CDL member kept an attendance
list. (Indianapolis Star, 1/5; Times, 1/4)
ABPC, Censorship Bull., June 1960, p. 3. See also Catholic Universe Bull.,
Feb. 5, 1960, p. 10, col. 2.
29. 39th ACLU ANN. REP. 18 (1959).
30. Hearings, supra note 20, at 16-18.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid. The support took several forms: stimulation of arrests and
[Vol. 45:5
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Criminal prosecutions have an enormous impact upon retail
and wholesale news dealers-reputable businessmen in their com-
munities. The embarrassment and shame of being charged with
the crime of selling obscene literature, added to the trouble and
expense of defending against criminal actions, are enough to terrify
dealers in any community in which the practice of criminal prose-
cution without forewarning has been employed. In Cleveland, we
are informed, only one rather obscure book dealer has dared to
stock the Kronhausens' Pornography and the Law, a serious effort
to define matter that may constitutionally be censored as obscene.'
And in Cincinnati the climate is such that the public library di-
rector refused to accept a copy of Vladimir Nabokov's Lolita, even
as a gift to the library. 4 Perhaps the severe impact of criminal
prosecution, radiating far beyond the particular books and maga-
zines upon which successful prosecutions have been based,' ex-
plains in part why law enforcement officials have made relatively
little use of the injunctive and book libel proceedings that are
available to them in many states.3"
prosecutions; assistance in the preparation of evidence; packing courtrooms
at the trials; and writing letters to judges before whom cases were pending.
39th ACLU ANN. REP. 18 (1959).
33. This information was obtained on January 30, 1960, in a conversa-
tion at Cleveland between Professor McClure and Mr. Howard B. Klein,
President of the City Club of Cleveland, Ohio, and a prominent book
dealer in that city.
34. 39th ACLU ANN. REP. 19-20 (1959).
35. In December, 1958, after a jury found Joseph L. Marshall, Cin-
cinnati's major news wholesaler, guilty of selling the magazines For Men
Only, Escapade, High Life, Gent, Dude, Bachelor, Glance, Pose, Sir!, Men,
Man's Life, Man's Conquest, Real Metz, and Rugged Men, Mr. Marshall
voluntarily discontinued the distribution of Nugget, Scamp, Men for Men,
Rogue, Stag, Playboy, Ace, Modern Man, Sexology, and Sir Annual. Let-
ter from Charles H. Keating, Jr., Chairman of CDL, to Father Paul Bus-
sard, Publisher of the Catholic Digest, Feb. 7, 1959.
36. See text accompanying notes 587-88 infra. So far as we have been
able to determine, there have been only four injunctive or book libel pro-
ceedings instituted since 1956.
An injunctive proceeding was recently instituted in Ohio against the Ma-
honing Valley Distributing Agency to enjoin the distribution of 14 maga-
zines and four books, including Playboy magazine and D. H. Lawrence's
Lady Chatterley's Lover. Censorship Scoreboard, Jan. 1960, p. 6.
In Georgia, the State Literature Commission (see Lockhart & McClure,
supra note 1, at 312-13) obtained an injunction against the sale of the pa-
per-bound novel Turbulent Daughters. 38th ACLU ANN. REP. 12 (1958).
In Illinois, the City of Chicago sought an injunction against a news whole-
saler to restrain distribution of alleged obscene matter, but the superior
court voided the ordinance authorizing the injunction proceedings because
it did not require scienter of the distributor. Note, The Requirement of
Scienter in Obscenity Statutes, 9 DE PAUL L. REv. 250, 253 n. 19 (1960).
And in Kansas City, Missouri, police raided the premises of a news
wholesaler and five retailers, seizing 13,000 copies of 280 publications un-
der a statute authorizing the seizure and destruction of obscene matter with-
out criminal prosecution. A circuit judge later found that 95 of the 280
19601
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As these developments were taking place, the principal target
of censorship changed almost completely. Before 1957, paper-
bound books-most of them reprints of books previously publish-
ed in hard covers-were the object of most concern."7 But as
criminal prosecutions began to replace the use of lists of proscribed
publications-and perhaps also as it became increasingly clear that
works of any genuine value are entitled to constitutional protection
against censorship--the main focus of censorship shifted to girly
magazines and erotic photographs." Only a few paper-bound
books, such as D. H. Lawrence's Lady Chatterley's Lover and
Grace Metalious' Peyton Place, encountered censorship trouble of
any kind. 9 And, as is usual in such cases, the efforts to censor
books boomeranged; Peyton Place is now the second-best seller in
the twentieth century40 and the Postmaster General's tangle with
publications were obscene. ABPC, Censorship Bull., Apr. 1958, p. 3. The
Missouri Supreme Court affirmed his decision. In re Search Warrant of
Property at 5 W. 12th St. v. Marcus, 334 S.W.2d 119 (Mo. 1960).
In New York, when officials by-passed the injunctive proceedings avail-
able to them and instituted criminal proceedings against the Richmond
County News Co., the defendant complained bitterly that it could not be
prosecuted in the absence of a warning or a notice of injunctive proceed-
ings. But the motion to dismiss the information was overruled almost sum-
marily. People v. Richmond County News, Inc., 8 Misc. 2d 162, 167 N.Y.S.
2d 406 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1957). And the defendant was subsequently con-
victed of selling an obscene magazine. People v. Richmond County News,
Inc., 13 Misc. 2d 1068, 179 N.Y.S.2d 76 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1958).
37. Lockhart & McClure, supra note 1, at 302-20.
38. E.g., In re Search Warrant of Property at 5 W. 12th St. v. Marcus
334 S.W.2d 119 (Mo. 1960) (girly magazines); Glanzman v. Christenberry,
175 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (photographs of nude and semi-nudo
women); Klaw v. Schaffer, 151 F. Supp. 534 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd, 251
F.2d 615 (2d Cir. 1958) (bondage photographs). See also ABPC, Censor-
ship Bull., June 1960, p. 1.
According to its chairman, the CDL has not taken any direct action
against books that have reached the best-seller lists. Hearings on Mailing
of Obscene Matter Before Subcommittee No. 1 of the House Committee
on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 75 (1958).
39. In San Mateo County, California, a local NODL group, calling itself
the Citizens Group for Better Reading Material, organized a typical NODL
campaign against such books as Andersonville and Peyton Place. It cn-
countered considerable opposition and the campaign probably didn't last
very long. ABPC, Censorship Bull., April 1958, p. 6; ACLU, Feature
Press Serv., Wkly Bull. 1961, Sept. 8, 1958, p. 2.
In Omaha, Nebraska, three persons were prosecuted and convicted for
selling Peyton Place, but their convictions were reversed on appeal when the
Nebraska Supreme Court ruled the Omaha ordinance under which they
were convicted void for vagueness. ACLU, Feature Press Serv., Wkly Bull.
1940, Mar. 10, 1958, p. 3.
In addition to its trouble with the Postmaster General, see text accom-
panying notes 492-94 and 634-37 infra, Lady Chatterly's Lover encounter-
ed difficulty in Providence, Rhode Island, where police requested druggists
to remove the unexpurgated version of the novel from sale. 1 Inside ACLU,
Oct. 1959, p. 2. See also note 36 supra.
40. ACLU, Feature Press Serv., Wkly Bull. 1940, Mar. 10, 1958, p. 3.
Erskine Caldwell's God's Little Acre still holds first place. Ibid.
[Vol. 45: 5
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Lady Chatterley's Lover sent its sales soaring and set publishers
to quarreling over publication rights and authorized versions of the
book.' The fight, it seems, is no longer so much between the
literati and the Philistines 42 as it is between the libertarians and
the censorious.43
How much the emerging constitutional standards governing the
censorship of publications for obscenity contributed to these
changes in the pattern of censorship is difficult to determine. The
standards thus far established have emerged piecemeal in a series
of decisions and opinions of the United States Supreme Court, and
it is hard to trace a direct causal relationship between those deci-
sions and opinions and the changes in the censorship pattern. Yet
it is equally difficult to avoid drawing the inference that the new
constitutional standards must have contributed to the relative free-
dom from censorship that now exists for both paper-bound and
hard-cover books.
II. THE DECISIONS: THEIR CONTEXT AND IMPACT
A. Tm BUTLER CASE
Butler v. Michigan,44 decided in February, 1957, was the first
case to break the Supreme Court's deadlock over obscenity. The
case began in June, 1954, with the prearranged sale of Griffin's
The Devil Rides Outside by Alfred Butler, Detroit sales manager
for the paper-bound edition's publisher, to Inspector Herbert W.
Case, then chief of Detroit's police censor bureau.' The sale had
been carefully staged to test the constitutionality of a Michigan
obscenity statute,46 which prohibited the sale---even to an adult-
41. Hamalian, The Lady Chatterley Spectacle, 3 Colum. Univ. Forum 8,
13 (Winter 1960); N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1959, p. 9, col. 6; N.Y. Times,
Aug. 1, 1959, p. 9, col. 3; N.Y. Times, July 30, 1959, p. 20, col. 4; N.Y.
Times, July 23, 1959, p. 14, col. 2.
42. Lockhart & McClure, supra note 1, at 343.
43. When works of literary stature are attacked, the literati rise in arms
to protect literature. But when the material under attack is, like girly maga-
zines, lacking in literary value, the literati remain quiescent and only the
strong civil libertarians rise in opposition. In an address at an ACLU con-
ference in May, 1960, Dan Lacy, managing director of ABPC, recom-
mended the ACLU should "concern itself with defending only those pub-
lications having some slight 'redeeming social importance.' Many delegates
disagreed, holding that this would place the burden of proof on the de-
fendant and would narrow rather than broaden freedom of expression."
ACLU, Civil Liberties, May 1960, p. 3.
44. 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
45. ABPC Bull., Censorship Developments, July 20, 1954, p. 1.
46. MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 28.575 (1938). The statute, stripped of some of
its excess verbiage, provided:
Any person who shall . . . sell . . any book . . . or other thing
. containing obscene . . . language, or obscene . . . pictures . . .
or descriptions, tending to incite minors to violent or depraved acts,
1960]
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of any book containing an obscenity that might tend to incite
minors to depraved acts or tend to corrupt their morals.47 Case
promptly arrested Butler48 and the test was on its way.
And as a test case it was a good one. For, as with all paper-
bound books then sold in Detroit,49 the local wholesale news dis-
tributor had submitted a copy of the book to the police censor
bureau in advance of its distribution to retail outlets. In the bu-
reau, police officers searched the book for objectionable words and
passages and then passed the objectionable excerpts on to Inspec-
tor Case, who in turn referred them to an assistant county prose-
cutor for an opinion on whether the book violated the Michigan
statute. 50 The assistant prosecutor, as was his custom, applied a
manifestly tending to the corruption of the morals of youth . . . shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor.
(Emphasis added.) The statute, patterned after a similar Massachusetts
statute, is typical of those in force in a number of states. See Lockhart
& McClure, supra note 1, at 339 nn.303 & 305, and at 343-44 n.321.
47.
A book had been picked as a test for which a finding of obscenity was
probable if one followed the letter of the Michigan statute-which,
as you know, condemns works "containing" objectionable material-
ignoring the content and the purpose of the work as a whole. The prin-
cipal purpose of the case was to provide an opportunity to test the con-
stitutionality of the statute.
Letter From Dan Lacy, Managing Director of ABPC, to Robert C. Mc-
Clure, July 30, 1954.
48. Record, pp. 19-20, Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
49. The Detroit censorship operation is described in Lockhart & Mc-
Clure, supra note 1, at 314-16.
50. At the trial, the prosecution submitted an exhibit of 101 excerpts
from John H. Griffin's, The Devil Rides Outside upon which Inspector
Case based his request for a warrant. Record, pp. 21, 252-94. Typical of the
excerpts were the following:
(Excerpt 6 from Page 3 1)
"These bastards! These ignorant bastards!"
Appellee's Motion to Dismiss Appeal, Appendix "A," Copy of People's Ex-
hibit 2, filed with Defendant's Application for Leave to Appeal to Michi-
gan Supreme Court, p. 2a.(Excerpt 10 from Page 78)
"I think of sleeping warm sleep, with an arm thrown across the soft
belly of my Lucette."
Id. at 3a.
(Excerpt 31 from Page 166)
"I can't make you out, Doctor. One moment you're a mystic, in love
with something intangible to the point of being poetic, and the next
moment you want to get me the worst old whore in the Valley."
Id. at 17a-18a.
(Excerpt 76 from Page 442)
"And tell me, do you think maybe I should try to keep her satisfied
in the meantime? I've never had any sexual experience, I'm just-asking
you."
Id. at 37a.
(Excerpt 81 from Pages 480 and 482)
"She's a fine woman, you know. I hope the bitches will leave her in
peace this time."
Id. at 39a.
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simple test in arriving at his official opinion: if he didn't want his
young daughter to read the book, he decided it was illegal." Ap-
plying this test to The Devil Rides Outside, he found it illegal and
prepared an opinion to that effect. The opinion was then trans-
mitted to the distributor, who withheld the book from distribution
to retail outlets.5 2 And so The Devil Rides Outside joined the
company of the numerous novels that appeared on the Detroit lists
of proscribed books, many of which were the distinguished works
of renowned authors.13
But good as the test case was, it did not make much of an im-
pression upon the judge of the Detroit recorder's court who tried
it. After a trial of several days, he lightly dismissed the consti-
tutional arguments that had been advanced, 4 ruled that sale of
the book violated the Michigan statute,'s found Butler guilty and
51.
'"We're policemen, not censors," Case said .... 'There's a law on
the books that makes it a misdemeanor to distribute any book that
might tend to corrupt the morals of the young. If we think a book fits
that description, we go into action."
Going into action means that the censor bureau submits the book to
John J. Rusinack, assistant prosecutor, for a legal opinion on whether
it violates the statute. f Rusinack agrees, a letter goes to the distributor
warning him that he will distribute the book at his own risk.
Rusinack says he has a simple test for determining whether a book
violated the law.
"If I feel that I wouldn't want my 13-year-old daughter reading it, I
decide it's illegal," Rusinack said. "Mind you, I don't say that it is il-
legal in fact. I merely say that in my opinion it would be a violation of
the law to distribute it. The distributors usually co-operate by withhold-
ing the book."
Detroit News, May 5, 1955, p. 16, col. 1. (Emphasis added.) Since Rusin-
ack's daughter was 13 in May, 1955, she must have been 11 or 12 when
The Devil Rides Outside was submitted to this process.
52. For some reason, Butler's lawyer didn't want these facts brought out
at the trial. By proper objection, he excluded all of them except the ex-
hibit of excerpts from the book. Record, pp. 17-18, 21-23.
53. See Lockhart & McClure, supra note 1, at 319; Memorandum for
Metropolitan Detroit Branch of the American Civil Liberties Union as
Amicus Curiae, pp. 9-12.
54. The court, without analysis or explanation, simply "found" that the
Michigan statute was constitutional and that the state had a right to pass the
statute under its police power for the purpose of protecting the health and
welfare of its citizens and its youth. Record, p. 231.
55. The court found "that the language contained in the book is obscene
and immoral and lewd and lascivious, and is such that it tends to incite
minors to violent or depraved acts, to the corruption of the morals of
youth." Ibid. (Emphasis added.) But further on in its oral opinion the court
muddied the "containing" issue, finding that "even viewing the book as a
whole, it [the objectionable material] was not necessary to the proper
development of the theme of the book nor of the conflict expressed there-
in." Id. at 232. This may explain why the United States Supreme Court
did not reach the "containing" issue, for in the oral argument it became
clear that Mr. Justice Reed believed the trial court had considered the
book as a whole. 25 U.S.L. WEEK 3117 (1956). See note 61 infra. For an
analysis of this constitutional issue, see pp. 88-95 infra.
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fined him $100." In the United States Supreme Court, however,
the constitutional arguments carried greater weight. 7
On his appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Butler con-
tended that the Michigan statute" violated the first and fourteenth
amendments to the Constitution of the United States for three rea-
sons: first, because it prohibited the sale to an adult of a book un-
suitable for minors; second, because its prohibitions were too vague
and indefinite; and, third, because it prohibited the sale of a book
"containing" obscene language and descriptions, thereby preclud-
ing consideration of the book as a whole.59 In a unanimous de-
cision6" the Court reversed Butler's conviction, relying solely upon
Butler's first point to invalidate the statute."' In a brief opinion
by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the Court ruled that the state cannot
quarantine "the general reading public against books not too rug-
ged for grown men and women in order to shield juvenile inno-
cence. Surely, this is to burn the house to roast the pig.""2 Mr.
Justice Frankfurter pointed out that Butler was not convicted for
selling to a child under a narrower Michigan statute 3 specifical-
ly aimed at the sale of obscene material to children." Instead, he
said of the general Michigan obscenity statute:
We have before us legislation not reasonably restricted to the evil with
which it is said to deal. The incidence of this enactment is to reduce
56. Record, p. 232.
57. The case was appealed directly from the decision of the Detroit re-
corder's court because the Michigan Supreme Court denied Butler's applica-
tion for leave to appeal. Id. at 295-96.
58. For the text of the statute, see note 46 supra.
59. Brief for Appellant, p. 6; Jurisdictional Statement, pp. 3-4. For the
state's proposed "Counter-Statement of Questions Presented," see Brief for
Appellee, pp. 4-5.
The Detroit Branch of the American Civil Liberties Union also tried to
raise the prior restraint issue inherent in the Detroit censorship operation.
See Memorandum for Metropolitan Detroit Branch of the American Civil
Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae, pp. 17-18.
60. And an almost unanimous opinion. All but Mr. Justice Black con-
curred in the opinion; he concurred in the result. Butler v. Michigan, 352
U.S. 380, 384 (1957).
61. The Court explicitly by-passed appellant's other two points. Id. at
382.
62. Id. at 383.
63. The Court referred to MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 750.142 & 750.143
(1938). The former prohibits the sale to a minor child of "any book . .. or
other thing, containing obscene language ... or descriptions tending to
the corruption of the morals of youth . . . ." The latter prohibits the ex-
hibition upon "any public street or highway, or in any other place within
the view of children passing on any public street or highway, any book
. or other printed paper or thing containing obscene language . . . or
descriptions tending to the corruption of the morals of youth .. .
64. This point was emphasized in the oral argument before the Court.
Mr. Justice Harlan asked Butler's counsel, "If the statute were limited to
sales to minors you would have a different case?" The counsel replied, "Yes,
and I would have a much harder case." 25 U.S.L. WEEr, 3117 (1956).
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the adult population of Michigan to reading only what is fit for chil-
dren. It thereby arbitrarily curtails one of those liberties of the in-
dividual, now enshrined in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, that history has attested as the indispensible conditions
for the maintenance and progress of a free society.6
Michigan's response to the Butler decision was prompt; within
a few months it repealed the unconstitutional statute and substi-
tuted in its place a typical obscenity statute."' But the Butler de-
cision did not put an end to Detroit's censorship operation, which
continued unabated until publishers secured an injunction that ef-
fectively stopped it.6
Florida's response to Butler was almost as prompt as Michi-
gan's. Within a few days after Michigan had acted, the Florida
legislature amended its basic obscenity statute, which was virtually
a carbon-copy of the unconstitutional Michigan statute.' s The
amendment was very much like Michigan's new statute. 9 Maine,
too, reacted with reasonable dispatch. It repealed its Butler-type
statute and enacted in its place a law prohibiting the sale to minors
under 18 years old of "any pamphlet, magazine, comic book, pic-
ture, picture book which contains fictional illustrations of sadism,
masochism, sexual perversion, bestiality, or lust, or of physical
torture of human beings."7 0 Then, realizing that this left the state
without any general obscenity law governing sales to persons over
65. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383-84 (1957).
66. MicH. STAT. ANN. § 28.575(1) (Supp. 1959). This repealing and
substitutional statute was finally enacted on June 13, 1957.
67. See text accompanying notes 14 & 15 supra. The following year
Michigan's legislature enacted a statute designed to reactivate the system.
MicH. STAT. ANN. § 27.1410 (Supp. 1959). See Publishers' Wkly, May 26,
1958, vol. 173, p. 32.
68. FA. STAT. ANN. § 847.01 (1944).
69. Fla. Laws 1957, ch. 57-779, § 1, at 1103-04. The amendment was
finally enacted June 20, 1957.
The 1957 amendment added a new provision prohibiting sales to minors
under 17 years of age. It prohibits the sale of any book or magazine, among
other things, "the cover or contents of which exploits, openly suggests, or is
partly or wholly devoted to illicit sex or sexual immorality."
Florida's relatively swift action may have been prompted by State v.
Clein, 93 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 1957). In that case, the publisher of Miami Life
was charged with a violation of the old Florida obscenity statute in the pub-
lication of a news item on April 30, 1955, about an incident involving a
white girl and a Negro man. The trial court granted defendant's motion to
quash the information, and the state appealed. While the appeal was pend-
ing, the Butler case was decided. The Florida Supreme Court reversed the
order granting the motion to quash, but one of the justices, in a separate
concurring opinion, pointed out that the reversal was without prejudice to
the defendant's right to challenge the constitutionality of the statute. He
was the only Florida justice to refer to the Butler case.
70. Me. Laws 1957, ch. 321, § 1 at 276. The statute was finally enacted
on August 28, 1957.
19601
MINNESOTA LA W REVIEW
18 years of age, the Maine legislature amended it to prohibit
sale of the described material to any person, regardless of age.71
Other states were much slower to react. Rhode Island and Vir-
ginia put their statutory houses in order only after courts in both
states invalidated Butler-type statutes.7 2 Rhode Island amended
its statute by deleting the unconstitutional phrase "manifestly tend-
ing to the corruption of the morals of youth" to bring it into line
with the Butler decision.73 Virginia repealed its unconstitutional
statute and enacted a comprehensive statute governing obscenity."
Still other states acted as if the Butler case had never been de-
cided. Vermont and West Virginia amended Butler-type statutes
to increase the penalties for violation without troubling to remove
their constitutional infirmities,7" while Iowa, South Carolina, Tex-
as, and Utah have apparently done nothing at all about their un-
constitutional statutes. 6
B. JUNE 24, 1957: THE ROTH, ALBERTS, KINGSLEY BOOKS, AND
ADAMS CASES
Within a few months the two questions that went unanswered
in the Butler case 7 -- and some additional issues not raised in that
case-were resolved in a series of decisions handed down on
June 24, 1957.8
71. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 134, § 24 (Supp. 1959). This amendment
also added films to the list of materials and deletcd the "fictional" require-
ment.
72. The Rhode Island statute was R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 11, § 11-
31-1 (1956). It was held unconstitutional by a superior court judge. Sec 39th
ACLU ANN. REP. 16 (1959).
The Virginia statute, VA. CODE ANN. § 18-113 (1950), was held uncon-
stitutional in Goldstein v. Commonwealth, 200 Va. 25, 104 S.E.2d 66
(1958).
73. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 86, § 1 (Supp. 1959).
74. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.1-227-18.1-236.3 (Supp. 1960). See Com-
ment, 17 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 322, 327-28 (1960).
75. 13 VT. STAT. § 8490 (1947) was amended by Vt. Laws 1957, No. 87,
to permit both fine and imprisonment rather than fine or imprisonment.
See 13 VT. STAT. ANN. § 2801 (1958). W. VA. CODE ANN. § 6066
(1955) was amended by W. Va. Acts 1959, ch. 38, to increase the penalty
for a second violation. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 6060 (Supp. 1960).
The West Virginia statute was saved from total destruction because, in
addition to the unconstitutional phrase "manifestly tending to corrupt the
morals of youth," it spoke of material "tending to corrupt the public mor-
als." The West Virginia Supreme Court severed the statute, upholding the
portion of the statute that prohibited the sale of matter containing ob-
scenity "tending to corrupt the public morals." State v. Miller, 112 S.E.2d
472 (W. Va. 1960).
76. For the statutory references, see Lockhart & McClure, supra note 1,
at 339 n.303.
77. See text accompanying notes 59-61 supra.
78. Roth v. United States [and Alberts v. California], 354 U.S. 476(1957); Adams Newark Theater Co. v. City of Newark, 354 U.S. 931
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1. Roth-Alberts
Samuel Roth, until his most recent conviction, was an experi-
enced dealer in not-very-erotic erotica.79 Among the materials he
advertised and sold through the mails out of New York City were
a monthly magazine called Good Times, A Review of the World
of Pleasure and a quarterly called American Aphrodite, issued in
bound volumes at ten dollars a volume80 After years of investi-
gation by postal inspectors"' a federal grand jury in New York
indicted him, in a 26-count indictment, for violating the federal
statute prohibiting the mailing of obscene matter and advertise-
ments for obscene matter."
(1957); Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957). For an excel-
lent critical analysis of the Roth-Alberts opinions, see Kalven, supra note
5, at 7-28.
79. E.g., in Roth v. Goldman, 172 F.2d 788 (2d Cir. 1949), Roth sought
to enjoin a postmaster from executing five orders excluding certain matter
from the mails. Four of them were fraud orders based upon Roth's mailing
of advertisements fraudulently representing four books to be salacious
when in fact they were not. The fifth order excluded a book entitled Wag-
gish Tales From the Czechs, which the court of appeals described as
a collection of some ninety-six "waggish tales," supposed to have been
brought down to us from another era and another clime, and sold
through the mails at the special discount of $10 from the listed S20
per volume. Our task is not made easier, however, when we discover
them to be American-made or shared smoking room jests and stories,
obscene or offensive enough by any refined standards and only saved,
if at all, by reason of being both dull and well known.
Id. at 789. For an analysis of the case, see Lockhart & McClure, supra
note 1, at 338.
Among the books upon which some of Roth's earlier convictions were
based are James Joyce's Ulysses, Arthur Schnitzler's Reigen, and Sir Richard
Burton's translation of The Perfumed Garden. Brief for Petitioner, pp. 5-6,
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
For an account of Roth's business operations, see MzaKis, THE SILENT
INvEsTIGATORS 289-99 (1959).
80. He also handled various assortments of what appear to have been
nude photographs entitled Wallet Nudes, French Nudes at Play, Stereoptic
Nude Show, and 2 Undraped Stars, as well as the publications NUS, Good
Times, Photo and Body, and something called Chicago Sex-Dimensional
Issue. Record, pp. 2-21.
81. MAxsus, op. cit. supra note 79, at 290-97.
82. Record, pp. 2-21. The pertinent provisions of the statute-62 Stat.
768 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1958) read:
Every obscene . . . book, pamphlet, picture . . . or other publication
of an indecent character; and
Every . . . circular . . . advertisement, or notice of any kind giv-
ing information, directly or indirectly, where, or how, or from whom,
or by what means any of such mentioned . . . things may be obtain-
ed .. .
Is declared to be nonmailable matter and shall not be conveyed in
the mails ....
Whoever knowingly deposits for mailing . . . anything declared by
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At the trial, the court charged the jury in terms reminiscent of
the old Hicklin rule. 3 He told them that the word "obscene" sig-
nified "that form of immorality which has relation to sexual im-
purity and has a tendency to excite lustful thoughts." "The mat-
ter," he said, "must be calculated to corrupt and debauch the
minds and morals of those into whose hands it may fall. It must
tend to stir sexual impulses and lead to sexually impure thoughts."84
Reminiscent though these words were of the old Hicklin rule,
the trial court rejected some of the extreme implications of that
rule. He instructed the jurors that they must judge the material as
a whole, not by detached portions taken out of context, and that
they must determine its effect, not upon any particular class of
persons, but upon the average person in the community. 5 But he
said nothing of the importance of literary or other social values,
which were so strongly emphasized in the famed Ulysses case;"
instead, he encouraged the jurors to ignore literary values and to
return a verdict based upon the literary taste of the unread man. 7
The jury apparently took the court's hint. In a puzzling verdict,
it found Roth guilty on one count involving only American Aph-
rodite, which had considerable literary stature,88 and on two
this section to be nonmailable . . shall be fined not more than
$5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
One of the counts-the 26th-was not for a direct violation of § 1461
but rather for a conspiracy to violate that section. Record, pp. 20-21.
83. Regina v. Hicklin, L.R. 3 Q.B. 360, 371 (1868): "I think the test of
obscenity is this, whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity
is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral
influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall." See
Lockhart & McClure, supra note 1, at 325-29.
84. Record, pp. 25-26.
For an analysis of the problems involved in testing for obscenity by the
effect a book has upon the thoughts of its readers, see Lockhart & Mc-
Clure, supra note 1, at 329-31, 379-82.
85. Record, pp. 25-26.
86. United States v. One Book Entitled "Ulysses," 72 F.2d 705 (2d
Cir. 1934). See Lockhart & McClure, supra note 1, at 327-28, 347-48, 393.
87.
You judge the circulars, pictures and publications which have been put
in evidence by present-day standards of the community. You may ask
yourselves does it offend the common conscience of the community by
present-day standards.
Record, p. 26.
The defendant also introduced in evidence certain books, bestsellers,
and excerpts therefrom, as some evidence of the current reading habits
of the public . . . .You may consider and compare the number of
people who read these books with the number of people who make up
our community, and it may be your judgment that some or all of the
books introduced by the defendant are obscene themselves ...
Id. at 27. In short, don't judge the books by the standards of those who
read books; do judge them by the standards of those who don't.
Roth did not take substantial exception to the charge. See Id. at 29.
88. The particular issue of American Aphrodite was volume 1, number 3,
as correctly stated in count 24; the reference to "Number Thirteen" in
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counts involving advertisements for American Aphrodite and other
material, but acquitted him on all counts involving assortments
of nude photographs bearing such alluring titles as French Nudes
at Play. 9 Then the court sentenced him to five years and $5,-
000. And the court of appeals, with Judge Frank's reluctant
concurrence,91 affirmed Roth's conviction.92
In the United States Supreme Court Roth raised eight issues,
four of which were important and four trivial. 3 The four im-
count 17 appears to be a typographical error. See Record, pp. 19 & 15
respectively.
Among the distinguished authors whose works appeared in the issue were
Herbert Ernest Bates, perhaps best known in the United States for The
Purple Plain, Rhys Davis, whose The Trip to London delighted thousands
of its readers, Pierre Louys, famous for Aphrodite, and Edwin Beresford
Chanceller, author of The Lives of the Rakes and many other historical
works. Here, too, were pieces by Harold Alfred Manhood, John Cournos,
Patrick Kirwan, Henry Miller, and Harry Roskolenko (Colin Ross).
In England, D. Val Baker criticized the Postmaster General's earlier ex-
clusion of American Aphrodite from the United States mail, pointing out
the genuine literary quality of its contents. Baker, Aphrodite in Trouble,
168 Publishers' Circular and Booksellers' Record 924 (1954).
89. Record, pp. 1-19; Brief for the United States in Opposition, pp.
12-13.
The count involving only American Aphrodite was count 24. The counts
involving advertisements for American Aphrodite and other material includ-
ed circulars advertising the magazines Good Times and, in one of the
counts, Photo and Body; these were counts 10 and 17. The Record does
not show that the advertisement for American Aphrodite was included in
count 10; this fact appears in the government's brief in opposition. The jury,
however, acquitted Roth on three counts involving Photo and Body and on
12 counts involving Good Times. It also acquitted Roth on 2 counts in-
volving advertisements for American Aphrodite. Record, pp. 1-19.
There was a fourth count on which the jury found Roth guilty-count 13.
This count involved only an advertisement for Good Times, vol. 1, no. 8.
But the jury acquitted Roth on a count for mailing that particular issue
and also acquitted him on numerous counts for mailing other advertise-
ments for the magazine. Id. at 1-19.
Since the count involving only American Aphrodite included both the
book itself and advertisements for it, the sole element of consistency in
the verdict is the conclusion that the book itself was obscene.
90. Id. at 1-2.
91. See Professor Kalven's delightful twin-review of Judge Frank's appen-
dix to his concurring opinion and of St. John-Steras' Obscenity and the Law.
27 Library Quarterly 201 (1957). Judge Frank doubted the constitution-
ality of the statute and invited Supreme Court review, but believed that
"since ours is an inferior court, we should not hold invalid a statute which
our superior has thus often said is constitutional (albeit without any full dis-
cussion)." United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796, 804 (2d Cir. 1956).
92. United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1956).
93. The four trivial issues were petitioner's questions 4-7. See Petition
for a Writ of Certiorari, p. 2. They dealt with such matters as the district
attorney's argument to the jury, the admission of evidence procured by post-
al inspectors who used aliases in responding to Roth's advertisements, and
the trial court's instructions to the jury. See United States v. Roth, 237 F.
2d 796, 799-801 (2d Cir. 1956) for the court of appeals' summary disposi-
tion of most of these questions.
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portant issues were whether the federal obscenity statute"4 vio-
lated the freedom of speech and press guarantees of the first
amendment, was too vague to meet the requirements of the due
process clause of the fifth amendment, improperly invaded the
powers reserved to the states and the people by the first, ninth,
and tenth amendments, and, finally, whether the publications con-
sidered as a whole were obscene. 5 Of these issues, Roth belabored
only the first three;" he advanced so perfunctory an argument on
the last" that the government did not respond to it." With the
case in this posture, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court
disregarded the trivial issues and, in granting a writ of certiorari,
limited the writ to the first three of the four important issues that
were raised, eliminating from the case any consideration of the
application of the statute to American Aphrodite.9
94. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1948). For the relevant text of the statute, see
note 81 supra.
95. These were petitioner's questions 1-3 and 8. See Petition for a Writ
of Certiorari, pp. 2-3.
96. See id. at 12-32.
97. Roth's argument on this question consisted of little more than the
bare assertions that American Aphrodite was not obscene, that the publica-
tions in the case contained nothing objectionable, and that the jurors could
not have read the entire volume of American Aphrodite before reaching a
verdict. See id. at 55-57; Petitioner's Reply Brief, pp. 2-3.
98. The Brief for the United States in Opposition countered all of Roth's
arguments on the other issues but said not a word on this one. Perhaps the
government recognized that this was its most vulnerable point in the case
and so ignored it in the hope that it would be overlooked; for, surely, had
the question been squarely met and argued, the government's position would
have appeared only slightly less ridiculous than that of the Postmaster Gen-
eral in his attempts to censor Aristophanes' Lysistrata. See note 88 supra
for a description of the literary stature of American Aphrodite's contents.
99. It is clear that, despite his literary pretensions, Roth was caught at
the trial with his literary breeches down and never managed to pull them up
again-if indeed they had ever been up in the first place.
For example, the particular volume of American Aphrodite in issue at
the trial contained Aubrey Beardsley's Venus and Tannhauser, also known
as Under the Hill. At the trial the government introduced, apparently with-
out objection, a copy of Haldane MacFall's biography of Aubrey Beards-
ley. In the book, MacFall, a British army officer who liked to write on the
side, chastised the "jackals" who had "egged him (Beardsley) on to base
ends and . . . sniggered at his obscenities" and who, after Beardsley's
death, published works he had been trying to keep from publication during
his lifetime. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, pp. 52-53. The government
used the book in its cross-examination of Roth and in its summation to the
jury, in an effort to establish that Beardsley's Venus and Tannhauser was
somehow a shamefully obscene work and that its other title-Under the
Hill-was further evidence of that fact. Id. at 52-53.
All of this caught Roth flat-footed; the best he could do in response was
to argue that the government's conduct was so inflammatory and prejudi-
cial as to deprive him of a fair trial. Id. at pp. 51-55; Petitioner's Reply
Brief, pp. 5-6. He made no effort to point out that Beardsley's Under the
Hill and Other Essays in Prose and Verse was first published in 1903 by
John Lane of London, and by Dodd, Mead and Company of New York, and
that it has been reprinted at least three times since then-in 1912, 1921, and
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The Alberts case wound up in the United States Supreme Court
in almost identical posture, though of course it arrived there by a
different route.
David S. Alberts and his wife, Violet E. Stanard Alberts, op-
erated a mail order business in Los Angeles.' °° Unlike Roth, they
had no literary pretentions whatever: although they handled a
number of the Haldemann-Julius booklets, some of which had re-
deeming social value,"'1 they apparently specialized in bizarre
1928. Nor did he make any use of Arthur Symons' account of how Under
the Hill was written and first published.
In his short biography of Beardsley, Symons-the distinguished English
poet-describes how he first met Beardsley in 1895 and how in that year
Beardsley worked on the piece in the Casino at Dieppe:
He was at the work then, with an almost pathetic tenacity, at his story,
never to be finished, the story which never could have been finished,
Under the Hill, a new version, a parody (like Laforgue's parodies, but
how unlike them, or anything!) of the story of Venus and Tann-
hauser. . . . The fragment published in the first two numbers of the
Savoy had passed through many stages before it found its way there,
and would have passed through more if it had ever been carried fur-
ther. Tannhauser, not quite willingly, had put on Abbe's disguise, and
there were other unwilling disguises in those brilliant, disconnected, fan-
tastic pages, in which every sentence was meditated over, written for
its own sake, and left to find its way in its own paragraph. It could
never have been finished, for it had never really been begun; but what
undoubted, singular, literary ability there is in it, all the same!
SYMONS, AuBREY BEARDSLEY 9-10 (1898). See also note 88 supra, for
some indication of the literary stature of most of the authors whose works
appeared in the volume.
Although in this posture of the case it is not surprising that the Court did
not include the question of the obscenity of American Aphrodite in its grant
of the writ of certiorari, it is astonishing-perhaps even disconcerting-
that of the 13 judges involved in the case only one, Mr. Justice Harlan,
recognized that American Aphrodite was not in fact pornographic. See
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 508 (1957). Chief Judge Clark of
the Court of Appeals observed:
We can understand all the difficulties of censorship of great litera-
ture, and indeed the various foolish excesses involved in the banning of
notable books, without feeling justified in casting doubt upon all crnmi-
nal prosecutions, both state and federal, of commercialized obscenity. A
serious problem does arise when real literature is censored; but in this
case no such issues should arise, since the record shows only salable
pornography.
Roth v. United States, 237 F.2d 796, 798-99 (2d Cir. 1956).
100. Record, pp. 100-02, Alberts v. California, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). Al-
berts was in charge of the business and supervised and directed his wife's
activities.
Mr. and Mrs. Alberts had for some time been carrying on a running bat-
tie with the Post Office Department under Mrs. Alberts' maiden name, Vio-
let Stanard. See Stanard v. Olesen, 121 F. Supp. 607 (S.D. Cal. 1954),
application to enjoin temporary impounding order denied 74 Sup. Ct. 768
(1954); Olesen v. Stanard, 227 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1955).
101. Among the choice titles were Homosexual Life, Wild Women of
Broadway, Confessions of a Minister's Daughter, and Petting as an Erotic
Exercise. Record, pp. 25-28, 107. But the list also included Gautier's
Fleece of Gold.
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photographs of nude and scantily-clad women." 2 After deputy
sheriffs, armed with a search warrant, raided the Alberts' office
and warehouse and seized hundreds of items,'0 ' the Alberts were
charged with lewdly keeping obscene materials for sale and adver-
tising obscene materials in violation of the California obscenity
statute.1 14 They were tried, without a jury, in the Beverly Hills
municipal court, which found Mr. Alberts guilty, sentenced him
to 60 days and $500, and put him on probation for two years.105
Mrs. Alberts, because she acted under her husband's direction,
was acquitted.' The appellate department of the superior court,
in a brief opinion, affirmed Alberts' conviction.0 7
102. Most of these were sado-masochistic photographs commonly known
as bondage and torture pictures. Id. at 27-28, 39-40. Others were of Hol-
stein-like women; the trial judge described one of them:
There is another one of a nude girl facing the camera, and there is a
table or a counter before her on which there are two champagne
glasses, and she has one breast in each of the two glasses-large breasts.
Id. at 91. In addition, the Alberts handled a number of sado-masochistic
books bearing such titles as Memoirs of a Spankee and Slaves of the Lash.
Id. at 55. See Brief for Appellee, pp. 49-59, for a description of the various
materials handled by the Alberts.
103. Record, pp. 24-42.
104. Id. at 1-3. They were also charged with keeping obscene recordings
for sale and with being lewd and dissolute persons, but these charges were
dismissed for lack of proof. Id. at 80.
The relevant provisions of the California obscenity statute read:
Every person who wilfully and lewdly, either:
3. . . . keeps for sale, or exhibits any obscene or indecent writing,
paper, or book . . . or
4. . . . publishes any notice or advertisement of any such writing,
paper, book, picture, print or figure;
6." ." .'. is guilty of a misdemeanor.
CAL. PEN. CODE ANN. § 311 (1955).
105. Record, pp. 5, 117-18.
The standards applied by the trial court in finding Alberts guilty are not
altogether clear, for nothing was said about them at that time. Id. at pp.
116-17. On an earlier motion to dismiss, the court addressed itself to Al-
berts' trial brief and engaged in a rambling account of standards for deter-
mining obscenity that ranged from dictionary definitions of "obscene" and
"indecent," through the Hicklin rule, to the Ulysses case. The court also
spoke of People v. Wepplo, 78 Cal. App. 2d 959, 178 P.2d 853 (1947), in
which the standard was said to be whether the material "has a substantial
tendency to deprave or corrupt its reader by inciting lascivious thoughts or
arousing lustful desires." Record, pp. 80-83, Alberts v. California, 354 U.S.
476 (1957). But the court did not give any clear indication of the particular
standard it employed in ruling on the motion. See id. at 83-93.
If, as the United States Supreme Court thought (354 U.S. at 486), the
trial court applied the test laid down in People v. Wepplo, 78 Cal. App. 2d
959, 178 P.2d 853 (1947), additional similarities between the Roth and Al-
berts cases appear; for the court in the Wepplo case rejected the "extreme"
"liberality" of the Ulysses standard and disregarded literary values. Id. at
962, 178 P.2d at 856. See notes 86 & 87 supra and accompanying text for
other similarities.
106. Record, pp. 117-18.
107. People v. Alberts, 138 Cal. App. 2d 909, 292 P.2d 90 (1955).
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On appeal to the United States Supreme Court Alberts had
trouble framing his issues. In his Jurisdictional Statement he set
out two: (1) whether the statute "upon its face and as construed
and applied" violated "procedural and substantive due process of
law" and abridged "freedom of speech, press and thought" and
(2) whether the statute "as applied here to the mailing of circulars
and the keeping of books for sale by mail" infringed on an area
pre-empted by the federal government.' In his Brief for the Ap-
pellant, however, Alberts rephrased the first issue so as to present
three grounds for his contention that the statute "on its face and
as construed and applied" violated the first and fourteenth
amendments. These grounds were: (1) that the statute prohibited
"books fairly within the area protected by the freedom of speech
and press provisions of the Constitution, particularly when the le-
gality of the book is measured by its effect upon the thoughts and
desires of its readers," (2) that the statutory provisions were "so
elastic and far reaching as to encompass virtually all literature and
art, thus giving censorial control of free expression to the trier of
fact," and (3) that the statute was unconstitutionally vague."°
Despite the opportunity open to him to challenge the application
of the statute to the materials actually involved in the case, Alberts
did not do so until it was too late;" indeed, almost to the very
last, he disclaimed raising that issue."'
So both the Alberts and Roth cases reached the United States
Supreme Court at a very high level of abstraction-a level so high
that the facts of the two cases had become literally irrelevant. And
both were argued on this level."'
Seen in this light, the basic issues before the Court were wheth-
er the federal and California obscenity statutes, on their faces and
in a vacuum, violated the freedom of expression guarantees and
the definiteness requirements of the United States Constitution.'
108. Jurisdictional Statement, pp. 4-5.
109. Brief for Appellant, p. 7.
110. Only in his reply brief did Alberts advance any argument that the
books he handled were not obscene. Appellant's Reply Brief, pp. 19-20.
Apparently his argument came too late to merit the Court's consideration.
See Alberts v. California, 354 U.S. 479, 481 n.8 (1957).
111. In his principal brief, Alberts stated:
The statute, as we shall endeavor to demonstrate, is so broad in
scope as to permit a limitless inhibition of speech and press. Conse-
quently, we do not actually reach the question of "particular applica-
tion."
Id. at 31. Then, in a footnote, Alberts denied any concession that the ma-
terials in the case were obscene. Id. at 31 n.8. See also note 110 supra.
112. An exception is Albert's belated contention that some of the books
he handled were not obscene. Ibid.
113. We dismiss, as irrelevant to our subject, the federalism issue raised
in the cases. For the Court's summary disposition of this issue, see Roth
v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 492-94 (1957).
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But it is hard to decide cases in a vacuum, without relation to
their factual settings, though the Court sometimes for good reasons
has done so," 4 and the Department of Justice moved swiftly to
bring the cases down to earth again.
In his brief for the United States, the Solicitor General set up
three categories of material "actually caught in the net of the fed-
eral obscenity statute.""' 5 The first category, he said, comprised
"novels of apparently serious literary intent," like Henry Miller's
Tropic of Cancer and Tropic of Capricorn, caught because "they
concentrate on explicit discussion of sex conduct in a vocabulary
based on four-letter words." They constitute less than two per cent
of the items for which persons are convicted under the statute.1
The second category he described as borderline material, pri-
marily photographic, that accounted for less than 10 per cent of
matter caught in the statute's net."' The final category, consti-
tuting 90 per cent of the total encompassed by the statute, com-
prised what he described as "black-market" or "hard-core" por-
nography-erotic objects and books, pamphlets, photographs, and
motion pictures depicting normal and abnormal sexual activity. 18
Then, to make sure that the Court understood what he meant by
"hard-core pornography," the Solicitor General sent to the Court a
carton containing numerous samples of actual hard-core pornog-
raphy. 9
This must have brought the cases back to earth abruptly, and
it must also have assured a decision favorable to the constitu-
tionality of both the federal and the California obscenity statutes.
For hard-core pornography is so foul and revolting that few people
can contemplate the absence of laws against it-that would be un-
thinkable. But, in returning to earth the cases landed on ground
from which they had not taken off.'
This was the setting in which the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the federal and California obscenity statutes
114. Note, United States Supreme Court's Rules of Sell-Limitation As
Applied to the Fundamental Rights of the First Amendment, 33 MINN. L.
REV. 390 (1949).
115. Brief for the United States, p. 34.
116. Id. at 35.
117. Id. at 35-37.
118. Id. at 37-39.
119. Letter From the Solicitor General to the Clerk of the United States
Supreme Court, April 19, 1957; Lewis, Censorship Limited in "Obscenity"
Cases, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1958, § E, p. 9, col. 6.
120. There was little or no evidence in either case of hard-core por-
nography, though Alberts must have come at least very close to the line
with his sado-masochistic books and pictures. See note 102 supra. The So-
licitor General conceded that Roth's material fell only into the second catc-
gory-borderline matter-and did not claim that any of it amounted to
hard-core pornography. Brief for the United States, p. 36.
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and, without passing on the merits of the materials actually in-
volved in either case, 2' affirmed the convictions of both Roth
and Alberts. The statutes, the court held, did not violate the free-
dom of expression and definiteness requirements of the United
States Constitution.' "
In the Roth-Alberts majority opinion,' Mr. Justice Brennan
wrote that "obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally pro-
tected speech or press"' 4 because obscenity is "utterly without
redeeming social importance."'"m But he went on to point out
that "sex and obscenity are not synonymous . . . [and the] por-
trayal of sex, e.g., in art, literature and scientific works . . . [is
entitled to] the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and
press"''" so long as it does not fall into the category of obscenity.
Stressing the importance of sex as a "subject of absorbing interest
to mankind through the ages" and "one of the vital problems of
human interest and public concern,"'' 7 Mr. Justice Brennan con-
cluded: "It is therefore vital that the standards for judging ob-
scenity safeguard the protection of freedom of speech and press
for material which does not treat sex in a manner appealing to
prurient interest."''
The opinion thus sought to separate protected from unprotected
material by use of the term "obscenity" as the label for the un-
protected. It then set up as an approved test for obscenity "whether
to the average person, applying contemporary community stand-
ards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals
to prurient interest.' ' 9
Each of the four Justices who did not join in the majority opin-
ion agreed with the majority that the freedom of expression guar-
antees of the Constitution applied to material relating to sex. But
Justices Douglas and Black, dissenting in both cases, argued
against all-obscenity censorship except where it can be demon-
121. "No issue is presented in either case concerning the obscenity of
the material involved." Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481 n.8(1957).
122. Id. at 492. The Court also held, in Roth, that the power to punish
obscenity is not vested exclusively in the states and, in Alberts, that the fed-
eral government had not so pre-empted the area as to preclude California's
punishment of persons keeping obscene material for sale, or for advertising
it through the mails. Id. at 492-94. See note 113 supra.
123. By Mr. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Frankfurter, Burton,
Clark, and Whittaker.
124. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
125. Id. at 484.
126. Id. at 487.
127. Ibid.
128. Id. at 488.
129. Id. at 489.
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strated that "the particular publication has an impact on action
that the government can control." '
Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring in Alberts but dissenting in
Roth, wanted to limit federal obscenity censorship strictly to hard-
core pornography'3' but to grant the states somewhat broader
censorship powers, the limits of which he did not spell out."'
And he made very clear his genuine concern for effective consti-
tutional protection against both federal and state obscenity cen-
sorship, persuasively objecting that the majority's approach would
result in insulating the crucial issue in obscenity cases from inde-
pendent constitutional judgment by entrusting the fact finder with
the responsibility of determining whether particular material is
"obscene."'13 3 He argued that reviewing courts, including the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court, must determine for themselves by inde-
pendent perusal of the material "whether the attacked expression
is suppressible within constitutional standards. 134 Then, practic-
ing what he preached, Mr. Justice Harlan examined the materials
involved in both cases; in Roth he found that the material fell
short of hard-core pornography and so voted to reverse Roth's
conviction, 135 but in Alberts he concluded that the material was
such that its suppression would not so "interfere with the commu-
nication of 'ideas' in any proper sense of that term" as to offend
130. Id. at 511.
131. See text accompanying note 118 supra.
132. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 500-08 (1957).
The danger is perhaps not great if the people of one State, through
their legislature, decide that "Lady Chatterley's Lover" goes so far be-
yond the acceptable standards of candor that it will be deemed offen-
sive and non-sellable, for the State next door is still free to make its
own choice. At least we do not have one uniform standard. . . The
fact that the people of one State cannot read some of the works of
D. H. Lawrence seems to me, if not wise or desirable, at least accept-
able. But that no person in the United States should be allowed to do so
seems to me to be intolerable, and violative of both the letter and
spirit of the First Amendment.
Id. at 506.
133. Id. at 497-98. Mr. Justice Harlan illustrated his point that the de-
termination of censorable obscenity is "not really an issue of fact but a con-
stitutional judgment of the most sensitive and delicate kind," by the follow-
ing comment, which also suggested the narrow bounds within which ho
would confine censorship:
Many juries might find that Joyce's "Ulysses" or Bocaccio's "Decamer-
on" was obscene, and yet the conviction of a defendant for selling ei-
ther book would raise, for me, the gravest constitutional problems, for
no such verdict could convince me, without more, that these books are
"utterly without redeeming social importance."
Id. at 498.
134. Id. at 497. For discussion of the scope of judicial review, see pp.
114-20 infra.
135. Id. at 508. See notes 80, 88 & 99 supra for a description of the ma-
terial involved in Roth.
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due process, and agreed with the Court in its affirmance of Al-
berts' conviction. 36
Chief Justice Warren, in a short opinion concurring in result,
revealed that he would give some constitutional protection to ma-
terial relating to sex, but he did not disclose what constitutional
standard he would apply. The central issue in obscenity cases, he
wrote, is not "the obscenity of a book or picture" but the "con-
duct of the defendant."'37 '"The nature of the materials is, of
course, relevant as an attribute of the defendant's conduct, but the
materials are thus placed in context from which they draw color
and character. A wholly different result might be reached in a dif-
ferent setting. ' 13' He voted to affirm the convictions of both
Roth and Alberts because they "were engaged in the business of
purveying textual or graphic matter openly advertised to appeal to
the erotic interest of their customers" and "were plainly engaged in
the commercial exploitation of the morbid and shameful craving
for materials with prurient effect.' 39 It seems clear that, when a
defendant's conduct is not personally reprehensible, Chief Justice
Warren would give constitutional protection to sexual materials. 4
2. Kingsley Books
In the Kingsley Books case the New York City corporation
counsel sued to enjoin Kingsley and several other book dealers
from selling a series of obscene books appropriately entitled Nights
of Horror.'' The trial court found the books obscene and grant-
ed the injunctions, but carefully limited the decree to the volumes
136. Id. at 503. See notes 101 & 102 supra for a description of the ma-
terial involved in Alberts.
137. Id. at 495.
138. Ibid.
139. Id. at 495-96.
140.
[The social problem presented by obscenity] does not require that we
sustain any and all measures adopted to meet that problem. The history
of the application of laws designed to suppress the obscene demon-
strates convincingly that the power of government can be invoked un-
der them against great art or literature, scientific treatises, or works
exciting social controversy. Mistakes of the past prove that there is a
strong countervailing interest to be considered in the freedoms guar-
anteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Id. at 495.
We surmise, for example, that the Chief Justice would give constitu-
tional protection to Haldeman-Julius were he ever to be prosecuted for
publishing the booklets handled by Alberts. See Time, Aug. 15, 1960, p. 38
for an account of the Haldeman-Julius enterprise.
141. Record, pp. 7-9, Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436
(1957).
The proceedings were instituted under New York Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure, § 22-a, which provided for post-publication injunctions (after a ju-
dicial hearing) against obscene matter.
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already published.14 The New York Court of Appeals unani-
mously affirmed the judgment.14
In the United States Supreme Court, as in the New York
Court of Appeals, the sole issue was whether the statute imposed
an unconstitutional prior restraint upon publications.", Kings-
ley and the other book dealers did not challenge the trial court's
finding that the books were in fact obscene;'45 indeed, they could
scarcely have done so, for the books clearly fell into the category
of hard-core pornography. " 6 The Court, in a five-to-four de-
cision, 47 sustained the statute but added nothing of importance
to the central problem with which this article is concerned-the
standards for determining what materials are constitutionally sub-
ject to obscenity censorship.
3. Adams Newark Theatre
In Newark, New Jersey, the city's director of public safety had
trouble with burlesque shows. He once, without a hearing and
without evidence of what kind of show the Adams Theatre would
put on, denied Adams' application for a license to operate a bur-
lesque theatre. When the New Jersey courts firmly put a stop to
that practice, 4 ' the city fathers amended the city's ordinances to
142. Record, pp. 13-14; Burke v. Kingsley Books, Inc., 208 Misc. 150,
142 N.Y.S.2d 735 (1955).
143. Brown v. Kingsley Books, Inc., 1 N.Y.2d 177, 134 N.E.2d 461
(1956).
144. Statement as to Jurisdiction, p. 2; Brief of Appellant, p. 4. See
Brown v. Kingsley Books, Inc., 1 N.Y.2d 177, 180, 134 N.E.2d 461, 462
(1956). When the New York Civil Liberties Union sought to inject issues
of vagueness and of clear and probable danger, Brief for the New York Civil
Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae, pp. 3-6, appellants repudiated these is-
sues. Supplemental Brief of Appellants, pp. 6-7.
145. Supplemental Brief of Appellants, pp. 6-7.
146. The trial court-Justice Matthew M. Levy-gave the following de-
scription of the books:
"Nights of Horror" makes but one "contribution" to literature. It
serves as a glossary of terms describing the private parts of the human
body . . . the emotions sensed in illicit sexual climax and various forms
of sadistic, masochistic and sexual perversion . . . . Perverted sexual
acts and macabre tortures of the human body are repeatedly depicted
... . These gruesome acts included such horrors as cauterizing a wo-
man's breast with a hot iron . . . completely singeing away the body
hairs . . . ringing the nipples of the breast with needles . . . Sucking
a victim's blood was pictured . . . and putting honey on a girl's
breasts, vagina and buttocks-and then putting hundreds of great red
ants on the honey.
Burke v. Kingsley Books, Inc. 208 Misc. 150, 158-59, 142 N.Y.S.2d 735,
742-43 (1955). And these, Justice Levy added, were not the "most sordid
features" of the books. Id. at 159, 142 N.Y.S.2d at 743.
147. Mr. Chief Justice Warren, and Justices Brennan, Black, and Doug-
las dissented. Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 445-48 (1957).
148. See Adams Theater Co. v. Keenan, 12 N.J. 267, 96 A.2d 519
(1953), opinion by Mr. Justice Brennan.
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prohibit "lewd, obscene, or indecent" shows and performances,1 49
specifying in detail a number of forbidden acts.' ° Adams and I.
H-irst Enterprises, both of whom operated licensed burlesque the-
aters in Newark, sought a declaratory judgment that the amended
ordinances were unconstitutional.' They won on a motion for
summary judgment in the state superior court, 52 but lost on
appeal to the New Jersey Supreme Court, which upheld the con-
stitutionality of the ordinances. 53
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the appellants
raised two issues-vagueness and freedom of expression.' And
once again these issues were presented to the court at a high level
of abstraction, 5 5 for Adams and Hirst had instituted their action
before the city had made any attempt to enforce the ordi-
nances.' The Court, in a brief per curiam decision, summarily
affirmed the judgment of the New Jersey Supreme Court, citing
only the Kingsley, Roth, and Alberts casesY"
And so on this last Monday in June, 1957 the censors enjoyed
a clean sweep. Those who favored censorship were understandably
encouraged by the day's decisions; they saw in them a victory for
the cause of decency and looked forward to a rosy future for cen-
149. The amended ordinances applied to theater licensees and perform-
ers. Statement as to Jurisdiction, pp. 26-31, Adams Newark Theater Co. v.
City of Newark, 354 U.S. 931 (1957).
150. They were:
The removal by a female performer in the presence of the audience
of her clothing, so as to make nude, or give the illusion of nudeness, of
the lower abdomen, genital organs, buttocks or breasts;
The exposure by a female performer in the presence of the audi-
ence, or the giving of the illusion of nudeness in the presence of the
audience, of the lower abdomen, genital organs, buttocks or breasts;
The exposure by a male performer in the presence of the audience
of the genital organs or buttocks;
The use by a performer of profane, lewd, lascivious, indecent or dis-
gusting language;
The performance of any dance, episode, or musical entertainment,
the purpose of which is to direct the attention of the spectator to the
breasts, buttocks or genital organs of the performer.
Id. at 4.
151. Statement of Appellees Opposing Jurisdiction and Motion to Dis-
miss or Affirm, pp. 2-3.
152. Adams Newark Theatre Co. v. City of Newark, 39 N.J. Super. 11,
120 A.2d 496 (L. 1956).
153. Adams Newark Theatre Co. v. City of Newark, 22 NJ. 472, 126
A.2d 340 (1956).
154. Statement as to Jurisdiction, p. 5.
155. See text accompanying notes 112-13 supra.
156. See Statement of Appellees Opposing Jurisdiction and Motion to
Dismiss or Affirm, p. 2.
157. Adams Newark Theater Co. v. City of Newark, 354 U.S. 931
(1957). Justices Black and Douglas dissented; Mr. Chief Justice Warren
wanted to note probable jurisdiction and to set the case for argument. Mr.
Justice Brennan did not participate.
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sorship of obscene materials.' But others-mostly law students
commenting in law reviews-took a more jaundiced view of the
decisions; some of them thought the Court's verbal formula for
determining what is obscene, as stated in the Roth and A lberts
opinion, 5 9 was far too vague and feared that "censors will have
a field day as a result of this decision."'' 0 Both were mistaken,
for the Court promptly began to demonstrate that it had really
placed very tight limits on what constitutionally may be censored
as obscene.' 6'
C. THE PER CURIAM DECISIONS: 1957 TERM
In the next term of court-the October, 1957 term-the United
States Supreme Court, in a series of per curiam decisions, disposed
of four cases presented to it on mundane levels far below the
level of the high-flown abstractions raised in Roth, Alberts, and
Adams.' Citing only Roth or Alberts the Court reversed without
opinion four United States Court of Appeals decisions that had
upheld obscenity censorship of: (1) the motion picture, The
Game of Love,' (2) an imported collection of nudist and art-
158. Msgr. Thomas E. Fitzgerald, executive secretary of the NODL,
hailed the Court's action, saying, "The cause of decency has been strength-
ened," and Postmaster General Arthur Summerfield declared, "The Post
Office Department welcomes the decision of the Supreme Court as a for-
ward step in the drive to keep obscene materials out of the mails." The
Wanderer, July 3, 1957, p. 6, col. 3. See also Text of Catholic Bishops' Plan
to Fight Obscenity, N.Y. Times, November 17, 1957, p. 58, col. 1. The
Christian Century reported that censors had been encouraged by the Court's
decision. 74 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 836 (1957).
159. See text accompanying note 129 supra.
160. Summers, Constitutional Protection of Obscene Material Against
Censorship as Correlated with Copyright Protection of Obscene Material
Against Infringement, 31 So. CAL. L. REV. 301, 306 (1958). See also 7 DE
PAUL L. REV. 111, 113 (1957); 60 W. VA. L. REV. 89 (1957)..
161. See Lewis, supra note 119.
162. See text accompanying notes 112-13 & 155 supra.
163. Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 355 U.S. 35, reversing 244
F.2d 432 (7th Cir. 1957). The court of appeals described "The Game of
Love" as follows:
[The thread of the story is supercharged with a series of illicit sexual
intimacies and acts . .. [A] flying start is made when a 16 year old
boy is shown completely nude on a bathing beach in the presence of a
group of younger girls [as a result of a boating accident]. Op that
plane the narrative proceeds to reveal the seduction of this boy by a
physically attractive woman old enough to be his mother. Under the
influence of this experience and an arrangement to repeat it, the boy
thereupon engages in sexual relations with a girl of his own age. The
erotic thread of the story is carried, without deviation toward any
wholesome idea, through scene after scene. The narrative is graphi-
cally pictured with nothing omitted except those sexual consummations
which are plainly suggested but meaningfully omitted and thus, by the
very fact of omission, emphasized.
244 F.2d 432, 436. (Emphasis added.)
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student publications containing many nude photographs," (3)
One-The Homosexual Magazine,"s and (4) Sunshine & Health
and Sun Magazine."8
164. Mounce v. United States, 355 U.S. 180, reversing 247 F.2d 148
(9th Cir. 1957). The court of appeals, in a forfeiture proceeding against
the publications, adopted as its own the opinion of the district court, which
had found the text unobjectionable but the publications "obscene" appar-
ently because the photographs placed too much emphasis upon front views
of nudes:
Although an avowed purpose of the books is to explain the nudist
movement, its principles, and its practices, there are relatively very few
photographs of the mixed groups of all ages which ordinarily would be
found in a nudist park. The great preponderance of the illustrations de-
picts shapely, well-developed young women appearing in the nude.
mostly in front exposures.
United States v. 4200 Copies Int'l Journal, 134 F. Supp. 490, 494 (E.D.
Wash. 1955). Similarly, the issues of Modelstudier, "ostensibly" an artist's
publication, were apparently found obscene because they "contain[ed]
many large closeup, full front-view photographs of nude men and women,
plainly showing the genital and pubic areas."
165. One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958), reversing 241 F.2d 772
(9th Cir. 1957). The court of appeals had sustained a postal order finding
One-The Homosexual Magazine non-mailable because "obscene." The lat-
ter court observed that the magazine did not live up to its "purpose of deal-
ing primarily with homosexuality from the scientific, historical and critical
point of view-to . . . promote among the general public an interest,
knowledge and understanding of the problems of variation." One, Inc. v.
Olesen, 241 F.2d 772, 777 (9th Cir. 1957). The court pointed to one story
in which a "young girl gives up her chance for a normal married life to live
with the lesbian," to a poem "about the alleged homosexual activities of
Lord Montagu and other British Peers . .. [which] contains a warning
to all males to avoid the public toilets while Lord Samuel is 'sniffing around
the drains' of Piccadilly," and to notices advising readers where similar ma-
terial could be obtained. Ibid.
166. Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S. 372 (1958), reversing
249 F.2d 114 (D.C. Cir. 1957). Here, too, the district court had found ob-
scene nude photographs clearly showing male and female genitalia and
pubic areas. Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 128 F. Supp. 564, 570-
73 (D.D.C. 1955). Of one of the photographs found obscene, the district
court said:
On page 29 [of Sunshine & Health for February, 1955] there is a
most unusual picture. Here are two women who appear to be in their
late twenties or early thirties. The woman to the left appears to be ap-
proximately 5 foot 7. She must weigh in the neighborhood of 250
pounds. She is exceedingly obese.
She has large, elephantine breasts that hang from her shoulder to
her waist. They are exceedingly large. The thighs are very obese. She is
standing in snow, wearing galoshes. But the part which is offensive, ob-
scene, filthy and indecent is the pubic area shown.
The hair extends outwardly virtually to the hip bone. It looks
to "&*Court like a retouched picture because the hair line instead of
being straight is actually scalloped or in a half-moon shape, which
makes the woman grotesque, vile, filthy, the representation is dirty,
and the Court will hold that the picture is obscene in the sense that it
is indecent, it is filthy, and it is obscene as a matter of fact. . ..
Id. at 571-72.
*See Kaplan, Obscenity as an Esthetic Category, 20 LA.w & CorNTMp.
1960]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Although in these per curiam decisions the Court gave no ex-
planation of the grounds for decision-apart from citation of the
Roth or Alberts cases-it seems very clear that the Court was
giving constitutional protection to material that in its judgment
did not treat sex "in a manner appealing to prurient interest"
within the standard for obscenity laid down in the Roth and Al-
berts cases. 6 7 In three of the four cases the Court must have
made an independent examination of the materials and found that
censorship of the materials violated constitutional requirements,
for in these three cases the Court simply "reversed" the court of
appeals. It thus terminated the litigation and gave final protec-
tion to the materials in question.'68 Only in one of the four did
PROB. 544, 553 (1955), for one explanation of how the depiction of pubic
hair came to be regarded as obscene.
167. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487-89 (1957). See also
text accompanying note 129 supra for the test approved in Roth-Alberts.
168. See Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 355 U.S. 35 (1957); One,
Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958); and Sunshine Book Co. v. Summer-
field, 355 U.S. 372 (1958). For an analysis advancing this point see Com-
ment, Per Curiam Decisions of the Supreme Court: 1957 Term, 26 U.
Cmi. L. REV. 279, 309-13 (1959).
The reversals, terminating the litigation and thus freeing the materials
from obscenity censorship, indicate that the rulings were on the merits
against censorship of the materials, for the principal issue before the Court
in each of the three cases was the consistency of the obscenity findings
with constitutional standards:
1) In the Times Film case the major substantive issue was whether the
film was obscene by constitutional standards. See Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari, p. 10; Brief in Opposition, p. 10; Petitioner's Reply Brief, p. 2.
The only other substantive issue related to the scope and meaning of Burstyn
v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952), but the citation of Alberts instead of Burs-
tyn indicates that the reversal was based on the obscenity issue, not on the
prior restraint or vagueness issues involved in Burstyn.
2) In One, Inc. the sole substantive issue raised in the petition for cer-
tiorari was the claim that, in finding One-The Homosexual Magazine to be
obscene, the court below failed to apply the proper standard for determin-
ing obscenity under the relevant statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1948). See Pe-
tition for a Writ of Certiorari, p. 7. The petition was written before Roth
and probably for this reason did not make the constitutional claim. The
Brief in Opposition, p. 4, urged that the court below had satisfied the Roth
test. The Supreme Court reversed, thus holding the magazine mailable.
Technically, this may not have been a constitutional decision, since the con-
stitutional issue was not formally raised. Yet the problem for decision was
the same whether the issue be considered the application of the statutory
formulation of "obscenity," under the federal act barring obscene material
from the mails, or the application of the constitutional standard of "ob-
scenity" originated in Roth. What is significant in the One, Inc. case is that
the Court citing Roth apparently applied the Roth standard in determining
that the magazine was not obscene.
3) In the Sunshine case, the only issue for which Roth could have been
cited by the Court was Sunshine's contention that the Post Office Depart-
ment, the district court and the court of appeals all applied standards of ob-
scenity in conflict with Roth, and that judged by proper standards the maga-
zines were not obscene. See Petition for CPrt, rnri. n 99" P* " in n"-,_
tion, p. 27. The other substantive issues related to the statutory authority
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the Court remand the case "for consideration in the light of Roth
v. United States.1 69 But whatever their basis, these four per cu-
riam decisions made it clear that the Court was applying the con-
stitutional guarantees of freedom of expression to confine obscenity
censorship within very narrow limits indeed.
These developments did not pass unnoticed by federal officials
concerned with obscenity censorship. 70 And as most state and
lower federal courts began to give a strict reading to the Roth-
Alberts standard for determining what is obscene,1 71 many local
of the Department, and to the refusal of the Department to receive evi-
dence in the administrative hearing, but on neither of these issues was Roth
remotely relevant. Yet the reversal was grounded on Roth, and instead of
sending the case back for application of the proper standard, the Supreme
Court simply reversed, thus ending the litigation and permitting the maga-
zines to be mailed. The most likely explanation is that the Court found for
itself that the magazines in question were not "obscene" within the con-
stitutional standard.
169. Mounce v. United States, 355 U.S. 180 (1957). In Mounce, the
government made a "confession of error" that the test used by the court of
appeals was "materially different" from the Roth test. Memorandum for
the United States, pp. 6-8. Thereupon the Court "reversed hnd remanded
to the U.S. District Court for consideration in the light of Roth v. United
States." Mounce v. United States, supra at 180.
170. "Indeed, Federal officials are clearly in a mood of caution about
any censorship on grounds of obscenity. Their one firm conviction is that
they are still free to move against 'hard-core' commercial pornography."
Lewis, supra note 119.
Even the Postmaster General retreated enough to lift his ban on Alberto
Moravia's The Woman of Rome. ABPC, Censorship Bull., Aug. 1958 p. 5.
But he did not, apparently, lift his bans on other major works such as
Hemingway's For Whom the Bell Tolls. See Paul & Schwartz, Obscenity in
the Mails, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 214, 224 (1957). Nor did he completely sur-
render on Sunshine and Health. See Sunshine Publishing Co. v. Summer-
field, 184 F. Supp. 767 (D.D.C. 1960).
171. For example, courts consistently ruled that the nudist motion pic-
ture "Garden of Eden" was not obscene. Excelsior Pictures Corp. v. City
of Chicago, 182 F. Supp. 400 (N.D. Ill. 1960); Commonwealth v. Moniz,
338 Mass. 442, 155 N.E.2d 762 (1959); Excelsior Pictures Corp. v. Regents
of the Univ. of N.Y., 3 N.Y.2d 237, 144 N.E.2d 31 (1957). Cf. State v.
Rothschild, 109 Ohio App. 101, 163 N.E.2d 907 (1958); State v. Morley,
63 N.M. 267, 317 P.2d 317 (1957). See also the following cases holding
other material not obscene: United States v. Keller, 259 F.2d 54 (3d Cir.
1958) (malicious personal postcards charging addressee with immoral sexual
conduct); Capitol Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Chicago. 260 F.2d 670 (7th
Cir. 1958) (motion picture "Mom and Dad"); City of Cincinnati v. Walton,
145 N.E.2d 407 (Cincinnati Munic. Ct. 1957) (nude photographs, nudist
and men's magazines, sado-masochistic publications, and enormous cundrum
marked "For the self-made man"; only two stories in Dude magazine and
the sado-masochistic publications ruled obscene); People v. Silberglitt, 15
Misc. 2d 847, 182 N.Y.S.2d 536 (Sup. Ct. 1958) (art model magazines);
People v. Brooklyn News Co., 12 Misc. 2d 768, 174 N.Y.S.2d 813 (Kings
County Ct. 1958) (Gent magazine).
Only a few courts appear to have given the Roth-Alberts standard a
broad reading. City of Aurora v. Warner Bros. Pictures Dist. Corp., 16 II.
App. 273, 147 N.E.2d 694 (1958) (motion picture "Baby Doll" prima facie
obscene); People v. Richmond County News, Inc., 13 Misc. 2d 1068, 179
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officials also became slightly more cautious in selecting the ma-
terials they sought to suppress. 72
With the tightening of the limitations upon the types of ma-
terial constitutionally subject to censorship came some criticism,
accompanied by proposals designed to evade the impact of the
Supreme Court's decisions. 73 Of these, the Post Office Depart-
ment's program, supported in part by the Department of Justice,
was the most elaborate.
In Los Angeles, New York, and perhaps also Chicago, the
Post Office and Justice Departments had difficulty convicting per-
sons for mailing obscene matter; courts and juries there were too
sophisticated, their attitudes too liberal.17' Balked by United
States v. Ross 75 in their efforts to prosecute mailers at the place
of receipt of the mail, the two departments supported the enact-
ment of legislation authorizing prosecution of a mailer at any
place through which the mall passed, as well as at the place of re-
ceipt of the mailY.6 It would be easier to obtain convictions and
N.Y.S.2d 76 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1958) (men's magazine, unidentified); Zenith
Int'l Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 183 F. Supp. 623 (N.D. II1. 1960)
(motion picture "The Lovers").
172. In San Francisco, California, when a municipal court ruled that Al-
len Ginsberg's Howl and Other Poems was not obscene, the president of
the police commission declared, "Henceforth we are going to make a dis-
tinction and use our heads before proceeding with precipitate arrests."
ABPC, Censorship Bull., Nov. 1957, p. 1.
Not all local officials saw the light. The Kansas Board of Review, for
example, recently denied a license to the motion picture "Garden of Eden."
Censorship Scoreboard, Jan. 1960, p. 8. See note 171 supra.
173. Congressman John Dowdy (D. Tex.), dissatisfied with the Supreme
Court's decisions, introduced an amendment to 62 Stat. 768 (1948), 18
U.S.C. § 1461 (1958), to prohibit the mailing of material "which, in the
opinion of the normal, reasonable, and prudent individual, would sug-
gest, induce, arouse, incite, or cause, directly or indirectly . . . lewd, libid-
inous, lustful, indecent, obscene, immoral, or depraved thoughts, desires,
or acts on the part of any person . . . ." Hearings, supra note 38, at 3-4,
9-11. Congressman Richard H. Poff (D. Va.) introduced a similar bill.
Id. at 81-83.
174.
Difficulties in prosecuting violators resulting from liberal attitudes
of courts and juries-particularly in certain metropolitan areas, notably
Los Angeles and New York-have established virtual sanctuaries a-
lowing dealers in publications devoted exclusively to distorted sex to
operate in defiance of the Post Office Department's best efforts to
bar their use of the mails or bring them to justice.
Report on Obscene Matter Sent Through the Mail to the House Committee
on Post Office and Civil Service by the Subcommittee on Postal Opera-
tions, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1959). See also ACLU, Civil Liberties, May
1958, p. 2; Hearings, supra note 38, at 8, 14; Paul & Schwartz, supra note
170. at 227.
175. 205 F.2d 619 (10th Cir. 1953). This case held that, under 62 Stat.
768 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1958), a mailer could be prosecuted only at
the place of mailing.
176. Hearings, supra note 38, at 31-32; S. REP. No. 1839, 85th Cong.
2d Sess. 5-6 (1958).
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heavier sentences in the hinterlands than in Los Angeles or New
York-the two principal cities in which mail order operators
conduct their businesses.' Besides, prosecution of an accused at
a place far from his home and place of business would make it in-
convenient for him to defend himself." The Congress enacted
the forum-shopping measure,179 and the Postmaster General was
encouraged by its results.8 "
Though encouraged, the Post Office was still not satisfied. It
found United States attorneys and the Department of Justice re-
luctant to institute criminal prosecutions on materials that fell
short of hard-core pornography, leaving the Post Office to admin-
istrative exclusion and impounding-mail proceedings8s in its
efforts to censor "borderline" material."s But the administrative
proceedings, particularly those for impounding mail addressed to
persons suspected of using the mails to distribute obscene matter,
proved disappointing. The statute authorizing the impounding-mail
proceedingst limited the duration of interim impounding orders
to 20 days, but the Post Office found it impossible to conclude a
hearing on the merits in that space of time.8 4 And the Post Of-
fice complained that courts had the annoying habit of disagreeing
with it on the obscenity of matorials it wanted to censor as ob-
scene. 19
So the Post Office came forward with proposals to extend the
177. Hearings, supra note 38, at 8.
178.
Those who are the subject of prosecution here [Los Angeles], be-
cause they place the material in the mails here, who were indicted
back, I believe it occurred in the State of Michigan back East, because
there were individuals that received the materials there. I have deferred
any action on my part here. The principals, of course, are from this
area, their attorneys are from this area. . . . [lit may be a great
deal more inconvenience [sic] for the defendants, to go back to Michi-
gan to defend themselves, which I think is true, which I think is just
real fine. We think it is excellent.
Statement of Laughlin E. Waters, U.S. Attorney, Southern District of Cali-
fornia, Hearings, supra note 20, at 126. (Emphasis added.) See also Toscano
v. Olesen, 184 F. Supp. 296 (S.D. Cal. 1960); United States v. Frew, 187
F. Supp. 500 (E.D. Mich. 1960).
179. 72 Stat. 940 (1958), 39 U.S.C. § 259(c) (1958).
180. See Hearings, supra note 20, at 9.
181. An "exclusion" order is one that denies the use of the mails to ma-
terial non-mailable under 62 Stat. 768 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1958).
See Monart, Inc. v. Christenberry, 168 F. Supp. 654 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Zuck-
man, Obscenity in the Mails, 33 So. CAL. L. Rnv. 171 (1960); 27 U. Cm. L.
Rka. 354 (1960).
An "impounding-mai' order is one that denies delivery of mail addressed
to persons using the mails to defraud or to mail obscene matter. See 28
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 454 (1960).
182. Hearings, supra note 20, at 70-75.
183. 70 Stat. 699 (1956), 39 U.S.C. § 259(b) (1958).
184. Hearings, supra note 20 at 76-77, 83.
185. Id. at 84, 112-14.
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duration of interim impounding orders from 20 to 45 days"" and
to insulate postal determinations of obscenity from effective ju-
dicial review. 1 7 The House of Representatives bought the postal
proposals,""8 but the Senate did not;" 9 both houses, however,
finally agreed upon a measure substituting a judicial temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction for the administrative
interim impounding orders. 90
The postal program for circumvention of the Roth-Alberts
standards for obscenity may have been the most elaborate, but it
was far from the most subtle. For Michigan cleverly sought to
minimize the effect of the standards by enacting as its test for ob-
scenity the exact words of the trial court's instructions to the jury
in the Roth case,' 9 ' which Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion in that
case appears, on casual reading, to approve as satisfying consti-
tutional requirements.'92
These, however, were light and very polite skirmishes. It was not
until the United States Supreme Court explicitly addressed itself
to the problem of what has been called "ideological obscenity"' 93
that some of the proponents of censorship began to fulminate not
186. Id. at 3, 21-22, 76-77.
187. The postal proposals, to escape effective judicial review, took two
forms: one dealt with judicial review of interim impounding orders, the other
with review of the Postmaster General's final orders in exclusion proceed-
ings as well as in impounding-mail proceedings.
The statute authorizes the Postmaster General to issue interim impound-
ing orders when "reasonable and necessary to the effective enforcement"
of the statute. 70 Stat. 699 (1956), 39 U.S.C. § 259(b) (1958). The Post Of-
fice Department wanted to change this standard to "in the public inter-
est." Hearings, supra note 20, at 21, 78-87, 109-10, 114. It also wanted to
restrict the federal district courts' power to enjoin enforcement of interim
orders to instances in which the issuance of the orders was "arbitrary or
capricious." Id. at 22, 86, 88, 106-07, 110-11.
In addition, the Post Office wanted to shift judicial review of the Post-
master General's final orders from the federal district courts to the courts
of appeal, making the "finding of the Postmaster General as to the facts
. . conclusive if supported by substantial evidence in the administrative
record." Id. at 22-23, 88, 112-14. The federal district courts had been too
prone to make a de novo review of the Postmaster General's orders, and
the Post Office didn't want that, even on the central issue of the obscenity
of the material involved. Ibid.
See pp. 114-20 infra for a discussion of the scope of judicial review in ob-
scenity cases.
188. Hearings, supra note 20, at 21-23; Report, supra note 174, at 20.
189. 17 CONG. Q. 21 (Sp. Supp. Sept. 18, 1959).
190. 74 Stat. 553 (1960). The Senate also unanimously passed a bill to
create a federal commission on "noxious and obscene" literature. ACLU,
Legislative Bull. (Aug. 1960).
191. See MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.575(2) (Supp. 1959). See also notes
84-85 supra. Cf. Congressman Dowdy's bill, supra note 173.
192. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 479 (1957). For a discus-
sion of Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion on this point see text accompanying
notes 301-10 infra.
193. See Lockhart & McClure, supra note 1, at 333-34, 374-76.
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only against the emerging constitutional standards governing ob-
scenity censorship but against the Supreme Court itself.
D. THE KINGSLEY PICTURES CASE
Although the United States Supreme Court had already given
some indication of its attitude toward ideological obscenity,'
it did not explicitly dispose of that issue until Kingsley Int'l Pic-
tures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of N.Y. decided in June,
1959.195
Kingsley Pictures imported the French motion picture Lady
Chatterley's Lover, based upon the bowdlerized version of D. H.
Lawrence's novel, 96 and applied to the Motion Picture Division
of the New York State Education Department for a license to ex-
hibit the film.19 The division found three scenes "immoral" and
directed that they be cut before public showing.9 s On appeal, the
Regents of the University of the State of New York affirmed the
division's action on two grounds: (1) the three scenes ordered de-
leted were immoral, and (2) "the whole theme of this motion pic-
ture is immoral . . . for that theme is the presentation of adultery
as a desirable, acceptable and proper pattern of behavior.""'
194. Particularly by the per curiam decision in the One, Inc. case.
See notes 165 & 168 supra.
195. 360 U.S. 684 (1959). See Kalven, supra note 5, at 28-34; 44 MINN.
L. REv. 334 (1960).
196. Record, pp. 2, 17-19, Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of
the Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
197. Id. at 2, 6, 12 & 19.
198. The division's order was:
Reel 2D:
Eliminate all views of Mellors and Lady Chatterley in cabin from point
where they are seen lying on cot together, in a state of undress, to end
of sequence.
Reel 3D:
Eliminate all views of Mellors caressing Lady Chatterley's buttock and
all views of him unzipping her dress and caressing her bare back.
Eliminate following spoken dialogue accompanying these actions:
"Mais tu es nue . . . "But you're nude . . .
Tu es nue sous ta robe, et tu You're nude under your dress,
ne le disais pas . . . Qu'est- and you didn't say so . . .
ce que tu as?" What is it?"
Eliminate accompanying English superimposed titles:
"You have nothing on . . .
"And you didn't, say so .
"What is it?"
Reel 4D:
Eliminate entire sequence in Mellors' bedroom, showing Lady Chatter-
ley and Mellors in bed, in a state of undress.
Id. at 10-11.
199. Id. at 16, 21. The regent's committee also said:
We rest our determination upon the fundamental recognition by our
society that adultery is condemned by God-given law (Sixth Command-
ment given to Moses on Mount Sinai) and man-made law (sections
100-103 of the Penal Law).
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The regents' decision was based upon a statute defining an "im-
moral" motion picture as a film all or part of which "portrays
acts of sexual immorality, perversion, or lewdness, or which ex-
pressly or impliedly presents such acts as desirable, acceptable or
proper patterns of behavior. "200
In the New York courts, the Appellate Division annulled the re-
gents' determination and, in a clear and concise opinion, ruled that
the statutory standard applied by the regents was "not a permissi-
ble standard under the United States Constitution for prior re-
straint." '' Only obscenity as "narrowly defined in modern ju-
dicial decisions," it said, could justify censorship of motion pic-
tures; and by that standard it ruled that the movie Lady Chatter-
ley's Lover was not obscene.202 The New York Court of Appeals,
however, reversed the Appellate Division and reinstated the re-
gents' determination.0 3 In doing so, the Court of Appeals
subtly recast the central issue. The regents, the court said, denied
a license to Lady Chatterley's Lover because the statute required
the denial of a license to "motion pictures which are immoral in
that they portray 'acts of sexual immorality . . . as desirable, ac-
ceptable or proper patterns of behavior.' ",10" Then, ruling that
the state may refuse to license a motion picture that "alluringly
portrays adultery as proper behavior ' 2°5 even though it is not ob-
scene,2 6 the court found that the film did exactly that.20 7
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Kingsley raised
In line after line and in sequence after sequence, this motion pic-
ture glorifies adultery and presents the same as desirable, as acceptable
and as proper. We can not put our seal of approval upon such a mo-
tion picture ....
Id. at 16.
200. N.Y. EDUC. LAw, § 122-a (1954).
201. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 4 App.
Div. 2d 348, 350, 165 N.Y.S.2d 681, 683 (1957).
202. Ibid.
203. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 4
N.Y.2d 349, 151 N.E.2d 197 (1958).
204. Id. at 351, 151 N.E.2d at 197.
205. Id. at 358, 151 N.E.2d at 201.
206. Id. at 361, 151 N.E.2d at 203.
207. "The dominant theme of the film may be summed up in a few
words-exaltation of illicit sexual love in derogation of the restraints of
marriage. . . . And this entire theme was woven about scenes which un-
mistakably suggested and showed acts of sexual immorality." Id. at 354,
151 N.E.2d at 199. "Thus, this film unquestionably presents adultery as a
proper pattern of behavior. And it does so employing several scenes of ob-
scenity." Ibid. "We reiterate that this case involves the espousal of sexually
immoral acts (here adultery) plus actual scenes of a suggestive and obsceno
nature." Id. at 356, 151 N.E.2d at 200.
Though he doubted the validity of the New York statute, Judge Desmond
concurred in result, because he wanted the United States Supreme Court to
pass upon that question. Judges Dye, Fuld, and Van Voorhis dissented. Id. at
370-75, 151 N.E.2d at 209-12.
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four issues. In addition to the prior restraint and vagueness issues,
Kingsley contended that the New York statute on its face and in
its application to Lady Chatterley's Lover violated the freedom of
expression guaiantees of the United States Constitution.2 s Unani-
mously, but in no less than six opinions, the Court reversed the
New York Court of Appeals." 9
Without considering whether Lady Chatterley's Lover was in
fact obscene,-210 the Court's majority"' held part of the statute
unconstitutional because, as interpreted by the New York Court of
Appeals, " 2 it violated the "First Amendment's basic guarantee
of freedom to advocate ideas. . . . [and] thus struck at the
very heart of constitutionally protected liberty. 21 Justices Black
and Douglas, concurring in the majority opinion, wanted to add
prior restraint as an additional ground for invalidating the stat-
ute,214 while Mr. Justice Clark, who concurred in result only,
thought the statute too vague to meet the requirements of due
process.2 5
Three of the Justices,2 16 taking a different approach, wanted
to dispose of the case on more limited and less abstract grounds.
They agreed with the general proposition that "abstract .. .dis-
cussion or advocacy of adultery, unaccompanied by obscene por-
trayal or actual incitement . . .may not constitutionally be pro-
scribed,"2 ' but took issue with the majority's interpretation of the
court of appeals' construction of the New York statute. The
court of appeals, the three Justices said, construed the statute
narrowly "to require obscenity or incitement, not just mere ab-
208. Jurisdictional Statement, pp. 3-4, Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v.
Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
209. For detailed analysis of the opinions, see 44 MiNN. L. Rnv. 334(1960).
210. The majority found it unnecessary to take up that issue because
"the [New York] Court of Appeals unanimously and explicitly rejected
any notion that the film is obscene." Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Re-
gents of the Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 686 (1959).
211. Mr. Justice Stewart wrote the majority opinion. He was joined
by Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Brennan and Douglas.
212. The majority's interpretation of the New York Court of Appeals'
construction was:
that the relevant portion of the New York Education Law requires the
denial of a license to any motion picture which approvingly portrays an
adulterous relationship quite without reference to the manner of its
portrayal.
Id. at 688. (Emphasis added.) Compare text accompanying notes 204 &
205 supra.
213. 360 U.S. at 688.
214. Id. at 690 & 697.
215. Id. at 699.
216. Mr. Justice Harlan, joined by Justices Frankfurtar and Whittaker,
wrote the separate concurring opinion here considered. Id. at 702-08.
217. Id. at 705.
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stract expressions of opinion."218 So construed, the New York
statute was, they thought, clearly constitutional."' 9 They voted to
reverse the Court of Appeals because it exceeded constitutional
limits in applying the statute to Lady Chatterley's Lover, a motion
picture "lacking in anything that could properly be termed obscene
or corruptive of the public morals by inciting the commission of
adultery." ' But the three Justices gave no explanation for their
conclusion that the film was not obscene; they only emphasized
the necessity for "considering the particularities of individual cases
in this difficult field. 221
Now the fat was in the fire, and the relatively mild criticism of
the developing constitutional standards governing obscenity cen-
sorship and the rather sophisticated efforts to evade them222
turned into fulminations against the courts, including the United
States Supreme Court, and a frontal attack on the standards them-
selves. To the proponents of censorship the Court's decision was
particularly shocking because it gave constitutional protection to
ideological obscenity-the advocacy of what they considered to be
immoral ideas.223
The United States Supreme Court, declared Congressman
Clare E. Hoffman (R., Mich.), had "endorsed adultery." '224 The
American Mercury published articles charging that these develop-
ments in constitutional law were the result of a gigantic anti-
Christian conspiracy, Jewish and Communist inspired. 25 And in
218. Id. at 707. They emphasized Chief Judge Conway's statement re-
iterating "that this case involves the espousal of sexually immoral acts (here
adultery) plus actual scenes of a suggestive and obscene nature." Id. at 706.
See also note 207 and text accompanying note 205 supra.
219. 360 U.S. at 702 & 707.
220. Id. at 708.
221. Ibid. Mr. Justice Frankfurter made much of the same point in his
separate concurring opinion. Id. at 696-97.
222. See text accompanying notes 173-192 supra.
223. The director of the New York Motion Pictures Division, Louis M.
Pesce, observed:
Certainly some segments of the community are very upset by the "Lady
Chatterley" decision-not so much on the erotic aspects but on the ad-
vocacy of what they consider an immoral idea.
N.Y. Herald Tribune, July 29, 1959, p. 1, col. 5. Mr. Pesce also reported
that the Motion Picture Division had liberalized its policies on nudity and
illicit love scenes as a result of the decision; as an illustration of the liber-
alized policies, he disclosed that the division had restored a scene in the
Brigitte Bardot film "Love Is My Profession" "depicting Miss Bardot, her
back to the camera, nude, walking from a shower to a living room." Ibid.
224. N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1959, p. 31, col. 8.
225. Benedict, The "Lady Chatterley's Lover" Case, 90 American Mer-
cury, Jan. 1960, p. 3; Benedict, Pornography, a Political Weapon, 90
American Mercury, Feb. 1960, p. 3.
The House Subcommittee on Postal Operations, headed by Congress-
woman Kathryn E. Granahan (D. Pa.), did not go quite so far; it reported
that-"The committee does not believe it unreasonable to suspect that there
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the United States Senate, Senator James 0. Eastland (D., Miss.)
introduced a constitutional amendment that would forbid abridg-
ment of the "right of each State to decide on the basis of its own
public policy questions of decency and morality, and to enact
legislation with respect thereto. . ... "
But the disappointed proponents of censorship soon suffered
an even crueler blow. For in Smith v. California,' its next de-
cision, the United States Supreme Court added a requirement of
scienter for criminal prosecutions to the battery of constitutional
requirements the Court had already established, and thus seemed
to jeopardize the widespread use of abrupt criminal prosecutions
as a means of suppressing materials thought to be objectionable."
E. THE SMITH CASE
Eleazar Smith operated a retail book and magazine store in Los
Angeles. He had at least several thousand new and used books in
stock, most of them purchased from dealers and publishers in New
York City in reliance upon advertising circulars and publishers'
catalogues. z 9 Among the books he had in stock was one entitled
Sweeter Than Life by Mark Tryon, the pseudonym for a hack, and
published by an obscure publisher known as the "Vixen Press."' o
A Los Angeles police officer bought some magazines and a copy
of the book from a clerk in Smith's store and then promptly ar-
rested the clerk."l Smith himself was charged with numerous vio-
is a connection between pornographic literature and subversive elements
in this country." Report, supra note 174, at 14.
226. Hearings, supra note 20, at 1; 86 Catholic Universe Bull., Jan. 22,
1960, p. 1, col. 7.
In a letter supporting the Eastland Amendment, Senator Herman E. Tal-
madge (D. Ga.) spoke of "the shocking and unconscionable decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States in the [Kingsley Pictures] case . ..."
"By that edict," he said, "that Court, which already has set itself above the
laws of man, undertook also to set itself above the laws of God." Then,
noting that the "Supreme Court is notorious for its ultraliberal rulings,"
he declared, "But, one or two more like this latest in the ultra for freedom
and only Congress can save us. If Congress can't, then there must be amend-
ments to the Constitution. We must save ourselves." Hearings, supra note
20, at 57.
227. 361 U.S. 147 (1959). See Kalven, supra note 5, at 35-40.
228. See text accompanying notes 23-3 6 supra.
229. Jurisdictional Statement, pp. 8-9, Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147
(1959); Brief for Appellant, pp. 6-7.
Unfortunately, we have not yet been able to gain access to the transcript
of the Record of this case. Our reconstruction of the case is necessarily
based upon the Jurisdiction Statement and the briefs of the parties, which
have been made available to us.
230. 23 LBRARY OF CONGREss, NATIONAL UNION CATALOG 1953-1957,
586 (1958). The catalog also lists for the same pseudonym and publisher
and for the same year-1954--the following titles: The Fire That Burns,
The Sinning Lens, Stage Struck and Take It Off! "Mark Tryon" does not
appear in the catalog for any earlier or later year.
231. Jurisdictional Statement, p. 8; Brief for Appellant, p. 6.
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lations of a Los Angeles ordinance making it "unlawful for any
person to have in his possession any obscene or indecent
book . . . in any place of business where . . .books . .. are
sold or kept for sale. .. .232
In the course of the trial Smith testified that he had not read
Sweeter Than Life, that indeed he had not read any book for
some time since it took him about three months to read one.2 3
And although he also testified that he had no reason to believe that
the book contained any objectionable material,234 he confirmed
his clerk's testimony2 3 that he had instructed the clerk not to per-
mit any one under 21 years of age to handle any books or art
magazines. 211
Also at the trial, Smith proffered the testimony of two expert
witnesses, one a clinical psychologist, the other a literary critic. 23
From the literary critic, Smith sought to elicit testimony that the
book Sweeter Than Life fell within commonly accepted commu-
nity literary standards, that it had literary merit and served a use-
ful social purpose, that many "best sellers" were comparable in their
depiction of lesbianism and other sexual activities, and that the
book would not appeal to the prurient interest of the average per-
son. 238 From the psychologist, Smith sought to establish that the
book did not go beyond "present day community standards re-
garding sexual behavior and expression" and that "within the
bounds of reasonable psychological certainty" the book would not
232. Jurisdictional Statement, pp. 2-3. The ordinance was Los ANOBLES,
CALIFORNIA, MUNICIPAL CODE, § 41.01.1. See Jurisdictional Statement,
pp. 14-15, for the full text of the ordinance.
233. Jurisdictional Statement, p. 9; Brief for Appellant, p. 7.
234. Ibid.
235. Motion to Affirm the Judgment and/or Dismiss This Appeal, p. 6.
236. Brief for Appellant, p. 7. In his Appellant's Brief in Opposition to
Motion to Dismiss and/or Affirm, Smith resisted the state's attempt to im-
pute "some knowledge" to him from the instructions to his clerk. Smith said:
[T]he entire testimony of the clerk ...made it clear that as a
matter of business policy, appellant had directed that no one under 21
years of age was to be permitted to handle any magazine or book in the
store. To infer knowledge of the contents or the character of any par-
ticular book from such circumstances would be clearly unreason-
able. In any event the court below disposed of this issue by holding that
under the ordinance knowledge and intent were not ingredients of the
offense, nor matters of defense .. ..
Appellant's Brief in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss and/or Affirm, p. 5
n.3. The referent of "the court below" in this quotation is the appellate
department of the superior court, not the trial court.
One newspaper account of the case reports that the book Sweeter Than
Life was on a table with a sign saying "only persons 21 years of age and
over may handle books on this table" and that the trial court "held that
the sign was evidence that Smith was aware of the contents of the book."
86 Catholic Universe Bull., Jan. 15, 1960, p. 4, col. 7.
237. Jurisdictional Statement, p. 27; Brief for Appellant, p. 65.
238. Jurisdictional Statement, pp. 27-28; Brief for Appellant, pp. 65-66.
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corrupt and deprave its readers by arousing lascivious thoughts or
lustful desires."m 9 The trial court excluded the testimony of both
witnesses,24° found Smith guilty, and sentenced him to 30 days
in jail. 41 The Appellate Department of the Superior Court af-
firmed the judgment.2
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Smith raised
four prolix issues, all of them complaining of violations of freedom
of speech and press, due process, and equal protection.4 3 Boiled
down, they amounted to contentions that (1) the ordinance was
unconstitutional because it did not require proof of scienter,2"
(2) constitutionally relevant evidence had been excluded, -45 (3)
unconstitutional standards had been applied to the book, ' and
239. Jurisdictional Statement, pp. 28-29; Brief for Appellant, pp. 66-67.
Smith did not, as indeed he could not, strongly press the literary merit of
Sweeter Than Life in the United States Supreme Court; indeed he came
close to conceding that the hack-written novel was hackneyed and that
its writing was unpolished. Brief for Appellant, p. 62. So did the Brief for
the American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae, p. 9.
240. Jurisdictional Statement, pp. 9 & 29; Brief for Appellant, pp. 7 & 67.
241. Brief for Appellant, p. 2.
All other charges against Smith were dismissed. Ibid. These, apparently,
mainly involved the possession of the magazines the police officer bought
in Smith's store. See note 229 supra.
242. People v. Smith, 161 Cal. App. 2d 860, 327 P.2d 636 (1958).
In its opinion the appellate court ruled, inter alia, that the book was
obscene considered as a whole, but with "obvious common-sense limits to
the 'over all' view." Id. at 863, 327 P.2d at 638. It ruled that the ordinance
did not require scienter, that "a book seller may be constitutionally pro-
hibited from possessing or keeping an obscene book in his store and con-
victed of doing so even though it is not shown he knows its obscene char-
acter, nor that he intends its sale." Id. at 866, 327 P.2d at 640. The court
also saw no error in the trial court's exclusion of the expert testimony. Id.
at 863, 327 P.2d at 638.
243. Jurisdictional Statement, pp. 6-8, Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147
(1959); Brief for Appellant, pp. 4-6.
The state rephrased the issues much more concisely. See Brief for Ap-
pellee, p. 2.
244. The ordinance, Smith contended, imposed-
absolute strict criminal liability for the mere possession of an "ob-
scene" book in a place of business where books are sold or kept for
sale, without requirement of proof of the defendant's knowledge of the
contents or character of the book or intent to sell, and without regard
to proof by defendant of the absence of such knowledge and intent.
Brief for Appellant, p. 4.
245. Here, Smith complained that the courts below had held that-
no evidence was admissible . . . to show the artistic, literary, scien-
tific and educational merits of the book . . . to show what the pre-
dominant appeal of the book would be to the average person and the
effect on his behavior; to show the degree of public acceptance of the
material contained in the book; and to show the absence of appeal to
prurient interest.
Id. at 5.
246. The unconstitutional standards, Smith said, were "the unconstitution-
ally restrictive (Hicklin (L.R. 3 Q.B. 360) and Besig, 208 F.2d 142 (C.A. 9,
1953)) standards for judging the obscenity of a book, to wit, the effect of
isolated excerpts upon particularly susceptible persons . .. ." Ibid.
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(4) the book was not obscene.2"7 The Court unanimously28
reversed the judgment of the California Court, but the Justices
could not all agree on the ground for reversal.
The majority seized upon only the first issue249 and, without
considering the particular application of the ordinance to Smith, 00
held that the ordinance on its face violated the freedom of expres-
sion guarantees of the federal constitution because it eliminated all
mental elements from the crime and thus tended seriously to re-
strict the dissemination of books that are not obscene.2 ' Mr. Jus-
tice Brennan, speaking for the majority,25 2 said:
By dispensing with any requirement of knowledge of the contents of
the book on the part of the seller, the ordinance tends to impose a se-
vere limitation on the public's access to constitutionally-protected mat-
ter. For if the bookseller is criminally liable without knowledge of the
contents, and the ordinance fulfills its purpose, he will tend to restrict
the books he sells to those he has inspected; and thus the State will have
imposed a restriction upon the distribution of constitutionally protected
as well as obscene literature.
253
Although the majority held that scienter in some degree is con-
stitutionally required, it explicitly declined to pass upon "what sort
of mental element is requisite to a constitutionally permissible
prosecution. ' 251
Despite his usual reluctance to reach unnecessary constitutional
issues, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in a separate concurring opinion,
protested the majority's failure to give "some indication of the
scope and quality of scienter that is required."25 He did not dis-
pute the constitutional necessity for some degree of scienter, but
wanted the Court to make it clear that the "decision, in its prac-
tical effect, is not intended to nullify the conceded power of the
State to prohibit booksellers from trafficking in obscene litera-
ture." 6 He also wanted to reverse the judgment for an additional
reason-the exclusion of expert testimony "regarding the prevail-
ing literary and moral community standards . . . . [and] the
psychological or physiological consequences of questioned litera-
247. Id. at 4.
248. All but one Justice voted for flat reversal of the judgment; Mr. Jus-
tice Harlan wanted to reverse the judgment and remand the case for a new
trial. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 169 (1959).
249. The majority explicitly disclaimed passing upon the other issues and
assumed without deciding that the book was correctly adjudged obscene.
Id. at 149 n.4.
250. Id. at 150.
251. Id. at 150-55.
252. Mr. Justice Brennan was joined by Mr. Chief Justice Warren and
Justices Clark, Stewart, and Whittaker.
253. Id. at 153.
254. Id. at 154. This is considered at pp. 103-08 infra.
255. Id. at 162.
256. Ibid.
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ture. .... ,,27 Mr. Justice Harlan wanted to reverse the judgment
and remand the case for a new trial solely because all evidence
bearing upon contemporary community standards, not merely ex-
pert testimony, had been excluded; 5 he was dubious about im-
posing any scienter requirement. 9
Justices Black and Douglas, concurring in separate opinions, re-
affirmed their conviction that all publications-even obscene ones
-are entitled to constitutional protection.260 Mr. Justice Doug-
las, however, approved the majority's requirement of scienter, for
he could "see no harm, and perhaps some good," in the require-
ment.
26
'
Hostile reactions to the Court's decision were not long in com-
ing. Mr. Justice Brennan's reasoning, said one commentator, was
"unrealistic" and "absurd. -6 - To another commentator, the deci-
sion added a "maddening complication" and a "frustrating ele-
ment" to the law of obscene literature .2  And municipal law of-
ficers complained that the decision would "cripple municipal ef-
forts to curb obscenity" "[b]ecause of the virtual impossibility of
proving scienter."264 Lower courts, however, seemed to have lit-
tle difficulty coping with the new requirement.2 65
I1. THE DEVELOPING
•CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS
These, then, are the obscenity decisions of the United States
Supreme Court in the contexts in which they were decided. In
pointing the way to developing constitutional standards, they settle
some of the issues inherent in obscenity censorship, give probable
257. Id. at 165. See Kohn, Social Psychological Data, Legislative Fact,
and Constitutional Law, 29 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 136 (1960).
258. Id. at 171-72. Mr. Justice Harlan here referred to Smith's efforts to
compare the content of Sweeter Than Life with that of other publications
widely accepted and openly published, sold, and purchased.
259. Id. at 169-70.
260. Id. at 156, 167-69. Mr. Justice Douglas adhered to the position he
advanced in the Roth case. See text accompanying note 130 supra. Mr.
Justice Black appears now to have come to the conclusion that no censor-
ship of obscenity is permissible in any circumstances.
261. Id. at 169.
262. Richmond News Leader, Dec. 19, 1959, p. 10, col. 1.
263. Breig, The Court and Smith, 86 Catholic Universe Bull., Jan. 15,
1960, p. 4, col. 7. Breig also observed: "The present court seems to see in
the Constitution a total preoccupation with individual liberty without ref-
erence to the common good. This is a mistaken attitude." Ibid.
264. Brief Amici Curiae of the Member Municipalities of the National
Institute of Municipal Law Officers in Support of Petition for Rehearing by
Appellee, p. 2. See also 86 Catholic Universe Bull., Jan. 15, 1960, p. 2
col. 2, for the comments of Cleveland's law director.
265. See, e.g., People v. Schenkman, 20 Misc. 2d 1093, 195 N.Y.S.2d
570 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1960). Cf. State v. Miller, 112 S.E.2d 472 (W. Va.
1960). See also Comment, 38 N.C.L. REv. 634 (1960).
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direction to the solution of others, leave some relatively obscure
and a few untouched.
We know, for example, that material considered by the Court
to be "obscene" does not enjoy constitutional protection, "0 and
that the clear and present danger test, commonly applied by the
Court in freedom of expression cases, does not apply to "obscene"
matter."' We know, too, that statutes simply prohibiting the
publication of obscenity are not unconstitutional for vagueness
and uncertainty,26 and that the injunctive powers of the courts
may be used to prevent further publication of already published
"obscene" matter, despite implications of prior restraint, so long as
the injunction is based on a fair judicial hearing. 09
But we also know that the Court gives constitutional protection
to non-obscene sexual material and takes a narrow view of what
is "obscene." ' Our uncertainties begin when we examine criti-
cally the verbal formula set out by the Court for determining what
is "obscene," and they multiply when we leave the realm of ab-
straction and attempt to separate the obscene from the non-ob-
scene, to determine what types of material in what circumstances
are obscene and therefore may be denied constitutional protection.
266. See text accompanying notes 123-29 supra.
267. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 486-87 (1957). At least one
court has recently rejected this position and applied the Black-Douglas
minority view. See People v. Douglas, 21 Misc. 2d 551, 202 N.Y.S.2d 160
(St. Lawrence County Ct. 1959).
The clearest and best judicial exposition of the need for applying the
clear and present danger test in obscenity cases appears in the dissenting
opinion of Justice O'Connell in State v. Jackson, 356 P.2d 495, 508 (Ore.
1960).
268. See text accompanying note 122 supra. We use the term "publica-
tion" here in its broadest sense to include sale as well as the narrower tech-
nical publication.
Some state courts, however, have imposed more stringent definiteness
requirements and ruled typical obscenity laws unconstitutional for vague-
ness. See State v. Christine, 239 La. 259, 118 So. 2d 403 (1960) (statute
prohibiting obscenity and defining "obscenity" as the "performance . .. in
any public place . . . of any act of lewdness or indecency, grossly scan-
dalous and tending to debauch the morals and manners of the people");
State v. Nelson, 168 Neb. 394, 95 N.W.2d 678 (1959) (ordinance pro-
hibiting sale of any publication "which, read as a whole, is of an obscene
nature"); Commonwealth v. Blumenstein, 396 Pa. 417, 153 A.2d 227(1959) (statute prohibiting the exhibition of motion pictures of an "obscene
. nature or character"). The defendant in the Louisiana case was Lilly
Christine, alias "Cat Girl," an "exotic" dancer. See 48 Life, No. 13, p. 66,
April 4, 1960.
Pennsylvania, in an effort to resurrect its obscenity laws, has enacted, al-
most verbatim, the definition of obscenity laid down in the Roth case. Coln-
pare PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4524 (Supp. 1959), with text accompanying
note 274 infra.
269. See text accompanying notes 141-47 supra.
270. See text accompanying notes 126-29, 162-69 supra.
[Vol. 45:5
CENSORSHIP OF OBSCENITY
A. WHAT IS OBSCENE?
1. The Verbal Formula
"Obscene material," the Court declared in the Roth-Alberts
opinion, "is material which deals with sex in a manner appealing
to prurient interest" 7' and in a footnote to this sentence added,
"I.e. material having a tendency to excite lustful thoughts."1
2
Obscenity is denied constitutional protection because it is "utterly
without redeeming social importance." 3 And a constitutionally
satisfactory test for obscenity is the test the Court said had been
adopted by American courts in relatively recent decisions: "wheth-
er to the average person, applying contemporary community
standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole
appeals to prurient interest. 274
Already some puzzling questions appear. If, as the Court seems
to say, material that appeals to prurient interest is material that
has a tendency to excite lustful thoughts, what degree of causal
relationship between the material and the thought is required?"'
Even if "the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole"
must have a tendency to excite lustful thoughts of "the average
person," does it necessarily follow that such material is always
"utterly without redeeming social importance"? 6
Is "the average person" always the proper hypothetical person
to whose prurient interest the material must appeal? What of ma-
terial, prurient to the average person, addressed to an audience of
persons to whom the material has no prurient appeal? Or of ma-
terial without prurient appeal to the average person addressed to
an audience of persons to whom it has a high degree of prurient
appeal?27
7
What is the "community" whose "contemporary standards" are
to be applied in the determination of what is obscene? Is it a com-
271. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957).
272. Id. at 487 n.20.
273. Id. at 484.
274. Id. at 489.
275. See Lockhart & McClure, supra note 1, at 330-33, for a discussion
of the causality problem.
Three of the cases cited by the Court as decisions adopting the consti-
tutionally satisfactory test for obscenity dealt with the causality question.
They were: Walker v. Popenoe, 149 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1945); United
States v. Levine, 83 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1936); and United States v. Dennett,
39 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1930). In the Levine case the court said that the de-
gree of likelihood of sexual stimulation as well as the degree of intensity
of the resulting sexual thought must outweigh the merits of the material.
See United States v. Levine, 83 F.2d 156, 158 (1936).
276. See pp. 95-99 inf!ra, for a discussion of the importance of aesthetic
and other social values of material claimed to be obscene.
277. See Lockhart & McClure, supra note 1, at 338-42 & 394-95, and
pp. 70-88 infra. for consideration of the audience problem.
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munity bounded by geographical limits or a community formed
along cultural lines? If a geographical community, is it the local
community in which the censorship of material for obscenity takes
place? And if local, how local-a particular state, or urban, or
rural area? Or is it the national community or even the larger in-
ternational community commonly called the western world?27
And if it is the community's contemporary standards that are to
be applied, what is to be done with materials like Jonathan Swift's
poems to Celia-accepted and widely read in the past-that are
likely to be a bit too raw for the contemporary standards of some
communities, however defined? 79
These are some of the puzzling questions raised by the verbal
formula for obscenity set out in the Roth-Alberts opinion. But
questions even more difficult and fundamental to the basic concept
of obscenity are suggested by some of the Court's citations and
comments about other tests for obscenity than the formula approv-
ed in that opinion.
In the footnote to the sentence setting out the constitutionally
satisfactory test for obscenity adopted by American courts 8'
the Court cited 13 cases as examples of decisions that had adopted
the approved formula.2 ' And the cases grouped together in this
footnote make strange bedfellows indeed. For in these cases the
courts adopted and applied a variety of tests for determining what
is obscene, and some even explicitly repudiated tests or factors
strongly emphasized by others. 2 In their efforts to define the ob-
278. See pp. 108-14 infra for a consideration of the geographical com-
munity problem. The cultural community question is a part of the larger
problem of the specialized audience, discussed at pp. 70-88 infra.
279. See Vizetelly, Extracts Principally from the English Classics showing
that the Legal Suppression of M. Zola's Novels would logically involve the
Bowdlerizing of some of the greatest Works in English Literature (1888),
for some of the Swift poems and other similar material.
280. See text accompanying note 274 supra.
281. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 n.26 (1957).
282. The thirteen cases were: Walker v. Popenoe, 149 F.2d 511 (D.C.
Cir. 1945); Parmelee v. United States, 113 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1940);
United States v. Levine, 83 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1936); United States v.
Dennett, 39 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1930); Khan v. Leo Feist, Inc., 70 F. Supp.
450 (S.D.N.Y. 1947), aff'd, 165 F.2d 188 (2d Cir. 1947); United States v.
One Book Called "Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), aft'd, 72
F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934); American Civil Liberties Union v. City of Chicago,
3 Ill. 2d 334, 121 N.E.2d 585 (1954); Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318
Mass. 543, 62 N.E.2d 840 (1945); State v. Becker, 364 Mo. 1079, 272 S.W.
2d 283 (1954); Adams Theatre Co. v. Keenan, 12 N.J. 267, 96 A.2d 519
(1953); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Melko, 25 N.J. Super. 292, 96 A.2d 47
(Ch. 1953); Commonwealth v. Gordon, 66 Pa. D. & C. 101 (Philadelphia
County Ct. 1949), aff'd sub nom. Commonwealth v. Feigenbaum, 166 Pa.
Super. 120, 70 A.2d 389 (1950); and as a "cf.," a portion of Judge Frank's
concurring opinion in Roth v. Goldman, 172 F.2d 788, 794-95 (2d Cir.
1949).
For the numerous inconsistencies in the views expressed by the courts in
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scene, some of these courts spoke of material that suggested or
aroused sexual thoughts or desires,' others of material that de-
praved or corrupted by suggesting or inciting such thoughts or de-
sires," and still others of pornography-dirt for dirt's sake, ma-
terial whose dominant purpose and effect is erotic allurement, a
calculated and effective incitement to sexual desire.' Beyond
these and other inconsistencies in the 13 cases cited, there were
some contradictions. For example, Ulysses and a number of other
cases"s6 assigned great importance to the literary and other social
values of the material at hand. But in Commonwealth v. Isen-
stadt's7 the court rejected this "pleasing fancy," saying that the
purpose of the obscenity law was to protect the public from harm
and that most members of the public cared nothing for literary
values, and affirmed a book dealer's conviction for handling Lil-
lian Smith's Strange Fruit despite its conceded literary merit.M
And the Missouri court, in State v. Becker, 9 repudiated the
Ulysses line of cases, saying: "The apparent rationale of those
.. . cases . . . seems to us to be confounded of confusion and
most of these cases, see Lockhart & McClure, supra note 1, at 327-50. Al-
though the Khan, American Civil Liberties Union, Becker, and Adams
Theatre cases are not included in that discussion, the differences in points
of view of the cases discussed are typical of the inconsistencies among
these four cases as well.
283. See Walker v. Popenoe, 149 F.2d 511, 512 (D.C. Cir. 1945); United
States v. Levine, 83 F.2d 156, 158 (2d Cir. 1936); United States v. One
Book Called "Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182, 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), affd, 72
F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934); American Civil Liberties Union v. City of Chicago,
3 Ill. 2d 334, 347, 121 N.E.2d 585, 592 (1954). See also Lockhart & Mc-
Clure, supra note 1, at 329-31.
284. See United States v. Dennett, 39 F.2d 564, 568 (2d Cir. 1930);
Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 549-50, 62 N.E.2d 840, 844
(1945); State v. Becker, 364 Mo. 1079, 1083-84, 272 S.W.2d 283, 285
(1954). See also Lockhart & McClure, supra note 1, at 332-33.
285. See Bantam Books v. Melko, 25 N.J. Super. 292, 316, 96 A.2d 47,
59 (Ch. 1953); Commonwealth v. Gordon, 66 Pa. D. & C. 101, 136, 151(Philadelphia County Ct. 1949), afrd sub nom. Commonwealth v. Feigen-
baum, 166 Pa. Super. 120, 70 A.2d 389 (1950). Cf. United States v. One
Book Called "Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), aff'd, 72 F.2d
705 (2d Cir. 1934).
286. Walker v. Popenoe, 149 F.2d 511, 512 (D.C. Cir. 1945); Parmelee
v. United States, 113 F.2d 729, 735-37 (D.C. Cir. 1940); United States v.
Dennett, 39 F.2d 564, 568 (2d Cir. 1930); United States v. One Book Called
"Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182, 183-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), aff'd, 72 F.2d 705,
708 (2d Cir. 1934); Bantam Books v. Melko, 25 NJ. Super. 292, 304,
314-15, 96 A.2d 47, 53, 58-59 (Ch. 1953).
287. 318 Mass. 543, 62 N.E.2d 840 (1945).
288. The Court did not preclude any consideration of literary values; it
said that they could be considered in determining whether a book is obscene,
but it is clear that the Court thought such values to be relatively unim-
portant. See Lockhart & McClure, supra note 1, at 344-48.
. 289. 364 Mo. 1079, 272 S.W.2d 283 (1954).
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artificialities, and seems not to have considered certain basic con-
cepts and teachings which we deem important. 290
We can discern only two common threads running through all
13 cases. In one way or another, every case spoke of judging ma-
terial as a whole instead of by its parts,29' or of judging it by
its effect upon average persons instead of by its effect upon the
weakest and most susceptible,292 or of both.293 Yet even this
analysis is not free from difficulty. One of the cases twisted the
notion that material is to be judged by reference to those it is like-
ly to reach-its probable audience 294 -to make the obscenity of
material turn on its effect upon a single individual to whom it is
sold rather than upon persons typical of the whole audience."'
Two cases indicated that evidence of the material's actual audience
is inadmissible, at least when offered by the defendant.9 ' And
two other cases paid lip service at best to the requirement that
290. 364 Mo. 1079, 1085, 272 S.W.2d 283, 286 (1954).
Still another contradiction appears in the disagreement over the com-
munity standard. Judge Bok, in Commonwealth v. Gordon, 66 Pa. D. & C.
101, 136 (Philadelphia County Ct. 1949), ajj'd sub nom. Commonwealth
v. Feigenbaum, 166 Pa. Super. 120, 70 A.2d 389 (1950), stressed the need
for a uniform national standard. But the courts in Commonwealth v. Isen-
stadt, 318 Mass. 543, 551, 62 N.E.2d 840, 845 (1945) and Adams Theatre
Co. v. Keenan, 12 N.J. 267, 271-72, 96 A.2d 519, 521 (1953), spoke of
local standards at the time and place of each alleged offense. And the
court in Parmelee v. United States, 113 F.2d 729, 731-32 (D.C. Cir. 1940),
spoke of "present critical point in the compromise between candor and
shame at which the community may have arrived here and now," but gave
no indication of the nature or scope of the "community" it meant. See also
Roth v. Goldman, 172 F.2d 788, 795 (2d Cir. 1949). For consideration of
the community standard problem, see pp. 108-14 infra.
291. See Khan v. Leo Feist, Inc. 70 F. Supp. 450, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1947),
a/I'd, 165 F.2d 188 (2d Cir. 1947); Adams Theatre Co. v. Keenan, 12
N.J. 267, 272, 96 A.2d 519, 521 (1953) ("dominant effect").
292. See Roth v. Goldman, 172 F.2d 788, 794-95 (2d Cir. 1949)
(Frank, J., concurring).
293. See Walker v. Popenoe, 149 F.2d 511, 512 (D.C. Cir. 1945); Par-
melee v. United States, 113 F.2d 729, 731 (D.C. Cir. 1940); United
States v. Levine, 83 F.2d 156, 157-58 (2d Cir. 1936); United States v.
Dennett, 39 F.2d 564, 568-69 (2d Cir. 1930); United States v. One Book
Called "Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182, 184-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), ajI'd, 72 F.2d
705, 707 (2d Cir. 1934); American Civil Liberties Union v. City of Chi-
cago, 3 Il. 2d 334, 344, 121 N.E.2d 585, 591 (1954); Commonwealth v.
Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 551-54, 62 N.E.2d 840, 845-46 (1945); State
v. Becker, 364 Mo. 1079, 1084, 272 S.W.2d 283, 285 (1954); Bantam
Books, Inc. v. Melko, 25 N.J. Super. 292, 314-15, 96 A.2d 47, 58 (Ch.
1953); Commonwealth v. Gordon, 66 Pa. D. & C. 101, 123, 125, 131,
134-35 (Philadelphia County Ct. 1949), af/'d sub nom. Commonwealth v.
Feigenbaum, 166 Pa. Super. 120, 70 A.2d 389 (1950).
294. See pp. 70-88 infra. See also Lockhart & McClure, supra note 1, at
338-42, for a discussion of the probable audience concept.
295. United States v. Levine, 83 F.2d 156, 158 (2d Cir. 1936).
296. United States v. Dennett, 39 F.2d 564, 568 (2d Cir. 1930); United
States v. Levine, supra note 295, at 158.
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material must be judged as a whole and by its impact upon aver-
age persons.297
Nevertheless, we conclude that the Court in the Roth-Alberts
opinion laid down two-and only two-constitutional require-
ments for determining what is obscene. The two requirements
are, of course, that material must be judged as a whole, not by its
parts, and that it must be judged by its impact on average persons,
not the weak and susceptible. 9 Our conclusion is supported by
the context in which the Court was speaking when it set out a
constitutionally satisfactory test for obscenity. 9 For the Court
was here concentrating its fire on the two most criticized aspects
of the old Hicklin rule as interpreted by some American courts:
the judging of material by isolated passages and by their effect on
particularly susceptible persons.300 To satisfy constitutional re-
297. In State v. Becker, 364 Mo. 1079, 272 S.W.2d 283 (1954), the
court, after speaking of "the effect of these publications [nudist maga-
zines) in their entirety upon persons of average human instincts," went on
to say that it could "not disregard an unambiguous enactment which has
as its obvious purpose the protection of the morals of the susceptible into
whose hands these publications may come." Id. at 1084, 272 S.W.2d at
286. (Emphasis added.) The court also approved the old Hicklin test for
obscenity. Id. at 1084, 272 S.W.2d at 285.
Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 62 N.E.2d 840 (1945), vir-
tually emasculated the "wholly obscene" standard; it tested the relevancy
of the objectionable passages by deciding whether the passages were nec-
essary to convey the "sincere message of the book." Id. at 557, 62 N.E.2d
at 847. The court in this case also greatly restricted the "average person"
standard; it included adolescents as an important part of the reading pub-
lie because "many adolescents are avid readers of novels," and approved a
refusal to charge the jury that the book must be judged by its effect upon
the "normal youth or adult as compared to the abnormal" because a book
that "adversely affects a substantial proportion of its readers may well be
found to lower appreciably the average moral tone of the mass." Id. at
552, 62 N.E.2d at 845.
298. For detailed consideration of the "wholly obscene" standard, see pp.
88-95 infra. The "average person" standard is considered at pp. 71-73 in-
fra.
299.
The early leading standard of obscenity allowed material to be judg-
ed merely by the effect of an isolated excerpt upon particularly sus-
ceptible persons. Regina v. Hicklin, [1868] L.R. 3 Q.B. 360. Some
American courts adopted this standard but later decisions have re-
jected it and substituted this test: whether to the average person, ap-
plying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of
the material taken as a whole appeal to prudent interest. The Hicklin
test, judging obscenity by the effect of isolated passages upon the
most susceptible persons, might well encompass material legitimately
treating with sex, and so it must be rejected as unconstitutionally re-
strictive of the freedoms of speech and press. On the other hand, the
substituted standard provides safeguards adequate to withstand the
charge of constitutional infirmity.
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 488-89 (1957). (Emphasis added.)
300. See Judge Learned Hand's celebrated attack on the Hicklin rule
in United States v. Kennerley, 209 Fed. 119, 120-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
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quirements, therefore, any test for obscenity must not include
these two objectionable elements.
We come to the same conclusion about the Court's statements
in the Roth-Alberts opinion that "both trial courts below suffi-
ciently followed the proper standard," and that "both courts used
the proper definition of obscenity."'3 1 We base our conclusion
upon an analysis of the content of the tests as well as upon the
context in which the Court stated its approval of these tests.
The tests so approved were not wholly consistent. If, as the
Supreme Court assumed, the trial court in Alberts applied the ob-
scenity test of People v. Wepplo, °2 the test was whether the ma-
terial had "a substantial tendency to deprave or corrupt its readers
by inciting lascivious thoughts or arousing lustful desires,"3 3
which is susceptible to an interpretation that the material must ad-
versely affect character and behavior.30 4 In Roth, however, the
trial court instructed the jury that the material must have "a ten-
dency to excite lustful thoughts."3 ' As with the 13 cases cited
by the Court as examples of decisions that had adopted a consti-
tutionally satisfactory test for obscenity, 0 ' the principal element
common to both tests was their requirement that the material be
judged as a whole rather than by its parts and, particularly in
Roth, that it be judged by reference to average persons rather than
the weak and susceptible.30 7 True, there was another element
common to both tests, for both the trial court in Roth and the
301. 354 U.S. at 489. The trial court's charge to the jury was not tech-
nically in issue in the Roth case, for this issue was excluded in the grant of
certiorari. See note 93 supra and text accompanying notes 93-99 supra.
302. 78 Cal. App. 2d 959, 178 P.2d 853 (1947). This was the assump-
tion of the United States Supreme Court. See Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. at 486. But it is far from clear that this was actually the case. See note
105 supra.
303. People v. Wepplo, 78 Cal. App. 2d 959, 961, 178 P.2d 853, 855(1947). (Emphasis added.) See also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. at 486,
quoting Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 62 N.E.2d 840 (1945).
304. See Lockhart & McClure, supra note 1, at 332-33. This is Mr. Jus-
tice Harlan's interpretation of the Wepplo test. See Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. at 498-99 n. 1.
305. Record, pp. 25-26, Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
True, the trial court also charged that the material "must be calculated to
corrupt and debauch the minds and morals of those into whose hands it
may fall" but immediately added that "it must tend to stir sexual im-
pulses and lead to sexually impure thoughts." Ibid. But the overall impres-
sion of the charge is that the arousal of sexual thoughts alone is enough
to make material obscene. This is Mr. Justice Harlan's impression, too. 354
U.S. at 498-99. It is consistent with the verbal formulas for obscenity
commonly used by the federal courts. See Lockhart & McClure, supra note
1, at 329-30.
306. See notes 281 & 282 supra and accompanying text.
307. See Record, pp. 25 & 26, Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476(1957); People v. Wepplo, 78 Cal. App. 2d 959, 961-62, 178 P.2d 853, 855
(1947).
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California court in Wepplo rejected literary merit as a factor of
any importance.38 But it is inconceivable that the Court, which
denied constitutional protection to obscenity because it is "utterly
without redeeming social importance,"3 9 could have endorsed
this portion of the tests applied in the two cases.
The context in which the Court stated its approval of the tests
applied in the Roth and Alberts cases also indicates that the Court
approved the tests only because they satisfied the requirements
that material be judged as a whole and by reference to normal
persons. The Court's statement of approval followed the paragraph
in which the Hicklin rule was discussed and rejected as unconsti-
tutional; in its next sentences-and in the same paragraph in
which the statement of approval appeared-the Court emphasized
at length that both trial courts had judged the material as a whole
and by its effect on normal persons.310
In sum, we can find in the Roth-Alberts majority opinion only
two constitutional requirements. The material must be judged as a
whole, not by its parts in isolation, and it must be judged by its
impact upon average or normal persons, not the weak and suscepti-
ble. We do not mean, of course, that there are no other constitu-
tional requirements-but they are not set out in the Roth-Alberts
opinion.
Although we have found two major constitutional requirements
for censoring obscenity, we are left with the most puzzling ques-
tion of all about the verbal formula for obscenity approved in the
Roth-Alberts opinion. What is obscenity? What is its essential na-
ture?" 1 On this central question the Court said only that "ob-
scene material is material which deals with sex in a manner ap-
pealing to prurient interest. 312
The definition of obscenity as sexual material that appeals to
308. See notes 87 & 105 supra. In the Wepplo case, the only thing that
saved the owner of a bookstore and his sales clerk from an affirmance of
their convictions for selling Edmund Wilson's Memoirs of Hecate County
was the trial court's error in eliminating scienter from the state obscenity
law. See People v. Wepplo, 78 Cal. App. 2d 959, 966, 178 P.2d 853, 858(1947).
309. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. at 484. This point the Court em-
phasized in the following passage: "All ideas having even the slightest re-
deeming social importance-unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even
ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion-have the full protection
of the guaranties . . . ." Ibid. (Emphasis added.) The Court also observed
that the "portrayal of sex, e.g., in art, literature and scientific works, is not
itself sufficient reason to deny material the constitutional protection of
freedom of speech and press." Id. at 487. (Emphasis added.)
310. Id. at 489-90. The Court here seemed to use "average person"
and "normal person" interchangeably.
311. We have already expressed ourselves on the difficulty of this prob-
lem. See Lockhart & McClure, supra note 1, at 320-24.
312. 354 U.S. at 487.
19601
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
prurient interest, however, merely pushes the central question
back a notch. If obscenity is sexual material that appeals to pru-
rient interest, what is the appeal to prurient interest that makes
sexual material obscene? What is its essential nature?
The phrase "appeal to prurient interest" is relatively rare in the
law of obscenity. Even the word "prurient" is not common and,
when used, is usually used to describe a type of abnormal person
who is not a suitable hypothetical person for judging the ma-
terial.313 In the Roth-Alberts opinion the Court borrowed the
phrase "appeal to prurient interest" from a tentative draft of the
American Law Institute's Model Penal Code,3"4 which in turn
had lifted it from a 1915 opinion of the Supreme Court. 3 5 But
the Court and the American Law Institute did not agree upon the
meaning of the phrase.
To the American Law Institute, "prurient interest" is a "shame-
ful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion;" ' it is "an
exacerbated, morbid, or perverted interest growing out of the con-
flict between the universal sexual drive of the individual and equal-
ly universal social controls of sexual activity."3 7 Material "ap-
peals" to this interest when, "of itself," the material has "the ca-
pacity to attract individuals eager for a forbidden look behind the
curtain of privacy which our customs draw about sexual mat-
ters." ' The Institute's primary purpose in adopting this defini-
tion was to prevent exploitation of the psychosexual tension created
by the conflict between the individual's normal sexual curiosity
and drive, and the powerful social and legal inhibitions that re-
strain overt sexual behavior.' 9
313.
This earlier doctrine [the Hicklin rule] necessarily presupposed that
the evil against which the statute [the Comstock law] is directed so
much outweighs all interests of art, letters or science that they must
yield to the mere possibility that some prurient person may get a sen-
sual gratification from reading or seeing what to most people is inno-
cent and may be delightful or entertaining. No civilized community
not fanatically puritanical would tolerate such an imposition .
United States v. Levine, 83 F.2d 156, 157 (2d Cir. 1936). (Emphasis
added.) See also Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 551, 62
N.E.2d 840, 845 (1945).
314. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10(2) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957). See
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. at 487 n.20.
315. See MODEL PENAL CODE, Comment, op. cit. supra note 314, at 29.
The opinion was by Mr. Justice McKenna in Mutual Film Corp. v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230 (1915). In the opinion he justified the censor-
ship of motion pictures in part because "they take their attraction from
the general interest, eager and wholesome it may be, in their subjects,
but a prurient interest may be excited and appealed to." Id. at 242. (Em-
phasis added.)
316. MODEL PENAL CODE, op. cit. supra note 314, § 207.10(2).
317. Id. at 29.
318. Id. at 10.
319. Id. at 10 & 30.
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The prevailing tests for obscenity were rejected by the Institute.
It rejected "the prevailing test of tendency to arouse lustful thoughts
or desires because it is unrealistically broad for a society that plain-
ly tolerates a great deal of erotic interest in literature, advertising,
and art, and because regulation of thought or desire, unconnected
with overt misbehavior, raises the most acute constitutional as well
as practical difficulties." 0 It also rejected the test of "tendency
to corrupt or deprave" because of the lack of evidence of any con-
nection between obscenity and misbehavior and because of "the
wide disparity of strongly held views as to what does tend to pro-
duce that result."3 21 To the draftsmen of the Model Penal Code,
"it seemed obvious that inquiry as to the nature of the appeal of a
book, i.e., the kind of appetite to which the purveyor is pandering,
is quite different from an inquiry as to the effect of a book upon
the reader's thoughts, desire, or action."32
But what seemed obvious to the draftsmen of the Code was not
obvious to the Court. For after borrowing the phrase "appeal to
prurient interest" from the Model Penal Code, the Court went on
to say that "material which deals with sex in a manner appealing
to prurient interest" is "material having a tendency to excite lust-
ful thoughts," and that "we perceive no significant difference be-
tween the meaning of obscenity developed in the case law and the
definition of the A.L.I., Model Penal Code . .. ."I At this
point the Court referred to one of the pages on which the drafts-
men of the Code explicitly rejected the prevailing tests for ob-
scenity and attempted to differentiate the test of "appeal to pru-
rient interest. '324 And Mr. Justice Harlan in his separate opinion
carefully called attention to this apparent contradiction between
the A.L.I.'s explanation of its "prurient interest" test and the
Court's interpretation of it, quoting at length from the same page
of the draftsmen's comments to the Code.= It seems probable
therefore that the Court regarded the distinctions drawn by the
Code's draftsmen as distinctions without a constitutionally signifi-
cant difference. 6
320. Id. at 10. This was the test applied by the trial court in the Roth
case. See note 305 supra and accompanying text.
321. MODEL PENAL CODE, op. cit. supra note 314, at 21-22. This was
the test stated in the Wepplo case. See text accompanying notes 303 & 304
supra.
322. Schwartz, Criminal Obscenity Law: Portents from Recent Supreme
Court Decisions and Proposals of the American Lawv Institute in the Model
Penal Code, 29 Pa. Bar Ass'n. Q. 8, 10 (Oct. 1957).
323. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 n.20 (1957).
324. Ibid.
325. Id. at 499-500.
326. Professor Schwartz, however, suggests that the Court 'may have
been trying to bring existing law up to the level of the Model Penal Code
by the tour de force of declaring it was already there," Schwartz, supra
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We are driven to the conclusion that the verbal formula for
obscenity approved by the Court in the Roth-Alberts opinion is
not a single formula at all but one that embraces all of the cur-
rent definitions of obscenity,327 including that of the Model Penal
Code." Any of these verbal formulas may be constitutionally
acceptable as a definition of "obscenity,"3 2 since none of them
judges material by the effect of isolated passages on particularly
susceptible persons."' 0 So we are left in the unhappy position of
the delegates to the Geneva Conference on the Suppression of the
Circulation and Traffic in Obscene Publications, who discovered
that they could not define obscenity, "after which, having triumph-
antly asserted that they did not know what they were talking
about, the members of the Congress settled down to their dis-
cussion." 31 We know only that material tested for obscenity must
be judged as a whole instead of by its parts and by its appeal to
or effect upon average persons instead of the weak and susceptible.
But of what it is that must be judged in this fashion we know
little save that it deal with sex in any of its many manifestations.
2. The Standard Applied: Hard-Core Pornography
Although the Court's verbal formula tells us little or nothing
about the essence of obscenity as a constitutional concept, it seems
clear that most of the Justices must have something fairly definite
in mind-something they apparently are not yet able or ready
to describe. For in a number of instances they have applied an un-
disclosed concept of obscenity to a variety of materials.
To at least seven members of the Court, neither the motion pic-
ture The Game of Love, nor the magazines Sunshine & Health,
Sun Magazine and One, The Homosexual Magazine were ob-
scene.332 If materials of this kind are not obscene, the Justices
note 322, at 11, or that the Court for the time being did not espouse
one or another of the available definitions but indicated a receptivity to
the language of the Model Penal Code. Id. at 10-13.
In State v. Jackson, 356 P.2d 495 (Ore. 1960), the court noted the in-
consistencies in the Roth-Alberts opinion and elected to adopt the Model
Penal Code's definition of obscenity "as a proper standard for Oregon courts
to follow." Id. at 507.
327. See text accompanying notes 280-290 supra.
328. MODEL PENAL CODE, Op. cit. supra note 314, § 207.10(2) & Com-
ment, pp. 10, 29-30.
329. We are not here suggesting that any or all of them are constitu-
tional, only that at this stage of our analysis they may be constitutionally
acceptable for the reason given.
330. See text following note 310 supra.
331. HUXLEY, VULGARITY IN LITERATURE 1 (1930). And see CAUSTON
AND YOUNG, KEEPING IT DARK 55 (1930).
332. See notes 163, 165, 166, 168 supra and accompanying text. We say
seven because Justices Black and Douglas probably cast their votes on
grounds other than the non-obscenity of the material. For their views, see
note 260 supra and accompanying text.
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could scarcely have had in mind the same concept of obscenity
as did the courts in the Becker, Isenstadt, and Wepplo cases, for
in these cases the courts thought, respectively, that Sunshine &
Health and Solaire Universalle De Nudisme, Lillian Smith's
Strange Fruit, and Edmund Wilson's Memoirs of Hecate County
were obscene." And the Justices assuredly could not have en-
dorsed a concept or definition of obscenity that embraced materials
of such literary stature as Strange Fruit and the Memoirs."z
These applications of whatever concept of obscenity the Jus-
tices have in mind suggest only what, in the minds of the Justices,
obscenity is not; they tell us little of what the Justices think ob-
scenity is. For some indication of the concept of obscenity held by
a majority of the Justices we turn to an instance in which, we are
convinced, the developing concept of obscenity was applied by the
Court-in the context of a case in which the obscenity of the ma-
terials was never in issue before the Court.
We have already noted that the Roth and Alberts cases reached
the United States Supreme Court at a high level of abstraction,
with the obscenity of the materials in both cases not in issue,
and that the Solicitor General brought the cases down to earth
with a carton of what he termed "black-market" or "hard-core"
The only other instances in which members of the Court have applied
their concepts of obscenity to material before them are the following:
Justices Frankfurter, Harlan, and Whittaker considered that the motion
picture "Lady Chatterley's Lover' was not obscene. See text accompany-
ing note 220 supra.
Mr. Justice Harlan thought that the material in Roth was not hard-core
pornography and that the material in Alberts was obscene. For descrip-
tions of this material see note 80 and accompanying text, notes 88-89, and
notes 101-102 and accompanying text. For Mr. Justice Harlan's views see
text accompanying notes 135-36. Mr. Justice Harlan also suggested that
D. H. Lawrence's Lady Chatterley's Lover, presumably in its unexpurgated
edition, might be obscene, Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 506
(1957), but that James Joyce's Ulysses and Boccaccio's Decameron were
not. Id. at 498.
Mr. Chief Justice Warren, stressing Roth's and Alberts' reprehensible
conduct, thought the materials in both cases were obscene in the particular
circumstances of these two cases. See text accompanying notes 139-40 su-
pra.
333. See State v. Becker, 364 Mo. 1079, 272 S.W.2d 283 (1954); Com-
monwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 62 N.E.2d 840 (1945); People v.
Wepplo, 78 Cal. App. 2d 959, 179 P.2d 853 (1947). The court in the
Becker case and the Supreme Court disagreed on the obscenity of nudist
magazines; Game of Love and One were far more objectionable than
Strange Fruit and Memoirs of Hecate County.
334. It is true, however, that Memoirs of Hecate County contained one
detailed description of sexual intercourse, and that this element was absent
in the materials held not obscene in the per curiam decisions. See notes
163, 165, 166, 168 supra. Yet on almost any scale of social values the
Memoirs would rank higher than those materials. See pp. 95-99 infra, for a
consideration of the importance of aesthetic and other social values.
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pornography." 5 In voting to sustain the constitutionality of the
obscenity statutes of California and of the United States, Justices
Frankfurter, Burton, Clark, Brennan, and Whittaker must have had
material of this kind in mind"' for hard-core pornography, par-
ticularly in pictorial form, is so blatantly shooking and revolting
that it would have been impossible for the Justices to put it out of
mind. 37 Since the basic issue before the Court was only the con-
stitutionality of the statutes on their faces and in a vacuum, with-
out regard to their application in the two cases, it seems likely
that the Court upheld their constitutionality as imaginatively ap-
plied to hard-core pornography.
We conclude, therefore, that the concept of obscenity held by
most members of the Court is probably hard-core pornography, a
conclusion consistent with the Court's "rejection of obscenity as
utterly without redeeming social importance. ' '33 But we still do
not know whether hard-core pornography exhausts the category
of the obscene, or whether some types of material may constitu-
tionally be held obscene though not pornographic. For an answer
to this question we must await clear-cut decisions of the Supreme
Court in cases involving such materials as undisguised girlie mag-
azines and Henry Miller's Tropic of Cancer and Tropic of Capri-
corn339 or, perhaps better yet for this purpose, his Quiet Days at
Clichy.
Meanwhile, we shall need an understanding of the nature of
"black-market" or "hard-core" pornography. But a satisfactory
335. See text accompanying note 119 supra.
336. Mr. Justice Harlan also had material of this kind in mind in the
Roth case, for he argued that the federal government had power to censor
only hard-core pornography and then found that the material in Roth did
not fall into that category. In the Alberts case, he concluded that the
material was such that its suppression would not so "interfere with the
communication of 'ideas' in any proper sense of that term" as to violate
due process, but he did not say whether this material was pornographic,
or whether it was something short of hard-core pornography but close
enough to warrant state censorship. See text accompanying notes 135 &
136 supra.
Mr. Chief Justice Warren also examined the material in the Roth and
Alberts cases, but he emphasized the reprehensible nature of the defend-
ants' conduct, indicating that the material might not be obscene in differ-
ent circumstances. See text accompanying note 137-140 supra.
337. Years ago, one of the authors was for a time a police officer and,
in making searches under a warrant or incident to arrest, occasionally un-
earthed pictorial pornography. Those who have never been exposed to ma-
terial of this kind may get some notion of its general nature from one of
the common scenes portrayed in photographic prints: women masturbating
with a variety of implements ranging from bananas to broomsticks. For
further indications of the character of hard-core pornography see notes
345-57 infra and accompanying text.
338. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
339. These were held obscene in Besig v. United States, 208 F.2d 142
(9th Cir. 1953).
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definition of the term is not easy to come by. In the Roth case the
Solicitor General did not attempt a definition; he contented him-
self with brief and general descriptions of the types of material
constituting the category.3 ° Others writing about hard-core por-
nography also speak of it as if its essential nature were self-evident
and needed little or no delineation; 4' and the same is true of
340. He said:
This is commercially-produced material in obvious violation of present
law. . .. This material is manufactured clandestinely in this country
or abroad and smuggled in. There is no desire to portray the material
in pseudo-scientific or "arty" terms. The production is plainly "hard-
core" pornography, of the most explicit variety, devoid of any dis-
guise.
Some of this pornography consists of erotic objects. There are also
large numbers of black and white photographs, individually, in sets,
and in booklet form, of men and women engaged in every conceiv-
able form of normal and abnormal sexual relations and acts. There
are small printed pamphlets or books, illustrated with such photo-
graphs, which consist of stories in simple, explicit, words of sexual ex-
cesses of every kind, over and over again. No one would suggest that
they had the slightest literary merit or were intended to have any.
There are also large numbers of "comic books," specially drawn for
the pornographic trade, which are likewise devoted to explicitly illus-
trated incidents of sexual activity, normal or perverted. . . . It may
safely be said that most, if not all, of this type of booklets contain
drawings not only of normal fornication but also of perversions of
various kinds.
The worst of the "hard-core" pornographic materials now being cir-
culated are the motion picture films. These films, sometimes of high
technical quality, sometimes in color, show people of both sexes en-
gaged in orgies which again include every form of sexual activity
known, all of which are presented in a favorable light. The impact of
these pictures on the viewer cannot easily be imagined. No form of in-
citement to action or to excitation could be more explicit or more ef-
fective.
Brief for the United States, pp. 37-38, United States v. Roth, 354 U.S. 476
(1957).
The Solicitor General also sought to distinguish hard-core pornography
from material in "the borderline entertainment area." He said:
The distinction between this [hard-core pornography] and the mate-
rial produced by petitioner and others, as discussed above, is not based
upon any difference in intent. Both seek to exploit the erotic market
place. The difference is that the "black market" traffickers make no
pretence about the quality and nature of the material they are pro-
ducing and offering.
Id. at p. 37.
341. See, e.g., Bromberg, Five Tests for Obscenity, 41 Cm. B. REcoRD
416, 418-19 (1960) (hard-core pornography is "readily identifiable" and
needs no "legal geiger counter . . . to apprize the viewer of the nature of
hard-core materials").
D. H. Lawrence's "genuine pornography" seems to be pretty much the
same as the Solicitor General's "black market" or "hard-core" pornog-
raphy. Lawrence once wrote:
But even I would censor genuine pornography, rigorously. It would
not be very difficult. In the first place, genuine pornography is almost
always underworld, it doesn't come into the open. In the second, you
can recognize it by the insult it offers, invariably, to sex, and to the
human spirit.
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most references to "pornography" unadorned by the qualifying ad-
jectives "black-market" or "hard-core." '342 Yet it may be possible
to arrive at a better understanding of the nature of hard-core por-
nography through a satisfactory explanation of the nature and
function of just plain pornography. Here anthropologist Margaret
Mead comes to the rescue.
"We may define pornography cross-culturally" Dr. Mead says,
"as words or acts or representations that are calculated to stimulate
sex feelings independent of the presence of another loved and
chosen human being."3 3 She finds that "an essential element in
pornography" is that it has "the character of the daydream as dis-
tinct from reality," and explains this element as follows:
True, the adolescent may take a description of a real event and turn it
into a daydream, the vendor of pornography may represent a medical
book as full of daydream material, but the material of true pornography
is compounded of daydreams themselves, composed without regard for
any given reader or looker, to stimulate and titillate. It bears the signa-
ture of nonparticipation-of the dreaming adolescent, the frightened,
the impotent, the bored and sated, the senile, desperately concentrating
on unusualness, on drawing that which is not usually drawn, writing
words on a plaster wall, shifting scenes and actors about, to evoke and
feed an impulse that has no object: no object either because the ado-
lescent is not yet old enough to seek sexual partners, or because the re-
cipient of pornography has lost the precious power of spontaneous sex-
ual feeling. 3
44
Margaret Mead's conception of pornography as daydream ma-
terial calculated to feed the autoerotic desires of the immature or
Pornography is the attempt to insult sex, to do dirt on it. This is un-
pardonable. Take the very lowest instance, the picture post-card sold
underhand, by the underworld, in most cities. What I have seen of
them have been of an ugliness to make you cry. The insult to the hu-
man body, the insult to a vital human relationship! Ugly and cheap
they make the human nudity, ugly and degraded they make the sexual
act, trivial and cheap and nasty.
It is the same with the books they sell in the underworld. They are
either so ugly they make you ill, or so fatuous you can't imagine any-
body but a cretin or a moron reading them, or writing them.
LAWRENCE, PORNOGRAPHY AND OBSCENITY, IN SEX, LITERATURE AND
CENiSORSHIP 74-77 (1953).
342. See Ellis, The Revaluation of Obscenity, MORE ESSAYS IN LovE
AND VIRTUE 130 (1931); Cairns, Freedom of Expression in Literature,
200 ANNALS 76, 85 (1938).
343. Mead, Sex and Censorship in Contemporary Society, NEW WORLD
WRITINGS 7, 18 (Third Mentor Selection 1953).
344. Id. at 19. Dr. Mead makes the same point in distinguishing por-
nography from "the bawdy, the ribald, the shared vulgarities and jokes,
which are the safety valves of most social systems." Id. at 23. She con-
tinues:
Pornography does not lead to laughter; it leads to deadly serious pur-
suit of sexual satisfaction divorced from personality and from every
other meaning. . . . The difference between the music hall in which
a feeble carrot waves above a bowl of cauliflower while roars of
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perverted is supported by the Kronhausens' detailed analysis of
pornographic books. For the Kronhausens found in pornographic
books the same sexual fantasy that Dr. Mead emphasized so strong-
ly.345 Pornographic books, say the Kronhausens, are always
made up of a succession of increasingly erotic scenes without dis-
tracting non-erotic passages. 6 These erotic scenes are common-
ly scenes of willing, even anxious seduction, s1 7 of sadistic deflora-
tion in mass orgies,348 of incestuous relations consummated with
little or no sense of guilt, 49 of superpermissive parent figures
who initiate and participate in the sexual activities of their chil-
dren,"m of profaning the sacred," of supersexed males and
laughter shake the audience of husband(s) and wives on their weekly
outing, and the strip tease, where lonely men, driven and haunted, go
alone, is the difference between the paths to heaven and hell, a dif-
ference which any society obscures to its peril.
Id. at 23-24.
345. See KRONHAUSEN, PORNOGRAPHY AND THE LAw 178-243 (1959).
346. Id. at 178-79.
347.
Characteristic of "obscene" books is the fact that in . . . seduction
scenes the "victim" is, more often than not, a willing collaborator. In
other words, the women who figure prominently in "obscene" books
are generally as anxious to be seduced as the men are to seduce
them .
Also characteristic of seduction scenes . . . is the fact that the
stories emphasize the physiological sex responses of the participants; in
this instance, particularly those of the women.
Id. at 195. (Emphasis added.)
348.
[D]efloration scenes with strong sadistic elements play an important
role. These defloration and rape fantasies are psychologically signifi-
cant in demonstrating the fusion of erotic and sadistic impulses, al-
though it is highly characteristic of these fantasies that no matter what
the degree of agony inflicted, the girl invariably disclaims any concern
over her pain.
Id. at 203.
[1]n almost every pornographic story which we examined, the deflora-
ation is accomplished with the aid of others ...
The participation of others in these defloration scenes is so charac-
teristic of "obscene" books that one could well list it as a separate cri-
terion of identification. It combines, in itself, various psychological
elements; for instance, the sadistic pleasure involved or the voyeuris-
tic element in watching.
Id. at 205. (Emphasis added.)
349. Id. at 207.
350. Id. at 211.
351. Id. at 216-17.
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females, 3-2 of Negroes and Asiatics as sex symbols,353 of male
and particularly female homosexuality, 3 4 and of flagellation,35
all described in taboo words.3"' The sole purpose of pornographic
books is to stimulate erotic response, never to describe or deal
with the basic realities of life.3,7
Many others have also noted in pornography its essential day-
dream quality, designed to feed the erotic fantasies of the sexually
immature. D. W. Abse, for example, says that pornography is ma-
terial that "simply encourages people to luxuriate in morbid, re-
gressive, sexual-sadistic phantasy and cultivates this morbidity in
them, tending to arrest their development.""3 8 Similarly, W. G.
Eliasberg speaks of the appeal of pornography to "immature sex-
352.
In keeping with the unrealistic nature of "obscene" books, one of
their outstanding characteristics is the emphasis which they place upon
the exaggerated size of the male organ, the largeness of the testicles,
and the copiousness of the amounts of seminal fluid ejaculated.
Id. at 221.
In keeping with the wish-fulfilling nature of "obscene" writings, the
female characters in these stories are just as men would like women to
be: highly passionate, sensuous, and sexually insatiable creatures who
like nothing better than almost continuous intercourse.
Conspicuous by its absence in "obscene" writings is any trace of
genuine modesty, restraint, or anxiety on the part of the women ...
"Obscene" books stress the female discharge almost equally as much
as the man's seminal fluid; this is, of course, to be expected, for if the
women are supposed to be as responsive as "obscene" books would
make us believe, there would be no better proof of this than reference
to the physiological manifestations of their erotic excitement.
Id. at 227-28.
[Jiust as "obscene" books describe men in a satyriasis-like condition
of permanent sexual excitement, the women likewise do not seem to
fit any cultural norms in our society and are represented as predatory
females ever on the prowl for a new sexual partner or a new sexual
experience. In this respect, females fulfill the fantasy and wish-ful-
filling character of "obscene" literature.
Id. at 229.
353. Id. at 229.
354. Id. at 232.
We find many supposedly Lesbian scenes all though the bulk of "ob-
scene" literature and . . . some books are mainly devoted to Les-
bianism. However, they clearly serve the purpose mainly of arousing
the male reader, who reacts to them as a heterosexual situation, and
not for any hypothetical Lesbians who may happen to read them.
Id. at 234.
This is, undoubtedly, also the reason why we do not find many ref-
erences to male homosexuality in "obscene" books. . . . The reason is
that, generally speaking, homosexuality is not erotically stimulating to
the averaae (heterosexual male) reader.
Id. at 234-35.
355. Id. at 237-42.
356. Id. at 219-21.
357. Id. at 18.
358. Abse, Psychodynamic Aspects of the Problem of Definition of Ob-
scenity, 20 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 572, 586 (1955).
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uality," which he says is "the non-genital, not individualized, not-
loving, amorphous interest in sex, which we have come to know
as characteristic of early stages of physical and psychological de-
velopment toward sex."359 London and Caprio note that those
who are morbidly interested in or collect pornography "have a
libido that is fixated at the paraphiliac level (psychic auto-eroti-
cism). '360 And Benjamin Karpman calls indulgence in pornog-
raphy a form of psychic masturbation." 1
Seen in this light pornography as a concept assumes manage-
able form. Pornography is daydream material, divorced from real-
ity, whose main or sole purpose is to nourish erotic fantasies or,
as the psychiatrists say, psychic autoeroticism. This concept of
pornography, together with the more detailed criteria developed
by the Kronhausens, should provide a reasonably satisfactory and
workable tool for distinguishing pornographic books from non-
pornographic ones. As applied to non-literary material, however,
it is not likely to be successful, for much widely accepted material
(such as the "pin-up girl") is designed to serve the same function
of feeding "auto-erotic reverie. 362 Some additional qualification
359. Eliasberg, Art: Immoral or Immortal, 45 J. CIuM. L & P.S.
274, 278 (1954). Dr. Eliasberg also noted:
A pornographic author never finds adjectives (qualities) enough to
bandy about. There is a hurricane of attributes, but no substance;
there are parts, but no whole. It is the same with the emotions as with
the erogenic zones: There are the zones, but no body to which they
belong; [t]here are the emotions, but no personality to feel them;
brush strokes but no painting and no painter.
Id. at 274. Cf. Mead's description of pornography in text accompanying
note 344 supra.
360. LONDON & CAPRIO, SEXUAL DEVIATIONS 627 (1950). "Paraphilia"
is a term used in psychiatry to designate sexual deviation; "auto-eroticism"
refers to sexual feeling or gratification that is self-induced, without sexual
relations with another.
361. KARPMAN, THE SEXuAL OFFENDER AND HIs OFFENSES 360 (1954).
Abraham Kaplan notes that pornography "is not itself the object of an ex-
perience, esthetic or any other, but rather a stimulus to an experience not
focused on it. It serves to elicit not the imaginative contemplation of an ex-
pressive substance, but rather the release in fantasy of a compelling impulse."
Kaplan, Obscenity as an Esthetic Category, 20 LAw & CONTENIP. PROD. 544,
548 (1955). (Emphasis added.) See also CRAIG, THE BANNED BOOKS OF
ENGLAND 154 (1937).
362. Eric Larrabee says that for Americans sex is-
an object of limitless potentialities for fantasy and envy. Our glamour
figures, male and female, whose justification is, in other respects, ob-
scure, serve to maintain an illusion that somewhere, for somebody, sex
can be a full-time activity ...
Expecting much of sex, but feeling as individuals that much is de-
nied them, Americans, as a mass, create in the substance of suppressed
desire the remarkable symbolic figures that are found here as in no
other culture. The existence of "the great American love goddess" is
more often noted than explained. . . . Her primary function is widely
understood but rarely mentioned-that is, to serve as the object of
auto-erotic reverie.
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is needed to cut the concept back to proper size. For this purpose,
the qualifications "black-market" or "hard-core" appended to por-
nography may be useful to indicate that non-literary material
must not only nourish erotic fantasies, but must be grossly shock-
ing as well.363 But even with these qualifications, the concept of
black-market or hard-core pornography is likely to be exceedingly
difficult to apply to some types of pictorial material. Its application
to pictures portraying acts of sexual intercourse or perversion
seems clear enough, but its application to nude pictures that do not
portray such acts is likely to present insurmountable difficulties.
In the Roth case, the Solicitor General conceded as much." 4
Beyond these relatively minor difficulties, the concept of black-
market or hard-core pornography poses some fundamental prob-
lems of obscenity censorship. Granting that the definition of hard-
core pornography can be used to separate the pornographic from
the non-pornographic with reasonable accuracy in most instances,
what of those persons who, like Samuel Roth and David Alberts,
market non-pornographic material as if it were pornography, ad-
vertising it to appeal to cravings for erotic fantasy?" 5
Persons who market non-pornographic material but advertise
it as if it were hard-core pornography, exploiting the craving of
the sexually immature for autoerotic fantasy, are not an attractive
lot. Their motives are bad, and their behavior is thoroughly rep-
rehensible. As Margaret Mead says, "[T]he little fly-by-night pub-
lishers who sell repackaged serious literary works or serious scien-
tific books with lurid promises of the titillation contained within
the covers are comparable to the innkeeper who, unbeknown to the
lovers who seek shelter under his roof, also conducts a voyeuristic
brothel."3 6 Yet we do not know at this stage whether material
Larrabee, The Cultural Context of Sex Censorship, 20 LAW & CONTEM'P.
PROB. 672, 683-84 (1955).
363. We are not suggesting that mere offensiveness of material can make
it obscene. See Lockhart & McClure, supra note 1, at 376-78. We arc
speaking here of pornography, which appeals to the sexually immature ap-
petite for erotic fantasy, and in addition is grossly shocking.
364. Brief for the United States, pp. 35-36, 103-104, United States v.
Roth, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
365. For a description of Roth's business, see text accompanying notes
79-81 supra. See also the advertisement for American Aphrodite repro-
duced in Mead, supra note 343, at 18-19.
For a description of Alberts' business, see notes 100-102 supra and ac-
companying text. We have one of his advertisements before us. The first
page is headlined "BANNED BY BIGOTS who can't stand the meaning
of the word SEX BUT AVAILABLE TO YOU IF YOU HURRY." The
rest of the advertisement is in keeping with the headline.
366. Mead, supra note 343, at 18. She also says:
The starved, unhappy adolescent, curious, ashamed, afraid to talk
to anyone, restlessly lifting books off top library shelves, is a subject
for compassion. But those commercial outfits which debase serious
work belong in the same class as panderers, exploiting pitiful needs in
[Vol. 45:5
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pushed in this fashion is entitled to constitutional protection. For
the material is not hard-core pornography, and we do not yet
know whether and in what circumstances material that falls short
of that category can nevertheless be classed as obscene and there-
fore denied' constitutional protection because of the manner in
which it is marketed.36 7
Hard-core pornography poses a related problem when the con-
stitutionally approved verbal formula for obscenity is applied to
material of that kind. For the verbal formula speaks of ob-
scenity's appeal to the prurient interest of the average or normal
person, whereas hard-core pornography appeals to the sexually
immature who use it to stimulate and feed their autoerotic rev-
eries. To the normal, sexually mature person, hard-core pornog-
raphy is repulsive, not attractive. 38 It may be, as Eric Larrabee
suggests, that "the American public is composed largely of Peep-
ing Toms," '369 but their peeping is only at socially accepted
and widely distributed material such as photographs of models in
bathing suits; 70 there is no indication at all that they would find
a way that does not still the needs but makes them all the more insati-
able.
Ibid.
367. See pp. 79-80 infra.
368. See Cairns, supra note 342, at 85; CRA, op. cit. supra note 361,
at 154; LAWENCE, op. cit. supra note 341, at 74-75; Lockhart & McClure,
supra note 1, at 337-38.
Heywood Broun once observed:
Sheer nastiness is feeble stuff. When I was a youngster and carefully
shielded I, too, had the romantic notion that among the forbidden
books were some powerful enough to steal away the very soul. By now
I have read them and another illusion is gone. There is scarcely a kick
in a barrel full. By what seemed a happy chance there fell into my
hands, the other afternoon, a whole library of paper-backs, prepared
in Paris for the American trade. Shock was the whole objective, but it
was not there. Indeed, after less than half an hour of reading my only
emotion was one of profound pity for the poor pornographers.
BRoUN & LEECH, ANTHONY COMSTOCK 268-69 (1927).
In England, Rebecca West, noting the small and impoverished pornog-
raphy shops on several London streets, concluded that pornography has
little popular appeal and that most people are not much interested in it.
CAUSTON & YOUNG, KEEPING rr DARK 11-12 (1930). See CRAIG, op. cit.
supra note 361, at 154; Lockhart & McClure, supra note 1, at 337-38.
369. Larrabee, supra note 362, at 684. Larrabee's argument is that "the
great American love goddess," whose primary function is to serve as the
object of autoerotic reverie, represents "the commercial exploitation of the
assumption that the American public is composed largely of Peeping
Toms." He finds support for the assumption in the approach to sex institu-
tionalized by the advertising business and says, 'To serve the hunger for the
unattainable, we have brought into existence an entire class of women
whose profession is catering to voyeurs, not even in the flesh, but through
photograths-namely, the models." Ibid.
370. Except on such fortuitous occasions as that in which the officers
and men aboard the "Reluctant" in Thomas Heggen's Mr. Roberts found
themselves. See HEGGEN, MISTER ROBERTS 83-94 (1948).
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hard-core pornography attractive. Curiosity there may well be, but
addiction to hard-core pornography, no. We are left, then, in a
quandary. Hard-core pornography, which appeals only to the sex-
ually immature, is clearly obscene, but by the Court's definition
obscene material is material that appeals to the prurient interest
of the average person for whom hard-core pornography holds
little attraction.
B. CONSTANT OR VARIABLE OBSCENITY?
Both of these problems-the problem of what to do about non-
obscene material that is marketed and advertised as if it were ob-
scene, and the quandary presented by the inconsistency between
the verbal formula for obscenity and the appeal of hard-core
pornography-raise a basic issue that, at the present stage in the
development of constitutional standards governing obscenity cen-
sorship, has been tentatively and perhaps almost inadvertently re-
solved one way. The issue, of course, is whether obscenity is an
inherent characteristic of obscene material, so that material cate-
gorized as obscene is always obscene at all times and places and
in all circumstances, or whether obscenity is a chameleonic qual-
ity of material that changes with time, place, and circumstance.
In the Roth and Alberts cases, Chief Justice Warren argued for
a concept of variable obscenity:
The line dividing the salacious or pornographic from literature or
science is not straight and unwavering. . . . It is manifest that the
same object may have a different impact, varying according to the part
of the community reached. But there is more to these cases. It is not the
book that is on trial; it is a person. The conduct of the defendant is the
central issue, not the obscenity of a book or picture. The nature of the
materials is, of course, relevant as an attribute of the defendant's con-
duct, but the materials are thus placed in context from which they draw
color and character. A wholly different result might be reached in a dif-
ferent setting.371
Then, finding that both Roth and Alberts "were engaged in the
business of purveying . . . matter openly advertised to appeal to
the erotic interest of their customers" and "were plainly engaged
in the commercial exploitation of the morbid and shameful crav-
ing for materials with prurient effect," the Chief Justice voted to
affirm their convictions.372 The Court's majority ignored Chief
Justice Warren's argument, and Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting in
the Roth case, explicitly rejected it.373
371. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 495 (1957).
372. Id. at 495-96.
373. "Nor do I think the statute can fairly be read as directed only at
persons who are engaged in the business of catering to the prurient mind-
ed, even though their wares fall short of hard-core pornography." Id. at
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The American Law Institute debated the same issue in con-
sidering the obscenity provisions of the Model Penal Code. In
the debate, Henry Hart, who probably had in mind the concept of
variable obscenity and wanted to emphasize it, urged that the
criminal offense of disseminating obscene material be defined as
"pandering to an interest in obscenity."' 4 The Institute rejected
Professor Hart's proposal because of its indefiniteness and its dif-
ficulty of enforcement.375 Instead, after formulating a definition
of obscenity, the Institute proposed that dissemination of obscenity
be prohibited. But it excepted from the offense the dissemination
of obscene material "to institutions or individuals having scientific
or other special justification for possessing such materiar"' 6 and
added as a separate offense the advertising or promotion of ma-
terial represented or held out as obscene.' Here, the Institute
seems to have adhered to the concept of a constant rather than a
variable obscenity, for under variable obscenity both of these situ-
ations would be handled in much the same way, without special
provision. But it also declared that obscenity should be judged with
reference to ordinary adults except when the material is designed
for or directed "to children or other specially susceptible audi-
ence. ' 378 Consequently, the American Law Institute seems to have
straddled the issue, adopting the concept of a partly variable ob-
scenity.
Although the United States Supreme Court did not adopt a con-
cept of variable obscenity in the Roth case when it had an oppor-
tunity to do so, 379 the issue is not a dead one. It was squarely
raised in United States v. 31 Photographs-" (the Kinsey Insti-
507-08. It should be noted that Mr. Justice Harlan was here giving only
his interpretation of the Comstock Act, not his opinion on the constitu-
tionality of a statute explicitly aimed at the personal conduct which the
Chief Justice thought the federal and state governments had power to pro-
hibit.
374. MODEL PENAL CODE, op. cit supra note 314, at 1 & 14. Professor
Hart's full definition of the offense was:
Pandering to an interest in obscenity is a misdemeanor. Pandering
means exploiting such an interest primarily for pecuniary gain, know-
ing that the interest exploited is an interest in obscenity for its own
sake.
Id. at 1.
The concept of variable obscenity was widely accepted before 1957. See
Lockhart & McClure, supra note 1, at 338 & 342.
375. MODEL PENAL CODE, op. cit. supra note 314, at 14-16. "Would
it be non-criminal for A to sell the books in his 'respectable' shop and
criminal for B who has many questionable and titillating items displayed
in his shopwindow?" Id. at 15.
376. Id. at § 207.10(4) (c) & Comment, p. 17.
377. Id. at § 207.10(6) & Comment, p. 53.
378. Id. at § 207.10(2) & Comment, pp. 36-38.
379. See text accompanying notes 371-73 supra.
380. 156 F. Supp. 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). See Comment, 34 IND. L.J.
426 (1959).
1960]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
tute case), where a federal district court adopted the concept of
variable obscenity and ruled that hard-core pornography, imported
from abroad by the Kinsey Institute for scientific study, was not
obscene. The Department of Justice, sensing certain defeat, de-
cided not to appeal.3s8 And from other quarters, too, strong
voices have spoken out with arguments favoring variable obscen-
ity.382 Until the issue reaches the Court in more clear-cut fashion
than it did in the Roth and Alberts cases-where, although im-
plicit in the facts of both cases, it was neither put in issue nor
argued-we can only speculate on future developments. Since the
issue is most likely to be presented in clear-cut fashion in a case
like Kinsey Institute, involving a clearly defined special audience
for the material in question, we reserve our speculation for discus-
sion of the special audience problem. 8 3
However the variable obscenity issue is resolved, the Court
must still face the question whether, apart from special audiences
or unusual circumstances, hard-core pornography exhausts the
category of the constitutionally obscene. For a final resolution of
the latter question, we can only await the Court's decision in
cases involving such materials as undisguised girlie magazines or
Henry Miller's Quiet Days at Clichy.8 4 But this question we ex-
plore in the next topic because in our opinion the focus-if not
the resolution--of this question is related to resolution of the
problem of the audience.
C. THE AUDIENCE PROBLEM: WHOSE PRURIENT INTEREST?
One of the two most criticized aspects of the old Hicklin test
for obscenity was its reference to particularly susceptible persons
as the standard for judging material alleged to be obscene.3"'
Literally applied, it would, as Judge Learned Hand pointed out
as early as 1913, reduce all literature "to the standard of a child's
library in the supposed interest of a salacious few."380 Accord-
ingly, most American courts in time came to reject this aspect of
the Hicklin rule,38 7 and, in 1957, the Supreme Court in Butler v.
Michigan"' gave constitutional sanction to the rejection.8 '
381. ABPC, Censorship Bull., April 1958, p. 1.
382. Paul & Schwartz, supra note 170, at 239-44.
383. See pp. 70-88 infra for a consideration of the audience problem.
384. A case of this kind would require a reputable adult importer of the
work, a reputable publisher who promotes the work to an audience of
adult persons in a restrained manner, or a reputable book dealer who sells
the work to an adult without emphasis upon its seamy episodes.
385. See Lockhart & McClure, supra note 1, at 325-26, 338-40; Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 488-89 (1957).
386. United States v. Kennerley, 209 Fed. 119, 120-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
387. See Lockhart & McClure, supra note 1, at 340.
388. 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
389. See text accompanying notes 44-46 supra.
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In negating the use of particularly susceptible persons as the
standard for judging obscenity, many courts spoke also of the
positive side of the coin-they said that material must be judged
by its effects upon the "average" or "normal" person instead of
the weak and immature 90 And the Supreme Court in the Roth-
Alberts opinion used the terms "average person" and "normal
person" interchangeably in referring to the person to whose pru-
rient interest obscene material must appeal. 39' But what kind of
person is this "average" or "normal" person who is to be employ-
ed as the touchstone for obscenity? And in what circumstances is
he the proper person to be so employed?
Some courts, as in Commonwealth v. Isenstadt,92 have de-
scribed him as a composite representing all elements of society in-
cluding the young and susceptible.39  Others, like the trial court
in the Roth case, have equated him with the man in the street. 9 '
And in the Ulysses case, Judge Woolsey referred to him as "a
person with average sex instincts-what the French would call
'homme moyen sensuel-who plays, in this branch of legal in-
quiry, the same role of hypothetical reagent as does the 'reason-
able man' in the law of torts and 'the man learned in the art' on
questions of invention in patent law."395
390. Lockhart & McClure, supra note 1, at 340.
391. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489-90 (1957).
392. 318 Mass. 543, 62 N.E.2d 840 (1945).
393.
The thing to be considered is whether the book will be appreciably
injurious to society .. .because of its effect upon those who read it,
without segregating either the most susceptible or the least susceptible,
remembering that many persons who form part of the reading public
and who cannot be called abnormal are highly susceptible to influ-
ences of the kind in question and that most persons are susceptible
to some degree, and without forgetting youth as an important part of
the mass, if the book is likely to be read by youth.
Id. at 552, 62 N.E.2d at 845. See also Lockhart & McClure, supra note 1,
at 340; cf. State v. Becker, 364 Mo. 1079, 1085, 272 S.W.2d 283, 286(1954).
394.
The test is not whether it would arouse sexual desires or sexual im-
pure thoughts in those comprising a particular segment of the com-
munity, the young, the immature or the highly prudish or would leave
another segment, the scientific or highly educated or the so-called
worldly-wise and sophisticated indifferent and unmoved .... The
test in each case is the effect of the book, picture or publication con-
sidered as a whole, not upon any particular class, but upon all those
whom it is likely to reach. In other words, you determine its impact
upon the average person in the community.
Record, pp. 25-26, Roth v. United States, quoted with approval, 354 U.S.
at 490. See also Volanski v. United States, 246 F.2d 842, 844 (6th Cir.
1957).
395. United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182, 184(S.D.N.Y. 1933), affd, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934).
The American Law Institute adopted this concept of the "ordinary adult."
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1. Defects in the "Average" or "Normal" Person Test
None of these concepts of the "average" or "normal" person is
wholly satisfactory. The Massachusetts formulation of the test as a
composite of all elements of society retains most of the objection-
able rigor of the old Hicklin rule; indeed, in the Isenstadt case.
it resulted in denying normal adults access to Lillian Smith's
Strange Fruit because, according to the court, the reading public
includes many normal adolescents and adults highly susceptible to
sexual stimulation as well as many abnormal children and adults
who would be adversely affected by the book.39
The concept of the average person as the common man, or the
man in the street, is less rigorous than the Massachusetts composite,
but it, too, presents difficulties. If it is true that the common man
knows' little and cares less about literary qualities,"' what is to
be done with material of substantial aesthetic value that the com-
mon man peruses for his own private titillation, oblivious of its
artistry?399 Is such material to be suppressed even when it was
the act of censorship itself that sent the otherwise unliterary per-
sons on their stampede for a look at it?"'0 If so, censorship pro-
ceedings against material would create the very circumstances
making acceptable material obscene.
The appeal of hard-core pornography-which is the principal,
if not the sole, occupant of the category "obscene ' 41 raises a
serious defect in the conception of the "average" or "normal" per-
son as either the common man or, more particularly, the person of
average sex instincts. For hard-core pornography appeals to the
sexually immature because it feeds their craving for erotic fantasy;
to the normal, sexually mature person it is repulsive, not attrac-
MODEL PENAL CODE, op. cit. supra note 314, § 207.10(2) & Comment,
pp. 36-39.
396. Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 62 N.E.2d 840 (1945).
397. See note 393 supra.
398. See Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 553, 62 N.E.2d
840, 846 (1945).
399. F. H. Bradley once noted that sometimes the sexual detail in liter-
ature breaks loose from an aesthetic whole. "[M]ost of the time the fail-
ure is in ourselves; but when this happens it is not art's failure. There may
be some who can't appreciate art, and perhaps they should stay away from
it. But what is not tolerable is that stunted natures should set up their de-
fects as a standard." Bradley, On the Treatment of Sexual Detail in Liter-
ature, 2 COLLECTED ESSAYS 618, 625 (1935).
400. When Edmund Wilson's Memoirs of Hecate County was prosecuted
for obscenity, its entire first printing of 70,000 copies was promptly sold
out. 150 Pub. Wk. 1506 (Sept. 21, 1946). And after Doubleday's convic-
tion in New York for publishing the book, Time magazine observed: "The
decision made thousands of citizens more impatient than ever to get their
morals ruined." 48 Time, Dec. 9, 1946, pp. 24-25.
401. See text accompanying notes 338-39 supra.
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tive. °2 Consequently, neither the common man nor the person of
average sex instincts is a suitable hypothetical person to use in
determining whether hard-core pornography appeals to his pru-
rient interest. If this were the exclusive test, hard-core pornography
would never be obscene, although it is the one class of material
now certainly obscene. Obviously, something is wrong here-so
wrong that the test for obscenity by reference to its effects upon or
appeal to the "average" or "normal" person will require clarifica-
tion or modification.
Perhaps the easiest way out of the dilemma would be to recog-
nize candidly that the reference to the average or normal person
was simply a slip of the tongue, an expression of disapproval of
the Hicklin rule's reference to particularly susceptible persons. It
is easy to slip from a negative to a positive form of statement,
using the positive as a way of stating the negative, though strictly
speaking the two forms of statement are not identical. In this
light, the statement that material is to be judged by its effects upon
or appeal to the average or normal person is simply a way of stat-
ing that material disseminated to the general public must not be
judged by its effects upon or appeal to the weak or susceptible,
for that, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter said in the Butler case, would
be "to burn the house to roast the pig." ' 3 This, we suspect, is
what happened in the majority opinion in the Roth and Alberts
cases, for the main thrust of that part of the Roth-Alberts opinion
in which the reference to the "average" and "normal" person ap-
peared was rejection of the Hicklin rule as "unconstitutionally
restrictive of the freedoms of speech and press" because it "might
well encompass material legitimately treating with sex."', If
this interpretation is correct, the kind of person to be used as a
standard in judging the effects or appeal of constitutionally ob-
scene material is undetermined at this stage in the development of
constitutional standards governing obscenity censorship.
In resolving the problem of the kind of "person" to be used in
testing material for obscenity, a number of possibilities are open
to the Court. It could, for example, adopt the Massachusetts con-
cept of the average person as a composite representing all ele-
ments of society including the young and susceptible."0 5 We re-
ject this possibility because it retains too much of the extreme
rigor of the old Hicklin rule and the Court has clearly indicated,
by both words and action, that it will not accept or tolerate such
a restrictive standard."'
402. See note 368 supra.
403. 352 U.S. at 383.
404. 354 U.S. at 489-90.
405. See note 393 supra and accompanying text.
406. See text accompanying notes 163-69 & 300 supra.
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2. Constant Obscenity: Its Application and Problems
If the Court adheres to its concept of a constant rather than a
variable obscenity"' and if, as we believe, it will limit the con-
stitutionally obscene to hard-core pornography or material very
close to that line,40 s the Court will have to develop a new kind of
hypothetical person for testing material. For hard-core pornog-
raphy holds little or no attraction for the normal, sexually mature
adult, and it is not disseminated to the general public for the sim-
ple reason that most people won't buy it. As D. H. Lawrence
once observed, "[G]enuine pornography is almost always under-
ground; it doesn't come into the open."410 Consequently, there is
neither reason nor occasion to employ the average or normal per-
son as the standard for testing for hard-core pornography. Given
the nature and appeal of hard-core pornography, it is clear that
the proper hypothetical person to use in testing material of this
kind is not the average or normal person but rather the sexually
immature who wallow in hard-core pornography to satisfy their
immature craving for erotic daydreams.
So far, so good-but with respect to hard-core pornography
only. Should the Court's concept of a constant obscenity turn out
to embrace material that is not hard-core pornography but close
to the line, present constitutional standards will leave us hope-
lessly at sea. By what hypothetical person's standards, for ex-
ample, are we to determine whether such a book as Henry Miller's
Quiet Days at Clichy is "obscene"? We cannot use the sexually
immature as the standard, for the book is not limited in its appeal
to persons of that kind. If the book were to be placed on the mar-
ket for the general public, many normal, sexually mature adults
would doubtless buy and read it. In these circumstances the ma-
ture reading public could not constitutionally be denied access to
the book simply because the sexually immature might find in
it food for their erotic fantasies.410 If the sexually immature per-
son could not be employed in these circumstances, what kind of
person, if any, should be? Assuming that some kind of hypo-
thetical person is required, it is clear that he must be representa-
407. See text accompanying notes 371-73 supra.
408. See text accompanying notes 338-39 supra and 410-15 infra.
409. LAWRENCE, op. cit. supra note 341, at 75. See also note 340 supra,
where the Solicitor General also noted the clandestine way in which hard-
core pornography is handled.
We do not mean to suggest that the peddlers of hard-core pornography
never push it or offer it to the public. They sometimes do, but only in the
hope of finding among the general public those sexually immature per-
sons who will be attracted by and purchase their material. Cf. Rebecca
West's observation on the pornography shops in London, note 368 supra.
410. See text accompanying notes 44-65 supra.
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five of the mature reading public.4 1 But even with a suitable
hypothetical person to employ in testing the material-and as-
suming obscenity to be a constant quality-we would still need a
reasonably satisfactory test for identifying material that is obscene,
though not hard-core pornography.
We are confident that ordinary nudist magazines, motion pic-
tures like The Game of Love, and books like the unexpurgated
edition of D. H. Lawrence's Lady Chatterley's Lover are not ob-
scene under the concept of constant obscenity currently held by
most members of the United States Supreme Court."' We are
also confident that hard-core pornography is obscene under that
concept." Our problem is to find some way to draw a line-
somewhere between these two classes of material-that will sep-
arate from non-obscene material the material that is obscene
though not hard-core pornography. What test will with tolerable
accuracy distinguish Henry Miller's Tropic of Cancer and Tropic
of Capricorn from Lady Chatterley's Lover? Or if the Tropics
are not quite raw enough to be classed obscene, what test will dis-
tinguish these novels from his Quiet Days at Clichy, which is
rawer still? Here we have had to throw up our hands in despair.
All of these books in varying degree might well appeal to the
prurient interest or have "a tendency to excite lustful thoughts""'
of sexually mature adult readers. All, in varying degree, go into
detailed descriptions of sexual intercourse. And portions of all,
again in varying degree, are raw. We can find no rational way
to distinguish them one from another and are thrown back to the
purely visceral reaction that of this lot Quiet Days is the rawest and
Lady Chatterley's Lover the least raw."' And we suspect that
411. He could be described as the sexually mature, heterosexual adult
or perhaps, in the Ulysses terminology, as the person of average sex in-
stincts. But we doubt that the common man or man in the street concept
would be wholly satisfactory, for many, perhaps most, ordinary adults sel-
dom or never read books. See notes 393 & 394 and text accompanying
note 395 supra for descriptions of the average or normal person.
412. See notes 163-68 supra and accompanying text. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found Lady Chatterley's Lover not
obscene. Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry, 276 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1960).
The Department of Justice must share this opinion, for it decided not to
appeal the decision. N.Y. Times, June 3, 1960, p. 29, col. 6.
We are here referring to nudist magazines of the type found not obscene
by the Supreme Court. See note 166 supra. Since then the nature of Sun-
shine and Health apparently has been so substantially altered that we can-
not be confident that current issues of the magazine are clearly not ob-
scene. See People v. Cohen, 205 N.Y.S.2d 481 (Queens County Ct. 1960).
413. See text accompanying notes 335-38 supra.
414. This is one of the tests the Comrt said it approved in the Roth-
Alberts cases. But see analysis of this statement in text accompanying notes
301-10 supra.
415. Although Lady Chatterley's Lover has qualities that are lacking in
Miller's novels--an obviously ideological property and a tenderness that
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the United States Supreme Court, faced with the extremely difficult
task of formulating a satisfactory constitutional test for material
that falls somewhere between Lady Chatterley's Lover and hard-
core pornography, might well decide to hold the line for constant
obscenity at the level of hard-core pornography.
No matter how this basic problem is resolved, the concept of a
constant obscenity will leave unanswered a number of important
questions. What is to be done about material, indisputably hard-
core pornography, that is addressed to an audience of social
scientists for purely scientific purposes?416 What, if anything, is
to be done about the panderer who pushes non-obscene material
as if it were obscene, seeking out an audience of the sexually im-
mature to exploit their craving for erotic fantasy?" 7 And al-
though the general public cannot constitutionally be denied access
to non-obscene material because it might have a deleterious in-
fluence upon youth,41 is it constitutionally permissible to pro-
hibit the dissemination of such material to adolescents?"'
Constant obscenity does not provide answers to these questions.
When, as in the Kinsey case,420 hard-core pornography is ad-
dressed to an audience of social scientists solely for scientific study,
courts are forced to write an exception into the obscenity statute
that the legislature did not enact.42' The panderer who advertises
non-obscene material as if it were obscene and the adolescent who
wants access to material disseminated to the general public are be-
yond the reach and protection of obscenity statutes. The former
probably may be reached by statutes prohibiting false adver-
tising,422 but the protection of the latter is made difficult by the
pervades the whole book-these are hardly qualities that can help to
distinguish between material that is not obscene and material that is ob-
scene though not hard-core pornography. Moreover, Quiet Days at Clichy
is a much more shocking book than Lady Chatterley's Lover. Consequent-
ly, a decision of the Supreme Court that a book like Lady Chatterley's
Lover is not obscene would not answer our question.
416. See text accompanying note 380 supra.
417. See text accompanying notes 365-67 supra and 436-37 infra.
418. This was the effect of the decision in the Butler case. See text
accompanying notes 60-65 supra.
419. This question was not raised in the Butler case. See note 64 supra
and accompanying text.
420. United States v. 31 Photographs, 156 F. Supp. 350 (S.D.N.Y.
1957); See Comment, 34 IND. L.J. 426 (1959).
421. No legislative body we know of-except that of Virginia-has
written such an exception into its obscenity statute. See VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.1-236.3(10) (Supp. 1960). The closest any other legislature has come
is the United States Congress in its enactment of the customs law, which
grants a discretionary exception for "classics or books of recognized and
established literary or scientific merit." 46 Stat. 688 (1930), 19 U.S.C.
§ 1305(a) (1958).
422. See MODEL PENAL CODE, op. cit. supra note 314, at § 207.10(6)
& Comment, p. 53. Section 207.10(6) provides that "a person who adver-
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drafting hurdle set up by the Court in Winters v. New York,4
which requires a high degree of precision in statutes limiting free
expression.
3. Variable Obscenity: Its Application, Problems and Advantages
(a) Delineation of the Audience
Variable obscenity provides solutions to most of the problems
that constant obscenity leaves unresolved. Under variable obscenity,
material is judged by its appeal to and effect upon the audience to
which the material is primarily directed. In this view, material is
never inherently obscene; instead, its obscenity varies with the
circumstances of its dissemination. Material may be obscene when
directed to one class of persons but not when directed to anoth-
er."4 Consequently, the concept of a variable obscenity provides
a ready answer to the question posed in the Kinsey case: Is ma-
terial, indisputably hard-core pornography, constitutionally "ob-
scene" when it is directed exclusively to an audience of social
scientists solely for the purpose of scientific study? The answer is
clearly, "Of course not."' "m Variable obscenity also makes it pos-
sible to reach, under obscenity statutes, the panderer who adver-
tises and pushes non-pornographic material as if it were hard-core
pornography, seeking out an audience of the sexually immature
who bring their "pornographic intent to something which is not
itself pornographic."' 6 Because it focuses attention on particu-
lar types of audiences, variable obscenity may, in addition, contrib-
ute to a solution of the problem created by the efforts of the sex-
ually immature to gain access to material aimed at a different
audience, by suggesting ways of confining such material in ap-
propriate channels.1 7 And if the United States Supreme Court
should abandon its current but tentatively held concept of con-
stant obscenity,' it is clear that the Court could, in applying
the variable test for obscenity, include material that is not hard-
core pornography within the category of the constitutionally ob-
tises or otherwise promotes the sale of material represented or held out by
him to be obscene commits a misdemeanor."
423. 333 U.S. 507 (1948). See MODEL PENAL CODE, op. cit. supra note
314, at pp. 55-57.
424. See Lockhart & McClure, supra note 1, at 340-42, 394-95.
425. This was the answer given by Judge Palmieri in that case, though
not quite so emphatically. See United States v. 31 Photographs, 156 F.
Supp. 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). See also Comment, 34 IND. LJ. 426 (1959).
426. Mead, supra note 343, at 18. For an illustration of how the vari-
able obscenity concept reaches the panderer of non-pornographic material,
see United States v. Rebhuhn, 109 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1940).
427. See text accompanying notes 455-70 infra for consideration of this
problem.
428. See text accompanying notes 371-73 supra.
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scene.429 But despite these apparent advantages, variable obscen-
ity is not without its own problems and difficulties.
To be a reasonably satisfactory tool for discriminating between
obscene and non-obscene material in circumstances that vary in
many different ways, variable obscenity requires, in each case,
careful delineation of the audience to which material is primarily
directed and evaluation of the nature of the material's appeal to or
impact upon persons making up the particular audience.
In defining the primary audience of material it is important to
recognize that most material is not directed to and does not reach
the general public. Instead, although publicly offered, it is di-
rected to and reaches only particular segments of the general pub-
lic. The patrons of an art theater are different from those who pa-
tronize the usual drive-in theater, just as both of these audiences
are, in varying degrees, different from the theater-goers who patron-
ize the legitimate stage. The patrons of museums are not at all
like those who frequent penny arcades to shoot at moving targets
and look at the peep-shows. Different types of books have dif-
ferent audiences, just as different types of magazines appeal to
different audiences.430 Radio and television have audiences that
vary with the nature of particular programs and the hour of the
day. 431
The existence of substantial variations in audience appeal with-
in every channel of communication is well known but often
overlooked by those who state that material must be tested
for obscenity by the standard of the average, normal, or ordinary
person. Under variable obscenity the concept of the average or
normal person has little place. Instead, variable obscenity requires
first a determination of the audience to which the material is pri-
429. See text accompanying notes 436-37 infra.
430. For example, the audience for inexpensive paper-bound books is
broader than the audience for books in hard covers or other trade editions.
See Lockhart & McClure, supra note 1, at 302-03.
This variability in audience applies even more to magazines, many of
which have carved out their own special audiences. The household with
The Atlantic Monthly on its coffee table is not likely to have beside The
Atlantic Monthly a copy of True Confessions. In New Metropolitan Fiction,
Inc. v. Dell Pub. Co., 19 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1927), the publisher of
the magazines Marriage and Marriage Stories resisted a competitor's reg-
istration of a trade mark for Modern Marriage magazine. In affirming the
Patent Commissioner's denial of the registration, the court pointed out that
all three magazines were aimed at an audience of the same class and then
noted that "this class is not composed of discriminating buyers; the record,
indeed, contains testimony to the effect that 'the type of people who read
"Marriage" and "Marriage Stories" are usually of the same intelligence of a
normal school child of 11 years of age.' " Ibid.
431. The soap-opera is a daytime phenomenon in both radio and tele-
vision; evening hours are never wasted on it for obvious reasons. Cf.
Larrabee, supra note 362, at 687 n.72.
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manly directed, and then, as the standard for testing the material,
the postulation of a hypothetical person typical of that audience.
But the hypothetical person for testing variable obscenity must
not be typical of the material's peripheral audiences; he must be a
hypothetical representative of only its primary audience. For in-
clusion of the peripheral audience would often lead to the denial
of material to its primary audience simply because it might be de-
leterious to a few on the periphery, thus returning us to the
clutches of the rejected Hicklin rule. In Commonwealth v. Isen-
stadt,'3 where the court included among the "reading public"
the highly susceptible, the abnormal, and the "many adolescents"
who were "avid readers of novels,"'" Lillian Smith's Strange
Fruit was held obscene. Surely, if the United States Supreme Court
were to adopt the concept of a variable obscenity, it would insist
that the peripheral audience be rigidly excluded from considera-
tion.
(b) The Nature of the Appeal to the Audience
Although we may have found the proper hypothetical person to
use as the standard in testing material for variable obscenity, we
still know little of the nature of material that, tested by such a
standard, is obscene. Following the definition of obscenity set out
in the Roth-Alberts opinion, we presume that the material would
have to appeal to our hypothetical person's prurient interest; but
of the nature of that appeal we know next to nothing."3" As be-
fore, we are forced to turn to pornography to gain some under-
standing of material the Court might regard as obscene if it were
to adopt the concept of a variable obscenity.'
Assuming, as we do, that hard-core pornography is the princi-
pal or perhaps even the exclusive concept of obscenity currently
held by most members of the United States Supreme Court,'4 it
seems likely that the Court would regard as obscene, under vari-
able obscenity, material that is primarily directed to an audience
of the sexually immature for the purpose of satisfying their crav-
ing for erotic fantasy, whether or not the material is intrinsically
hard-core pornography. Thus, obscenity statutes could constitu-
tionally be employed to reach persons who, like Samuel Roth and
David Alberts, advertise material that is not intrinsically porno-
graphic as if it were hard-core pornography, seeking out an audi-
ence of the sexually immature to exploit their pitiful needs.4'3
432. 318 Mass. 543, 62 N.E.2d 840 (1945).
433. Id. at 552, 557, 62 N.E.2d at 845, 848.
434. See text accompanying notes 313-19 supra.
435. See text accompanying notes 335-37 supra.
436. See text accompanying notes 338-39 supra.
437. See, e.g., United States v. Rebhuh, 109 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1940).
See also Mead, supra note 343, at 18.
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In these circumstances, both the panderer and the members of his
sexually immature audience treat the material as if it were hard-
core pornography.
When material is thus treated as hard-core pornography, the
nature and appeal of hard-core pornography seems to furnish a
reasonably satisfactory tool for separating the obscene from the
non-obscene, regardless of its intrinsic nature. But when material
is neither intrinsically hard-core pornography, nor treated as such,
variable obscenity leaves us just as much at sea as did constant ob-
scenity and for the very same reasons.4 38 And we suspect that
should the Supreme Court adopt the variable obscenity concept, it
might well draw the constitutional line at the level of material
that is treated as hard-core pornography.439
On the merits, there is much to be said for drawing the line at
this point under a variable obscenity concept. Control over all ma-
terial treated as hard-core pornography would leave free from con-
trol very little material that can reasonably be regarded as socially
undesirable. For any material directed primarily to an audience of
the sexually immature for the purpose of feeding their craving for
erotic fantasy would be considered obscene, whatever its intrinsic
nature when directed at a mature adult audience. At the same time,
the nature and appeal of hard-core pornography provides a work-
able standard that would eliminate the shadowy area into which
we must move if we go beyond hard-core pornography.
Assuming the Court adopts such a standard, its application
would require a careful delineation of the material's primary au-
dience and then a determination of whether, in the circumstances
and judged by a hypothetical person typical of those making up
the primary audience, the material's sole or predominant appeal
is to a sexually immature craving for erotic fantasy. This two-
step process, we believe, provides a reasonably workable and dis-
criminating method of distinguishing between the obscene and
the non-obscene in a wide variety of situations. Indeed, courts had
been doing just this for years,440 until the constant obscenity
concept of the Roth-Alberts opinion threw some of them into con-
fusion.44'
438. See text accompanying notes 412-15 supra.
In addition to the Henry Miller books, the girlie magazines-which by
their very nature have special audiences made up of or bordering upon
the sexually immature-would present enormous difficulty. And what would
we do with standard material advertised generally in bad ti-tt . .. as
a motion picture advertised as "frank," "daring," or "sexsational"?
439. Compare text following note 415 supra.
440. See Lockhart & McClure, supra note 1, at 340-41.
441. See, e.g., Klaw v. Schaffer, 151 F. Supp. 534 (S.D.N.Y. 1957),
af 'd per curiam, 251 F.2d 615 (2d Cir. 1958); City of Cincinnati v. King,
107 Ohio App. 453, 159 N.E. 767, affirming 6 Ohio Op. 2d 313, 152
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(c) An Impediment to Enforcement?
Yet it must be conceded that variable obscenity presents some
practical difficulties in law enforcement. A police officer in mak-
ing an arrest or a magistrate at a preliminary hearing cannot al-
ways "make necessary preliminary judgments from the book or
picture itself, without, for example, inquiring whether an itiner-
ant peddler is offering his wares only to rare book collectors.""'
It is also true that in the prosecution of obscenity cases variable
obscenity sometimes requires evidence beyond the material itself.
These, however, do not seem to us to be sufficiently important ob-
jections to variable obscenity to justify its rejection as impractica-
ble.
We are convinced that in most obscenity cases sufficient evi-
dence of the circumstances of dissemination of the material is
readily available and is in fact commonly considered by police of-
ficers and magistrates in making their necessary preliminary judg-
ments. For example, most art and photography schools employ live
nude models for their students, and so far as we are aware the
authorities never bring charges of obscenity against them even
though there may be a few "students" on the periphery of the
schools' primary audiences who enroll solely for erotic gratifica-
tion. But in some cities newspapers carry advertisements inviting
readers to photography studios where-the ads imply but do not
explicitly state-attractively named females will pose for them in
the nude." 3 No one should have the slightest difficulty distin-
guishing between the two cases, for in the latter case the studio is
plainly appealing to a sexually immature audience. And we sup-
pose, though we have no factual data to support our guess, that
when studios of the latter kind get too far out of hand the authori-
ties take steps to bring them into line. This is the sort of judgment
that we are convinced police officers, magistrates, and prosecuting
attorneys constantly make in all types of obscenity cases, upon
evidence that is both adequate and readily available to them.
We are also convinced that the intrinsic nature of the material
fairly allocates the practical burden of procuring evidence of the
material's primary audience and its appeal to that audience.44
N.E.2d 23 (C.P. 1958); cf. In re Search Warrant of Property at 5 W. 12th
St. v. Marcus, 334 S.W.2d 119, 126 (Mo. 1960).
442. MODEL PENAL CODE, op. cit. supra note 314, at 38. Yet the Ameri-
can Law Institute itself proposed that obscenity be "judged with reference
to children or other specially susceptible audience if it appears from the
character of the material or the circumstances of its dissemination to be
specially designed for or directed to such an audience." Id. at § 207.10(2).
443. We suppose that if a reader appears at the studio without a camera
the studio will rent him one, with or without film.
444. Competent prosecutors make extensive use of such evidence. Brom-
berg, supra note 341, at 419-21.
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When the material is intrinsically hard-core pornography, the risk
of an adverse ruling by the trier of fact will always, as a practical
matter, place the burden of producing evidence of the material's
primary audience and its lack of prurient appeal to that audience
upon the disseminator of the material. The Kinsey Institute suc-
cessfully produced such evidence in United States v. 31 Photo-
graphs.445 On the other hand, when a work of apparent literary
merit by a reputable author is issued by a respectable publisher,
the burden of producing evidence relating to the audience will,
as a practical matter, fall on the prosecution. For example, in the
Roth case"' one of the short stories contained in the volume of
American Aphrodite upon which Roth was convicted was Boy
With a Trumpet, by the distinguished Welch novelist, Rhys Da-
vies. This short story was the title story of a collection of Davies'
short stories published by Doubleday in 1951, and so far as we
are aware neither Doubleday nor any book dealer anywhere in the
country was disturbed by any official for selling the book. With
material of this kind, the prosecution should carry the entire bur-
den of proving that a particular disseminator of the book was,
like Roth, a panderer directing the book at a primary audience of
the sexually immature for the purpose of satisfying their appetite
for erotic fantasy.447
Between these two extremes, the practical burden of producing
evidence of the material's primary audience and of the nature of
its appeal will shift in varying degrees, depending upon the in-
trinsic nature of the material. The more the material shows on its
face the likelihood of its appeal to an audience of the sexually
immature, the more the disseminator will have to scratch for evi-
dence that he made a legitimate appeal to a different primary
audience. Conversely, the more the material shows on its face that
it is standard fare for sexually mature adults, the harder law-en-
forcement officers will have to dig to establish that a particular
disseminator's primary audience is really made up of the sexually
immature, to whom he purveyed the material for the purpose of
feeding their desire for erotic fantasy. To illustrate, the mail order
operator who, like David Alberts, handles "bondage photos" will
have a very difficult time finding evidence to persuade the trier of
fact that his primary audience is not made up of the sexually im-
mature, for photographs of this type appeal only to a special vari-
ant of the sexually immature-those who associate sex with cruelty
445. 156 F. Supp. 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). See Comment, 34 IND. L.J.
426 (1959).
446. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
447. For a description of Roth's business, see text accompanying notes
79-81 supra.
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and brutality.44 Law-enforcement officials will have an equally
difficult time in proceeding against a book dealer for handling
the unexpurgated edition of Lady Chatterley's Lover, for they
will be required to prove that this dealer's primary audience for
the book is made up of adolescents or other sexually immature
persons.4 9 But in proceedings against a dealer for handling
Henry Miller's Quiet Days at Clichy or his Tropic of Cancer and
Tropic of Capricorn, both sides will be likely to scramble for evi-
dence of that dealer's primary audience for the books. If he is a
reputable book dealer whose clientele is made up mainly of bib-
liophiles, he will of course seek to establish these facts, and law
enforcement officials will then have difficulty proving that this
particular dealer's primary audience for these books is a sexually
immature one. But if the dealer is one of little or no repute, who
handles along with the Miller novels only girlie and nudist maga-
zines and other books predominantly sexual in nature, law enforce-
ment officials will certainly make use of this evidence and the deal-
er will then have difficulty proving that his audience for the Miller
books is not a sexually immature one.45
We conclude therefore that variable obscenity is just as prac-
ticable in operation as constant obscenity. Those instances in which
variable obscenity makes it necessary for law enforcement offi-
cials to dig hard for evidence that a particular person is dissemi-
nating material to a primary audience of the sexually immature
for the purpose of feeding their desire for erotic fantasy are in-
stances in which we believe they should be put to that effort and
required to procure their evidence before proceeding with obscenity
charges. We see no impediment to fair law enforcement here.
448. "Bondage photos" are photographs of women, scantily clad in
black costumes, tied or strapped to various objects such as barber chairs in
a variety of ways. Often they show two women, one tied or strapped and
the other standing by with a whip. They are usually shown wearing high-
heeled boots or button shoes and gauntlets. Their obvious appeal is only
to the particular sub-class of the sexually immature whose fantasies link
sex and flagellation.
See text accompanying notes 100-02 supra for a description of Alberts'
business.
449. We assume that the unexpurgated edition of Lady Chaunerley's
Lover might be obscene when directed at an audience of sexually imma-
ture persons. Otherwise, we take for granted that the book is not obscene.
See text accompanying notes 412 supra & 492-94 inIra.
450. It seems clear to us that these Henry Miller novels would be clearly
obscene under the variable obscenity concept when directed at an audience
of the sexually immature. When directed at a mature audience, they would
not be obscene, under either the constant or variable obscenity concept, if
the United States Supreme Court limits obscenity to material that is hard-core
pornography or to material that is treated as such. But we do not yet know
whether the Court will draw the line at these points.
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(d) Effect upon the Sexually Immature
Although adoption of the concept of variable obscenity would
not make law enforcement impracticable, it may be objected that
variable obscenity would jeopardize independent judicial review
of obscenity decisions, effectively deprive the sexually immature
segments of the populace of material that may occasionally have
great social importance, and make the law appear ludicrous in
denying to harmless old men the material from which they seek to
keep alive the illusion of virility. Reserving discussion of the effect
of variable obscenity upon independent judicial review for treat-
ment with our consideration of judicial review in obscenity cases,45 1
we dispose of the last two objections here.
It is, of course, true that in some circumstances variable ob-
scenity may effectively deprive the sexually immature, including
some harmless old men, of material that in other circumstances
would not be obscene and might even have great social importance.
But the circumstances in which this segment of the populace is
deprived of otherwise non-obscene material are circumstances in
which the material has no social importance for the audience to
which it is primarily directed. Though denied to an audience of
the sexually immature when primarily directed to such an audi-
ence, the material is preserved for all others; and even some of the
sexually immature may peruse the material if they are willing to
procure it from sources that do not channel it to a primary audi-
ence of the sexually immature. " ' And while it may seem ludicrous
to deprive sexually immature but harmless old men of the material
they use to nourish their illusions of sexual virility, it is not ludi-
crous to protect adolescents from material they crave to satisfy in
erotic fantasy their immature hunger for sexual knowledge and ex-
perience.453 Which leads us to the question of whether adoles-
cents may constitutionally be denied access to material aimed at
a primary audience of sexually mature adults because the material
might be thought harmful in some way to adolescents gaining ac-
cess to the material.454
451. See pp. 114-20 infra.
452. The adult but sexually immature may, if they wish, turn to legiti-
mate channels for the material. Consequently, the only material likely to be
totally denied such persons is hard-core pornography, which, of course, the
concept of a constant obscenity logically would also deny to them but
without preserving the pornography for those to whom it is a proper sub-
ject of scientific study.
453. "The starved, unhappy adolescent, curious, ashamed, afraid to talk
to anyone, restlessly lifting books off top library shelves, is a subject for
compassion." Mead, supra note 343, at 18.
454. This is the question that was not raised or decided in the Butler
case. See note 64 supra and accompanying text. The United States Su-
preme Court may have had a chance to grapple with the question in Mat-
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(e) For Adults Only
The concept of a constant obscenity, which assumes that ob-
scenity is an inherent quality of material that renders it unfit for
everyone in all circumstances, provides no answer to this question.
If adolescents are to be denied access to material legitimately di-
rected to a primary audience of sexually mature adults, constant
obscenity will require that statutes be couched in language pro-
scribing something other than obscenity. And because of the
Butler and Winters cases,455 the drafting of such a statute pre-
sents a formidable hurdle-a hurdle that statutory draftsmen and
legislators have not yet been able to overcome.
Variable obscenity, however, furnishes a useful analytical tool
for dealing with the problem of denying adolescents access to ma-
terial aimed at a primary audience of sexually mature adults.
For variable obscenity focuses attention upon the make-up of pri-
mary and peripheral audiences in varying circumstances, and pro-
vides a reasonably satisfactory means for delineating the obscene
in each circumstance. 457
As we have seen, variable obscenity by its very nature permits
protection of adolescents from material when it is directed pri-
marily to them for the purpose of satisfying in erotic fantasy their
hunger for sexual knowledge and experience. 45 At the same time,
it protects primary audiences of sexually mature adults from dep-
rivation of material despite the fact that some persons on the
periphery of the audience might gain access to the material for the
purpose of satisfying their immature appetites for erotic fan-
tasy.5 9 But the problem presented by peripheral audiences of
adolescents is more difficult to deal with. Is it possible to protect
the primary audiences of sexually mature adults from deprivation
thews v. Florida, 99 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 1951), where the defendant was con-
victed of exhibiting obscene pictures to a 12-year-old girl, but the Court
denied certiorari. Matthews v. Florida, 356 U.S. 918 (1958). We do not
know, however, whether the material in this case was hard-core pornog-
raphy, or material legitimate for a primary audience of sexually mature
adults but found to be too raw for a 12-year-old girl.
455. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957); Winters v. New York,
333 U.S. 507 (1948).
456. See Paramount Film Distrib. Corp. v. City of Chicago, 172 F.
Supp. 69 (N.D. Il. 1959); Werner v. City of Knoxville, 161 F. Supp. 9(E.D. Tenn. 1958); Katzev v. County of Los Angeles, 52 Cal. 2d 360, 341
P.2d 310 (1959); Police Comm'r of Baltimore v. Siegel Enterprises, Inc.,
162 A.2d 727 (Md. 1960); Adams v. Hinkle, 51 Wash. 2d 763, 322 P.2d
844 (1958).
457. See text accompanying notes 424-50 supra.
458. But material designed merely to inform adolescents about sex, not
to feed erotic fantasy, is not obscene even when directed to a primary au-
dience of adolescents. United States v. Deanett, 39 F.2d 564 (2d Cir.
1930).
459. See text following note 433 supra.
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of material that is not obscene to them and, at the same time, keep
adolescents from the material because they would use it porno-
graphically? This is, in short, the old problem of the "adults only"
classification, a problem that at bottom is one of the feasibility of
excluding a peripheral audience of adolescents without inter-
fering with the primary audience of sexually mature adults.
The problem is most acute with books, both hard-cover and
paper-bound, and with magazines. To insist that dealers in books
and magazines determine at their peril which ones must not be
sold to adolescents would be asking the impossible of them4 °
and therefore would probably violate the constitutional require-
ment of scienter.46' To prohibit dealers from exhibiting within
the view of adolescents books and magazines that can be sold
only to adults would raise the additional problem of undue inter-
ference with the material's primary audience." 2 Beyond these ob-
stacles is the disrupting effect of "adult only" counters or shelves
in book stores and at newsstands, for the "adult only" label would
serve only to attract adolescents eager for a look at the forbidden
fruit and would make it difficult for the dealer to prevent ado-
lescent shoplifting of the books and magazines.463 To avoid
these difficulties cautious dealers might well decide to abandon all
books and magazines claimed by any one to be unsuitable for
adolescents. For these reasons, we suspect that the Supreme Court
might well invalidate statutes designed to deny a peripheral ado-
lescent audience access to books and magazines aimed at a pri-
mary audience of sexually mature adults, because of the tendency
to reduce adult reading material to a level suitable for adoles-
cents.464 Admittedly, however, our prediction is made with no
great assurance, for until the actual impact of such statutes on
the distribution of books and magazines to their primary audi-
ences of sexually mature adults becomes more clear, our argu-
460. This is particularly true of dealers in paper bound books who or-
dinarily have little knowledge of the contents or nature of the books they
handle.
461. See pp. 103-08 infra, for a discussion of the scienter requirement.
462. A Maryland statute was recently held unconstitutional for this rea-
son, among others. Police Comm'r of Baltimore v. Siegel Enterprises,
Inc. 162 A.2d 727 (Md. 1960), cert. denied 81 Sup. Ct. 273 (1960).
463. Margaret Mead suggests that labeling material forbidden for cer-
tain audiences may serve a useful function in making readers aware of the
kind of material they are reading. Mead, supra note 343, at 21-23.
464. See Lockhart & McClure, Obscenity in the Courts, 20 LAw & CON-
TEMP. PROB. 587, 601-02 (1955).
In late 1956, the City of Chicago enacted a carefully drafted ordinance
prohibiting the sale, to persons under 17 years of age, of any publication
"which, considered as a whole, has the dominant effect of substantiall,
arousing sexual desires in persons under the age of 17 years . ...
Hearings, supra note 38, at 134. An ordinance of this kind would be a
suitable vehicle for raising the question.
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ment is based on conjecture. Here, as in other situations, the
Court is likely to feel its way, seeking to reconcile the conflicting
interests of the primary and peripheral audiences in the light of
actual experience with statutes of this type.
Motion pictures "for adults only" present fewer difficulties than
books and magazines. Assuming a constitutional and workable
system of film classification, 4" the classification of some motion
pictures "for adults only" would have only an indirect-and pos-
sibly minor-impact upon adults constitutionally entitled to see
such pictures. It is relatively easy to exclude adolescents from mo-
tion picture audiences without interfering with the admission of
adults466-- unlike the difficulty of excluding adolescents from busi-
ness establishments selling books and magazines, which adoles-
cents may have perfectly legitimate reasons for entering." 7 The
immediate effect of excluding adolescents from theaters exhibiting
motion pictures "for adults only" would be to cause economic loss.
This economic loss could result indirectly in depriving adults of
motion pictures not suitable for adolescents. With their mass audi-
ences lost to television, motion picture producers may be com-
pelled to rely heavily upon large audiences of adolescents, and
therefore may be unwilling to risk substantial investment in the
production of adult motion pictures.4" Similarly, some motion
picture exhibitors, lacking a sufficiently large audience of sophisti-
cated adults interested in pictures "for adults only," may find it
economically undesirable to exhibit motion pictures from which
adolescents must be excluded. Although some sexually mature
adults may, for these reasons, be deprived of convenient oppor-
tunities to view motion pictures they would like to see, we can see
in the operation of these market factors no sufficient justification
for invalidating legislation properly drafted to exclude adolescents
from motion pictures directed to primary audiences of adults
and properly classified "for adults only."4"9 Although the Supreme
465. We have excluded the "prior restraint" problem from considera-
tion in this Article. For adequate treatment, that problem would require a
separate article. See Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 29 U.S.L WEEK
4120 (1961).
466. As every liquor dealer knows, there may sometimes be difficulty
in judging the correct age of customers. But in motion picture classifica-
tion, the constitutional requirement of scienter will probably be extended
to protect the exhibitor who admits a 16-year-old in the honest but mis-
taken belief that the adolescent is, for example, over 18, if that should be
the age limit set by the classification system.
467. To purchase, for example, a tube of toothpaste in a drug store or
a copy of Alcott's Little Women instead of the unexpurgated edition of
Lady Chatterley's Lover.
468. Note, "For Adults Only": The Constitutionality of Governmental
Film Censorship by Age Classification, 69 YAL.E L. 141, 149 (1959).
469. The legislation would have to set out a proper and reasonably
definite test for classifying motion pictures forbidden to adolescents and
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Court has not yet considered the problem, 471 we are reasonably
confident that such a statute will pass constitutional muster.
D. THE DOMINANT THEME OF MATERIAL CONSIDERED AS A
WHOLE
In Roth-Alberts, the Supreme Court's contribution to the de-
veloping constitutional standards was not limited to its rejection
of the "most susceptible persons" test. A second major contribu-
tion was its rejection of the "isolated passages" test of the old
Hicklin rule, as that rule had come to be interpreted by American
courts.4 ' When in 1954 we urged that to protect the values of
free expression a constitutional standard for obscenity should re-
quire that material be judged as a whole instead of by its parts,1 2
most courts had already departed from the earlier "isolated pas-
sages" test as a matter of statutory interpretation. 3 But a con-
stitutional requirement that material be judged as a whole was
needed to protect material from a few narrow-minded courts that
could be too shocked by four-letter words and frank passages to
examine and understand their relation to the theme of the material
as a whole.474 Such a constitutional requirement was also needed,
also specify age limits that reasonably correspond to the normal begin-
ning and ending of adolescence. See text accompanying notes 436-37 su-
pra, for our suggestion that a suitable and practicable test is whether the
adolescents would treat the material as if it were hard-core pornography.
And since individual differences among children bring them to adolescence
at different ages, it is important that the legislation set age levels that cor-
respond to the norm and not be extended to cover those few children
whose entry into maturity is long delayed. In Paramount Film Distrib. Corp.
v. City of Chicago, 172 F. Supp. 69 (N.D. Ill. 1959), the court upset a
Chicago ordinance because it was "hopelessly indefinite" in its reference to
any film that "tends toward creating a harmful impression on the minds of
children" and because its age limit of 21 was unreasonably high. See Note,
"For Adults Only," supra note 468, for an analysis of the case.
470. In the two motion picture cases since the Roth-Alberts decisions-
Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S.
684 (1959) and Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 355 U.S. 35 (1957)-
the Court simply lifted censorship of "Lady Chatterley's Lover" and
"The Game of Love," respectively, without consideration of the audience
problem. In the Times Film case, the exhibitor volunteered to restrict
his audience to persons 18 years of age or older. Appendix to Petition for
a Writ of Certiorari, p. 5a. The master in the district court proceedings
recommended to the court an injunction against censorship except for
persons under 18. Id. at p. 30a. The district court and the court of appeals
upheld the censorship without respect to age. Consequently, the validity
of censorship by age classification was not before the United States Su-
preme Court when it reversed per curiam. See note 168 supra for a dis-
cussion of the case.
471. See notes 298-300 supra and accompanying text.
472. Lockhart & McClure, supra note 1, at 392.
473. Id. at 345.
474. See, e.g., Besig v. United States, 208 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1953),
where the court paid lip service to the "book as a whole" test but seemed
to base its decision on isolated passages that shocked the judges, who made
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in more than one-fourth of the states, to neutralize statutes that
had incorporated the "isolated passages" test declaring material ob-
scene when it "contains" obscene words or passagesc 
7
The Roth-Alberts opinion established the needed constitutional
requirement. The majority opinion of the Supreme Court is both
deliberate and explicit on this point. In the paragraph setting
out a constitutionally satisfactory standard for obscenity, the Court
rejected the old Hicklin rule as "unconstitutionally restrictive of
the freedoms of speech and press" because it judged obscenity "by
the effect of isolated passages upon the most susceptible persons"
and thereby "might well encompass material legitimately treating
of sex."4"6 The Court ruled that the test for obscenity substituted
for the Hicklin rule by later American decisions "provides safe-
guards adequate to withstand the charge of constitutional infirm-
ity."' According to the opinion, the substituted test, which the
Court raised to the level of a constitutionally satisfactory test for
obscenity, is "whether to the average person, applying contempo-
rary community standards, the dominant theme of the material
taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest."417
Since the only issues actually before the Court in both the Roth
and Alberts cases involved the constitutional validity of the two
statutes,7 9 this part of the opinion might properly be classified
as dictum. But it was not inadvertent or casual dictum. On the
contrary, it was one of the key paragraphs of the entire opinion,
summing up in short compass a constitutionally satisfactory test
for distinguishing obscene material, which is not entitled to con-
stitutional protection, from non-obscene material, which is entitled
to such protection. Moreover, in the next paragraph the majority
opinion explicitly pointed out that the trier of fact in both cases
had judged "each item as a whole as it would affect the normal
person."48 0
There is every reason to believe that this key paragraph is en-
titled to as much weight as any other portion of the Roth-Alberts
majority opinion-perhaps even more-because none of the four
Justices who refused to join in the opinion is likely to disagree
with the requirement that material be judged as a whole. Mr. Jus-
tice Harlan, in his separate opinion, explicitly agreed to this re-
quirement, saying, "I agree with the Court, of course, that the
no apparent effort to consider the relevance of the passages to the book
as a whole.
475. Lockhart & McClure, supra note 1, at 344 n.321, lists 14 states
with such statutes in effect in 1954.
476. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957). (Emphasis added.)
477. Ibid.
478. Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
479. See pp. 19-25 supra.
480. 354 U.S. at 489. (Emphasis added.)
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books must be judged as a whole and in relation to the normal
adult reader."'' And since Chief Justice Warren and Justices
Black and Douglas would permit less censorship than the other
six Justices"5 2 it seems improbable that they would permit ma-
terial to be judged by isolated parts.
No Supreme Court opinion since Roth-Alberts has touched on
the point, but state courts and lower federal courts have followed
the constitutional requirement that material must be judged as a
whole and by its dominant theme. 83 With one rare exception, 8'
however, state legislatures have shown no inclination to amend
their "containing" statutes to conform to the constitutional require-
ment. Indeed, since Roth-Alberts two state legislatures have amend-
ed their statutes but retained or re-enacted the "containing" pro-
visions." 5 The greater responsiveness of courts to the new re-
quirement is demonstrated by the Connecticut Supreme Court's
reconciliation of the state's "containing" statute with the Roth-
Alberts requirement. The Connecticut statute proscribes material
"containing obscene, indecent or impure language, or any pic-
ture of . . . like character." Giving no explanation except a ci-
tation to the Roth-Alberts opinion, the court simply ruled that the
statute "contemplates" that the material is to be considered as a
whole.' Since the only alternative to this tour de force was to
hold the statute unconstitutional, the Connecticut Supreme Court
may have set a practical example for courts in the dozen states
whose statutes still retain "containing" provisions.
481. Id. at 502. (Emphasis added.)
482. See text accompanying notes 130, 137-40, 260-61 supra.
483. Probably the most significant of these were the two excellent
opinions in the Grove case, which rejected the Postmaster General's ban
on the unexpurgated edition of Lady Chatterley's Lover. Both invoked the
Roth requirement to overrule the Postmaster General, whose decision was
based on the alleged obscenity of individual passages without concern for
their relation to the theme of the novel. Grove Press, Inc. v. Christen-
berry, 175 F. Supp. 488, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), a/I'd, 276 F.2d 433, 437-39
(2d Cir. 1960). See also State v. Sul, 146 Conn. 78, 147 A.2d 686 (1958);
People v. Bantam Books, 9 Misc. 2d 1064, 172 N.Y.S.2d 515 (Sup. Ct.
1957); State v. Kowan, 7 Ohio Op. 2d 81, 156 N.E.2d 170 (C.P. 1958).
484. On June 13, less than two weeks before the Roth decision, the
Michigan legislature replaced its "containing" statute with one simply pro-
hibiting sale of an "obscene . . . book." Mich. Pub. Acts 1957, No. 265.
In 1958 the statute was amended to incorporate explicitly the requirement
that the book be considered as a whole. See MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.575(2)
(Supp. 1959). But the Michigan legislature apparently overlooked the "con-
taining" provisions of another pre-1957 statute limiting the type of mate-
rial that can be sold to "any minor child." See MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 28.377 (1938).
485. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 134, § 24 (Supp. 1959), replacing
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 134, § 24 (1954); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
31, § 11-31-1 (Supp. 1959), leaving the "containing" language unchanged
in R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 31, § 11-31-1 (1956).
486. State v. Sul, 146 Conn. 78, 147 A.2d 686 (1958). The statute in-
volved was CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-243 (1958).
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The Supreme Court has yet to speak of how it will apply the
requirement that material must be judged by "the dominant theme
of the material taken as a whole." We are not without some guid-
ance, however, for in Roth-Alberts the Court simply lifted to the
level of a constitutional requirement a concept that enlightened
courts had already fairly well developed as a matter of statutory
interpretation.4" These decisions will be helpful in charting the
probable meaning of the new constitutional requirement, but they
do not settle one of its most critical issues.
In applying the requirement that material must be judged as a
whole and by its dominant theme, courts have often spoken of
the relevance of the objectionable parts to the dominant theme. If
the objectionable parts are relevant to the dominant theme, courts
ordinarily have found the material not obscene. But if the parts
are irrelevant to the theme and independently obscene themselves,
courts have usually found the material obscene. 4ss The critical
issue arises when it is claimed that the material is obscene because
the objectionable parts, though relevant to the dominant theme,
are not necessary to communicate the theme. For example, in
Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, Lillian Smith's Strange Fruit was held
obscene because, in the court's judgment, the author could have
conveyed her "sincere message" without the objectionable parts
of the book."'9 Other courts use a far more satisfactory test that
does not put courts in the silly position of instructing authors
how to write their books. They determine the relevancy of the ob-
jectionable parts to the theme of the material as a whole by the
author's sincerity of purpose, a standard of relevancy that recog-
nizes what is sometimes called "literary necessity"-the author's
need to use whatever words and passages he feels will produce
the over-all effect he hopes to achieve.49 And here the testimony
of the author himself or of expert witnesses is indispensable to a
sound judgment of relevancy.49'
Since Roth-Alberts, this critical issue has been considered in
only one case-the case that arose out of the Postmaster General's
efforts to cleanse the mails of the unexpurgated edition of D. H.
Lawrence's Lady Chatterley's Lover. In that case Judge Bryan,
in the federal district court, and Judge Clark, in the court of ap-
487. Lockhart & McClure, supra note 1, at 345-47.
488. Id. at 346.
489. 318 Mass. 543, 557, 62 N.E.2d 840, 847 (1945): "IT]he matter
which could be found objectionable is not necessary to convey any sincere
message the book may contain." This is one of the cases cited by the
Supreme Court as having adopted the requirement that material must bejudged as a whole and by its dominant theme. See Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 489 n.26 (1957).
490. See Lockhart & McClure, supra note 1, at 347 n.340.
491. Id. at 346 n.339, 349-50.
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peals, accepted "literary necessity" as the test for relevancy of the
objectionable parts to the dominant theme of the novel considered
as a whole.492 Judge Clark explicitly rejected the notion that the
objectionable parts must be objectively necessary to convey the
"sincere message" of the material as a whole. He also displayed a
thorough understanding of and appreciation for an author's sense
of literary necessity:
Obviously a writer can employ various means to achieve the effect
he has in mind, and so probably Lawrence could have omitted some
of the passages found 'smutty' by the Postmaster General and yet
have produced an effective work of literature. But clearly it would ...
not have been the book he planned, because for what he had in mind
his selection was most effective, as the agitation and success of the
book over the years has proven. In these sex descriptions showing
how his aristocratic, but frustrated, lady achieved fulfillment and na-
turalness in her life, he also writes with power and indeed with a mov-
ing tenderness which is compelling, once our age-long inhibitions
against sex revelations in print have been passed ...
The same is true of the so-called four-letter words found particu-
larly objectionable by the Postmaster General. These appear in the
latter portion of the book in the mouth of the gamekeeper in his
tutelage of lady in naturalness and are accepted by her as such.
Again this could be taken as an object lesson at least in directness as
compared to the smirk of much contemporary usage, which (perhaps
strangely) does not seem to have offended our mailmen. In short, all
these passages to which the Postmaster General takes exception-in
bulk only a portion of the book-are subordinate, but highly useful
elements to the development of the author's central purpose. And that
is not prurient.493
Had the Department of Justice not decided against an appeal,49
Lady Chatterley's Lover might have provided us with a definitive
resolution of this critical issue. Nevertheless, it seems likely that the
government's decision not to seek review in the Supreme Court
represents the sound conclusion that the Court would probably ac-
cept Judge Clark's espousal of literary necessity as the test for de-
termining the relevance of objectionable passages to the dominant
theme of the work as a whole.
The particular concept of obscenity applied will, of course, af-
fect the determination of the dominant theme of material. Under
the concept of a constant obscenity, which is unconcerned with
audience, the dominant theme is an inherent quality of the ma-
terial itself, considered as a whole. But under the concept of a
variable obscenity, the dominant theme of material considered as a
492. Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry, 175 F. Supp. 488, 501-02
(S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff'd, 276 F.2d 433, 437-39 (2d Cir. 1960).
493. Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry, 276 F.2d 433, 438-39 (2d
Cir. 1960). (Emphasis added.)
494. See N.Y. Times, June 3, 1960, p. 29, col. 6.
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whole varies according to the material's primary audience.4es In
this view, the dominant theme of Lady Chatterley's Lover, without
appeal to prurient interest when the book is addressed to a pri-
mary audience of sexually mature adults, might well be found to
appeal to the prurient interest of an audience of adolescents or
other sexually immature persons when aimed primarily at them for
the purpose of exploiting their craving for erotic fantasy.""0 Of
course, under variable obscenity the material must still be consider-
ed as a whole, though the dominant theme of the material is de-
termined by the nature of its appeal in the eyes of the primary
audience and of the disseminator of the material to that audience.
The constitutional requirement that obscenity be determined by
the dominant theme of material considered as a whole, not by
isolated passages, is applicable to motion pictures and plays as well
as to books.49 The requirement, designed to protect freedom of
expression, applies to all means of communication.9 8 A question-
ed scene in a motion picture may be just as relevant to its domi-
nant theme as the challenged episodes and words in the unexpur-
gated edition of Lady Chatterley's Lover. Indeed, the need for
this requirement is particularly acute with motion pictures because
of the ease with which censors can and do order the deletion of
495. See pp. 68-70, 73-88 supra for a consideration of the two concepts
of obscenity.
496. Judge Bryan recognized that the Grove Press Company had made
"no attempt . . . to appeal to prurience or the prurient minded." Grove
Press, Inc. v. Christenberry, 175 F. Supp. 488, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
497. Columbia Pictures Corp. v. City of Chicago, 184 F. Supp. 817
(N.D. Ill. 1959); American Civil Liberties Union v. City of Chicago, 13
11. App. 2d 278, 141 N.E.2d 56 (1957). Unfortunately we have no Su-
preme Court decision on this precise point. Kingsley Pictures could have
raised the point, for the censors had ordered three scenes deleted from "Lady
Chatterley's Lover" as "immoral." See note 198 supra and accompanying
text. But this issue dropped out of sight when the New York Regents' af-
firmance of the deletion was based, in part, on its conclusion that the
"whole theme" of the picture was immoral because it presented adultery
as a proper pattern of behavior, and the consideration of the case in the
Supreme Court became focused on that issue. See text accompanying
notes 210-13 supra.
498. As indicated in note 497 supra, no Supreme Court opinion has ruled
on the precise point of applying the dominant theme test to motion pic-
tures. But the Court has repeatedly ruled that motion pictures are signifi-
cant media for the communication of ideas entitled to freedom of expres-
sion protection. See, e.g., Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952);
Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S.
684 (1959). And the Court has reversed motion picture censorship on the
authority of the Roth and Alberts cases, in a case in which the apparent
basis for the per curiam decision was the trial court's failure to follow the
standard laid down in those cases. See Times Film Corp. v. City of Chi-
cago, 355 U.S. 35 (1957), considered in notes 163 & 168 supra. Nowhere
has the Court intimated that a different standard would be applied to mo-
tion pictures than to books.
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particular scenes before exhibition of the film,'109 a technique not
applicable to books which as a practical matter must be accepted
or rejected as a whole. 00 This does not mean that the visual
impact of a motion picture is to be disregarded, or that a motion
picture can show sexual scenes with as much frankness as they
may be described in books. But it does mean that scenes in motion
pictures cannot be considered in isolation, apart from their rele-
vance to the dominant theme of the motion picture considered as
a whole.
Sometimes courts and others have difficulty grasping the appli-
cability of this constitutional requirement to magazines, books of
short stories, and other collected works. 10' They overlook the
fact that every magazine, every anthology, every collection of works
always and necessarily has a dominant theme and purpose; none is
ever thrown together at random, with no over-all theme or objec-
tive in view. Even the American Law Institute fell into this
trap. 0 2 The absurdity of this position is demonstrated by a con-
sideration of E. E. Cummings' Collected Poems. Cummings, of
course, is one of the great poets of our time, and his Collected
Poems is obviously designed to show the full range of his poetical
works. Yet under the view that magazines, anthologies, and col-
lected works need not be judged by their dominant themes nor
considered as a whole, Cummings' Collected Poems might be cen-
sored or bowdlerized as obscene because it includes, for example,
poems 134 and 250.503 It leads to the absurdity of publishing
volumes represented as the complete or collected works of Benja-
min Franklin or Mark Twain that discreetly omit Franklin's Letter
to the Academy at Brussels and Twain's 1601."' We reject the
notion that magazines, anthologies, and other collected works need
499. See, e.g., 38th ACLU ANN. REP. 17 (1958). Unfortunately, ex-
hibitors or producers, or both, appear to find it easier to yield to the cen-
sor's scissors than to resist them through an appeal to the courts.
500. In Detroit, Michigan, however, one publisher before 1957 sub-
mitted manuscripts to the police censor bureau in advance of publication
and deleted the words and passages the police found objectionable. See
Lockhart & McClure, supra note 1, at 316.
501. See, e.g., Flying Eagle Publications, Inc. v. United States, 273 F.2d
799 (1st Cir. 1960) (six short stories in magazine Manhunt found obscene);
Report on Obscene Matter Sent Through the Mail to the House Committee
on Post Office and Civil Service by the Subcommittee on Postal Opera-
tions, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 20-26 (1959) (two of four articles or stories in
the publication Big Table held obscene by postal hearing examiner).
502. See MODEL PENAL CODE, op. cit. supra note 314, at 40.
503. No. 134 begins:
she beinz Brand-new; and you know consequently
a little stiff I was careful of her . . .
No. 250 begins:
may i feel said he
i'll squeal said she
504. See Lockhart & McClure, supra note 1, at 337.
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not be judged as a whole and by their dominant themes. But in
rejecting that absurd notion it is important to recognize that some
pornographers may seek to disguise the pornographic nature of
the dominant theme of the materials they assemble by the inclu-
sion of some material that is clearly legitimate."' Here the con-
cept of variable obscenity should be helpful in ascertaining the
true dominant theme of the material despite the effort to disguise it.
E. REDEEMING SOCIAL IMPORTANCE
The new constitutional requirement that material be judged
for obscenity by the dominant theme of the material considered as
a whole permits, but does not of itself require, consideration of the
aesthetic or other social values of the material.5 Long before the
Roth-Alberts opinion, courts agreeing that material should be
judged as a whole nevertheless disagreed over the relevance and
importance of literary values. To some, literary values were irrele-
vant.507 At the opposite extreme, others held obscenity statutes
totally inapplicable to works of genuine literary value."' Most,
however, found literary values relevant but gave them varying de-
grees of importance,5 9 ranging. from negligible10 to almost over-
whelming'5 n
Although in Roth-Alberts the Supreme Court cited with ap-
parent approval two cases, one holding literary values irrelevant *z
505. This is likely to occur with some magazines, such as girlie maga-
zines, unlikely with anthologies and collected works.
506. Lockhart & McClure, supra note 1, at 347.
507. See People v. Dial Press, Inc., 182 Misc. 416, 48 N.Y.S.2d 480
(Magis. Ct. 1944); People v. Friede, 133 Misc. 611, 233 N.Y. Supp. 565
(Magis. Ct. 1929); People v. Seltzer, 122 Misc. 329, 203 N.Y. Supp. 809
(Sup. Ct. 1924). See also People v. Wepplo, 78 Cal. App. 2d 959, 962, 178
P.2d 853, 856 (1947).
508. See cases cited in Lockhart & McClure, supra note 1, at 347. See
also St. Hubert Guild v. Quinn, 64 Misc. 336, 118 N.Y. Supp. 582 (Sup.
Ct. 1909); People v. Gonzales, 107 N.Y.S.2d 968, 969 (Magis. Ct. 1951).
509. See Lockhart & McClure, supra note 1, at 347. See also Times Film
Corp. v. City of Chicago, 244 F.2d 432, 435 (7th Cir. 1957), rev'd, 355
U.S. 35 (1957); United States v. 4200 Copies Int'l Journal, 134 F. Supp.
490, 494 (E.D. Wash. 1955), afrd sub nona. Mounce v. United States, 247
F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1957), rev'd, 355 U.S. 180 (1957); American Civil
Liberties Union v. City of Chicago, 3 Ill. 2d 334, 347, 121 N.E.2d 585,
592 (1954); People v. Holt (Ct. Gen. Sess. N.Y. 1922), reported in HOLT,
JURGEN AND THE LAW 73 (1923); Commonwealth v. Mercur, 90 Prrrs.
L.J. 318 (Alleghany County Ct. 1942). For a discussion of the Times Film
and Mounce cases, see notes 163, 164, & 168 supra.
510. See Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 62 N.E.2d 840
(1945).
511. See United States v. One Book Entitled "Ulysses," 72 F.2d 705
(2d Cir. 1934).
512. People v. Wepplo, 78 Cal. App. 2d 959, 178 P.2d 853 (1947),
cited in 354 U.S. at 486 and apparently approved at 489.
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and the other treating them as of negligible importance, 13 it
seems clear that the Court cited them approvingly for other rea-
sons. 14 In the same opinion, the Court emphasized that obscene
material is "utterly without redeeming social importance, ' 51 5 an
observation hardly consistent with the notion that literary values
are insignificant. And in its later decisions, the Court has found
material of even minor redeeming social importance not obscene 510
thus indicating that it probably will assign great, perhaps even
overwhelming importance, to the aesthetic and other social values
of material caught up in obscenity charges." 7
If, however, the Court should move from the constant to the
variable obscenity concept,"' material of social value, perhaps
even great social value, might properly be found obscene-but
only in those circumstances in which the material lacks redeeming
social importance to its primary audience."9 Since the material
is preserved for all others who may be capable of understanding
and appreciating its value, there is no great loss to society in de-
nying the material to a primary audience using it only as food for
erotic fantasy. Indeed, variable obscenity might well lead to a
greater total measure of freedom for material of social value than
constant obscenity would allow. For variable obscenity permits em-
phasis upon the value of material for its primary audience. Under
the constant obscenity concept, courts are faced with the choice
of finding the material before them either obscene or not obscene
for everyone in all circumstances. Confronted with that stark
choice, a court might well tip the scales in favor of obscenity when,
under the variable obscenity concept, it would find the same ma-
terial not obscene for a particular primary audience. In the Kinsey
case"' Judge Palmieri escaped from the constant obscenity strait-
513. Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 62 N.E.2d 840(1945), cited in 354 U.S. at 489 n.26.
514. The Court cited these and other cases only because they rejected
the "Partly obscene" and "susceptible persons" features of the old Hicklin
rule. See text accompanying notes 281-300 supra.
515. 354 U.S. at 484. The Court also emphasized the great importance of
protecting freedom of speech and press for discussion of all matters of
public concern, and included sex as one of the vital matters of such con-
cern. Id. at 487-88.
516. See notes 163, 165, 166 & 168 supra and accompanying text. None
of the materials in these per curiam decisions had great social value, yet
in three of the four cases the Court held the material not obscene.
517. See text accompanying notes 332-34 supra.
518. See pp. 68-70. 73-88 supra for an analysis of these two conepets.
519. See text following note 439 supra. This would happen where social-
ly valuable material, not obscene when addressed to a primary audience of
sexually mature adults, is treated by both its disseminator and its primary
audience of the sexually immature as if it were hard-core pornography.
520. United States v. 31 Photograths, 156 F. Supp. 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
See Comment, 34 IND. L.J. 426 (1959).
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jacket by way of the variable obscenity concept, which permitted
him to find that photographs, indisputably hard-core pornography,
were not obscene when addressed solely to the Kinsey Institute.
Similarly, the concept of obscenity held and applied by the first
court to be confronted hereafter with Henry Miller's scabrous nov-
els521 will, we believe, greatly influence the court's decision on
their obscenity; if the novels are discreetly handled and clearly
directed to a primary audience of sexually mature and sophisti-
cated adults, the variable obscenity concept is more likely to pro-
duce a ruling favorable to the books than is the constant ob-
scenity concept.5 2
2
Yet, whichever of the two competing concepts of obscenity ul-
timately prevails, we are convinced that material of redeeming so-
cial importance is not obscene and is entitled to constitutional pro-
tection-at least in those circumstances in which the material has
social value for its primary audience.am This much seems very
clear at the present stage in the development of constitutional
standards governing obscenity censorship. But the means for de-
termining whether material has social value and, if so, the weight
to be accorded it, are not yet at all clear. And these are crucial
problems, for it is easier to say that we will respect and protect
material of redeeming social importance than it is to do so in prac-
tice. This is particularly true of works of art, because many peo-
ple-including some police and prosecuting officers, and some-
times judges too--do not understand or appreciate them. These
people neither know nor understand how the fine arts-including
drama, fiction, poetry, dancing, and even music-are vehicles for
the communication of ideas.524 Consequently, some way must be
found to assure that in all obscenity cases the value of the ma-
521. See text accompanying notes 413-15 supra.
522. We have a hunch that the variable obscenity concept, with its
strong emphasis upon the particular audiences of material, would helpjudges and other triers of fact to repress their own personal reactions to
material. For example, if the postal hearing examiner who found the far-out
beatnik publication, The Big Table, obscene had considered its actual- pri-
mary audience, he would have been better able to suppress his personal
reactions to the publication and the decision would have gone the other
way. The decision was vacated in Big Table, Inc. v. Schroeder, 186 F. Supp.
254 (N.D. Ill. 1960). For the examiner's opinion, see Report, supra note
174, at 21-26.
523. While the concept of the primary audience has its principal use
under variable obscenity, we believe that even under constant obscenity
the Court must and will consider the social value of material to its primary
audience in determining whether it is entitled to constitutional protection.
Of course when it does so, it will be moving to the brink of variable ob-
scenity.
524. See Lockhart & McClure, supra note 1, at 369-71; FERrUSON, Music
AS METAPHOR (1960). In San Francisco recently, the police ordered the
proprietor of an art gallery to remove a painting of a nude from his dis-
play window. 39th ACLU ANN. REP. 17 (1959).
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terial is first of all considered and then given its proper weight in
arriving at a decision on the obscenity of material.
At one time, not many years ago, a number of courts refused to
admit evidence of the value of material alleged to be obscene;"'
and some that admitted such evidence refused to give it any
weight.526 Most courts, however, readily admitted and seriously
considered evidence of the value of the material before them. Rec-
ognizing their limitations, these courts welcomed the assistance
that competent critics and expert witnesses could give them.52 It
seems to us that the admission and thoughtful consideration of
such evidence are essential to an intelligent appraisal of material
alleged to be obscene, for without such evidence courts are forced
to assume the role of critic and expert in many fields of human
endeavor-a role that few courts, if any, are competent to play. 28
Although in 1954 we suggested that admission of such evidence
was "probably not a constitutional requirement, 52 9 we are now
convinced that this evidence is of such crucial importance that its
admission ought to be raised to the level of a constitutional re-
quirement. Indeed, without such evidence in the record, appellate
courts will often find it impossible to review intelligently the ob-
scenity decisions brought before them.'30
But the admission of critical and expert evidence cuts both
ways. If such evidence is, as we believe, indispensable to an in-
telligent appraisal of much material sought to be censored as ob-
scene, in many cases it may also be indispensable to an intelligent
penetration of the disguise of pornographic material masquerad-
ing as legitimate fare. For example, a pseudo-physical-culture mag-
azine was published in Chicago a few years ago. Although not a
Charles Atlas magazine, it would have appeared to the normal
heterosexual male only as a rather bizarre magazine because of
the unusual clothing worn by the muscular men pictured in its
photographs and the peculiar settings and props included in the
525. See cases cited in Lockhart & McClure, supra note 1, at 348.
526. In United States v. Two Obscene Books, 92 F. Supp. 934 (N.D.
Cal. 1950), the district court refused to issue a commission for taking the
depositions of literary critics on Henry Miller's Tropic of Cancer and Tropic
of Capricorn. See Recent Case, 35 MINN. L. REV. 326 (1951). When evi-
dence of their value and literary stature was later entered in the record,
both the district court and the court of appeals refused to give it any
weight. United States v. Two Obscene Books, 99 F. Supp. 760 (N.D. Cal.
1951), af 'd sub nom. Besig v. United States, 208 F.2d 142 (9th Cir.
1953). For a critical appraisal of these works, see Krim, The Netherworld
of Henry Miller, 57 Commonweal, Oct. 24, 1952, p. 68.
527. Lockhart & McClure, supra note 1, at 348.
528. Id. at 393. See also MODEL PENAL CODE, op. cit. supra note 314,
at § 207.10(2) (c) & Comment, pp. 40-43.
529. Lockhart & McClure, supra note 1, at 393.
530. For consideration of judicial review in obscenity cases, see pp.
114-20 infra.
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photographs. Analyzed by a psychologist or psychiatrist, how-
ever, the magazine took on an entirely different character; it was
then seen for what it really was-a magazine for male homosexuals
to whom the clothing, settings, and props had symbolic mean-
ing.531 The admission and consideration of critical and expert
evidence are just as essential to an intelligent appraisal of the ma-
terial in cases of this type as in cases involving material of aesthetic
or other legitimate social values.
Although we are convinced that the admission of evidence of
the social value of material alleged to be obscene---or of the ab-
sence of value-deserves to be raised to the level of a constitu-
tional requirement, we are not sanguine about it. So far, only
one Justice-Mr. Justice Frankfurter-has indicated that he
would approve of such a constitutional requirement; another-
Mr. Justice Harlan-has expressed disapproval.' It may be
true that, if the concept of a constant obscenity is followed and
if that concept is limited to hard-core pornography, there will not
often be occasion to call upon competent critics and experts for
assistance.5" But if the Supreme Court, adhering to the constant
obscenity concept, should go beyond hard-core pornography in
categorizing the obscene,"s or if the Court should move from
the constant to the variable obscenity concept 01 it is hard to
see how material could be intelligently appraised for obscenity or
how an appellate court could intelligently review obscenity de-
cisions without the evidence of competent critics and experts. We
think that the admission of such evidence, when proffered by
either side in an obscenity case, should be made a constitutional
requirement.
F. THE END OF IDEOLOGICAL OBSCENITY
Before Kingsley Pictures some courts found material obscene
because it challenged current moral standards." t But censorship
of such "critical or ideological obscenity," simply for the ideas it
contained, flew squarely in the face of the very reason for guar-
anteeing freedom of expression-to keep our democratic society
531. We are indebted to Dr. Starke R. Hathaway, Professor of Clinical
Psychology, University of Minnesota, for this information and these in-
sights.
532. See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 164 (1959).
533. See id. at 171-72. None of the other Justices has indicated any po-
sition on this issue.
534. Yet even here, as in the case of the pseudo-physical-culture maga-
zine, such evidence would occasionally be indispensible. See text accom-
panying note 531 supra.
535. See text accompanying notes 410-15 supra.
536. See text accompanying notes 379-83 supra.
537. See cases cited in Lockhart & McClure, supra note 1, at 333-35.
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free to perfect its own standards of conduct and belief through the
heat of unrepressed controversy and debate."3 8 In 1959, Kingsley
Pictures3 9 put an end to censorship for ideological obscenity
when the Court ruled that the constitutional "guarantee of the free-
dom to advocate ideas" protects the right to advocate that adultery
may be proper in some circumstances. Despite other differences
reflected by six opinions,54 eight of the Justices concurred in
this position and the ninth expressed no dissent."' The opinions
seem to indicate clearly that the Supreme Court will not tolerate
censorship of ideas, however repugnant they may be to currently
accepted moral standards.
The main thrust of the opinion in Kingsley Pictures is a strong
declaration of the constitutional right to advocate unconventional
ideas and behavior "immoral" by current standards, and to do so
in effective and dramatic ways. In his opinion for a majority of
five,5"' Mr. Justice Stewart emphasized that censorship of the
motion picture Lady Chatterley's Lover-not for obscenity but for
alluring portrayal of adultery as proper behavior 5 3-"struck at
the very heart of constitutionally protected liberty." '4 For the
"First Amendment's basic guarantee is of freedom to advocate
ideas." 45 It made no difference that the film "attractively por-
trays" a relationship contrary to moral standards, religious pre-
cepts and the legal code,5"6 because the constitutional guaran-
tee--
is not confined to the expression of ideas that are conventional or shar-
ed by a majority. It protects advocacy of the opinion that adultery may
sometimes be proper, no less than advocacy of socialism or the single
tax. And in the realm of ideas it protects expression which is eloquent
no less than that which is unconvincing.547
538. Id. at 374-76.
539. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 360
U.S. 684 (1959).
540. For a brief summary of the positions of the Justices in the six
opinions, see text accompanying notes 211-21 supra.
541. Only Mr. Justice Clark withheld any expression of views on the
ideological obscenity problem. He preferred to base reversal of the censor-
ship on the ground that the statute was unconstitutionally vague. 360 U.S.
at 699-702.
542. Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan and Mr. Chief Justice Warren
concurred in the Stewart opinion. Justices Black and Douglas wrote sep-
arate concurring opinions on other points, but both expressly joined in the
Stewart opinion. Id. at 690, 697.
543. Mr. Justice Stewart's opinion noted that the New York Court of
Appeals opinions had "explicitly rejected any notion that the film is ob-
scene" and had sustained the censorship because it found that the picture
'alluringly portrays adultery as proper behavior.' " Id. at 686-87.
544. Id. at 688.
545. Ibid.
546. Id. at 688-89.
547. Id. at 689.
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While Justices Harlan, Frankfurter and Whittaker did not con-
cur in the Stewart opinion because they interpreted the New York
Court of Appeals decision to rest in part on "actual scenes of a
suggestive and obscene nature,""5 they did not disagree with the
basic constitutional ruling of the majority. On the contrary, writing
for the three, Mr. Justice Harlan stated:
Granting that the abstract public discussion or advocacy of adultery,
unaccompanied by obscene portrayal or actual incitement to such be-
havior, may not constitutionally be proscribed by the State, I do not
read those opinions [of the Court of Appeals] to hold that the statute
on its face undertakes any such proscription.P 9
Are there any limits to this strongly stated position that material
challenging current moral standards and advocating conduct in-
consistent with those standards is constitutionally protected free-
dom of expression? Both the Stewart and Harlan opinions suggest
that there may be. In the majority opinion, Mr. Justice Stewart
invoked the rationale of Mr. Justice Brandeis' classic exposition
"of the "clear and present danger" concept in Whitney v. Califor-
nia." He agreed with Brandeis that free speech protects advo-
cacy of conduct forbidden by law so long as "the advocacy falls
short of incitement and there is nothing to indicate that the ad-
vocacy would be immediately acted upon;" absent such incitement
or immediate danger, the deterrent must be left to "education and
punishment for violation of the law, not abridgment of the rights
of free speech.' '"" Similarly, Mr. Justice Harlan's opinion recog-
nized the constitutional right to "abstract public discussion or ad-
vocacy of adultery," but only when "unaccompanied by obscene
portrayal or actual incitement to such behavior. ' '11 2
The Kingsley Pictures opinions thus suggest two possible limita-
tions on constitutional protection for "ideological obscenity." Con-
ceivably, a book may be found obscene, quite apart from the ob-jectionable ideas it asserts. Nothing in Kingsley Pictures suggests
that constitutional protection for ideas immunizes otherwise ob-
scene material from censorship. On the contrary, Mr. Justice Har-
lan expressly limited his recognition of constitutional protection to
548. Id. at 706. This dispute over the interpretation of the court of
appeals' opinions is considered in detail in 44 MINN. L. REv. 334 (1959).549. 360 U.S. at 705-06. Though finding that the New York decision
was based on "espousal of sexually immoral acts plus actual scenes of a
suggestive and obscene nature," "id. at 706, Justices Harlan, Frankfurter,
and Whittaker found the film "lacking in anything that could properly be
termed obscene" and therefore concurred in striking down the censor-
ship. Id. at 708.
550. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).551. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 360
U.S. 684, 689 (1959).
552. Id. at 705. (Emphasis added.)
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"abstract public discussion or advocacy of adultery, unaccom-
panied by obscene portrayal."' 53 And Mr. Justice Stewart took
care to make clear that the Court's decision was based upon its
conclusion that the New York Court of Appeals decision had "re-
jected any notion that the film is obscene"" 4 and had approved
denial of the license because the film "approvingly portrays an
adulterous relationship, quite without reference to the manner of
its portrayal."5"' Such care in limiting their opinions suggests
that the Justices recognized they would be faced with a very dif-
ferent problem if the claim were made that the manner of por-
trayal was itself obscene. But in such a case the ideological content
of the material in question could, in some circumstances, immu-
nize it from obscenity censorship because of the constitutional re-
quirement that obscenity be determined by the dominant theme of
the material considered as a whole.
The other possible limitation on constitutional protection for
the expression of ideas advocating deviation from moral standards
is the suggestion in both the Stewart and Harlan opinions that ad-
vocacy amounting to incitement to illegal action would not be
protected." Since advocacy of immoral conduct is not "ob-
scene" within constitutional requirements, such advocacy would
be subject to the clear and present danger test commonly used
by the Court in other freedom of expression cases.557 We doubt
that this limitation will provide a basis for harmful interference
with the serious expression of unconventional ideas relating to
sexual conduct. What is important to our society is freedom to
advocate unpopular and unconventional ideas, not freedom to in-
flame or incite persons to violate the law without first changing it.
Further, we doubt that advocacy of unconventional moral con-
duct, unaccompanied by portrayal that satisfies the constitutional
requirements for censorable obscenity, is likely to be found to
create a clear and present danger of illegal conduct.58
553. Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
554. Id. at 686.
555. Id. at 688. (Emphasis added.)
556. Mr. Justice Stewart's opinion not only used the Brandeis quotation
from Whitney, quoted in the text accompanying note 551 supra, but ex-
pressly made the point that New York did not suggest "that the film
would itself operate as an incitement to illegal action." Id. at 688. The
brief statement in Mr. Justice Harlan's opinion, quoted in the text ac-
companying note 549 supra, appeared to accept this implied limitation
on the constitutional protection for ideas.
557. See text accompanying note 550 supra. For an analysis of the
"clear and present danger" test, see Lockhart & McClure, supra note 1,
at 363-68. Obscenity is not subject to this test because of the decision in
Roth-Alberts that freedom of expression guarantees do not apply to ob-
scenity, but that decision is inapplicable to advocacy that is not "obscene."
558. See our earlier analysis of this point in Lockhart & McClure, supra
note 1, at 376.
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The impact of Kingsley Pictures upon the administration of
censorship laws may not be dramatic. Seldom does a decision sus-
taining censorship admittedly rest on ideological obscenity stand-
ing alone. 9 But before 1959, when Kingsley Pictures was de-
cided, the objectionable nature of some ideas played a promi-
nent role in many obscenity decisions.so Kingsley Pictures should
put an end to this element in obscenity censorship, as apparently it
is doing.5" Henceforth, obscenity censorship must be based upon
a finding of obscenity that satisfies constitutional requirements, not
upon a fuzzy blending of borderline obscenity with objectionable
ideas.56
G. CRIUMNAL INTENT
In the Supreme Court's latest obscenity ruling, Smith v. Cali-
fornia,"' all but two of the Justices agreed that some unde-
termined degree of scienter is a constitutional prerequisite to
criminal prosecution for the sale of obscene literature. In reversing
the conviction of a bookstore proprieter for possession of an ob-
scene book, Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for a majority of the
Court,'" ruled that the state cannot constitutionally eliminate
"all mental elements from the crime,"" as the lower California
court had done.5 6 Justices Douglas and Frankfurter also indi-
cated their agreement that scienter in some form is constitutionally
required for an obscenity conviction,5 7 and even the two Jus-
559. See id. at 333-34.
560. See id. at 334 n.268.
561. See, e.g., Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry, 175 F. Supp. 488,
501 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), where Judge Bryan, on the authority of Kingsley Pic-
tures, overruled the Postmaster General's ban on Lady Chatterley's
Lover and threw out as immaterial any consideration of conflict between
the ideas in the book and the accepted moral code. In affirming this ruling
the court of appeals, in an opinion by Judge Charles Clark, gave no con-
sideration whatever to the unconventional nature of the ideas advanced as
a possible basis for sustaining the censorship. See Grove Press, Inc. v.
Christenberry, 276 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1960). For similar recent recognition
of the impropriety of basing censorship on advocacy of unconventional con-
duct, see Excelsior Pictures Corp. v. City of Chicago, 182 F. Supp. 400,
403 (N.D. IMI. 1960) (film advocating nudism as a way of life); cf. State
v. Rothschild, 190 Ohio App. 101, 163 N.E.2d 907 (1958).
562. See text accompanying notes 198-207 supra.
563. 361 U.S. 147 (1959), described in more detail in text accompanying
notes 228-61 supra.
564. The majority consisted of Chief Justice Warren, and Justices Bren-
nan, Clark, Whittaker and Stewart.
565. Id. at 155.
566. Id. at 149.
567. Recognizing that his views in opposition to obscenity censorship
were in the minority, Mr. Justice Douglas gave a brief blessing to the
scienter holding by his comment: "I see no harm, and perhaps some good,
in the rule fashioned by the Court which requires a showing of scienter."
Id. at 169. Mr. Justice Frankfurter was dissatisfied with the vagueness of
the majority's ruling on scienter. See text accompanying notes 580-83 infra.
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tices who withheld their explicit approval did not take a negative
position. Mr. Justice Black would permit no censorship at all,518
and Mr. Justice Harlan did not reach the question, though he
said he was "unconvinced." '569
The Court's majority believed that a scienter requirement was
necessary to prevent obscenity statutes from interfering with free-
dom of expression by restricting, in their practical operation, the
dissemination of books that are not obscene. To penalize book-
sellers "even though they had not the slightest notice of the char-
acter of the books they sell" would, the Court reasoned, impose a
severe limitation on the public's access to constitutionally protect-
ed material.57 To the extent that a strict-liability obscenity stat-
ute is effective,5"' it would tend to cause a bookseller to restrict
his sales to books he has inspected. The Court also reasoned that
"timidity in the face of absolute criminal liability" would lead
booksellers to "self-censorship, compelled by the State . . . af-
fecting the whole public, hardly less virulent for being privately
administered. Through it, the distribution of all books, both ob-
scene and not obscene, would be impeded. 172 The latter reason-
ing appears to suggest that the Court is concerned with more than
a mere hesitation to sell without knowledge of contents. The ex-
pressions "timidity in the face of absolute criminal liability" and
"self-censorship" both suggest hesitation to take a chance on han-
dling borderline books whose contents are known but whose char-
acter as "obscene" or "not obscene" cannot be known in advance
of a court ruling.
There is plenty of evidence to support the Court's fear that
booksellers prefer self-censorship to the risk of prosecution under
a strict statute, at least where there is any substantial community
pressure aimed at suppression of "objectionable" books. 73 Re-
tail distributors of paper-bound books, most of them not profes-
sional booksellers at all, are likely to remove from their shelves any
book objected to by militant censorship groups, rather than ex-
amine their contents or-even knowing the contents-attempt to
reach a considered judgment on whether they are "obscene" under
evolving constitutional standards. Mr. Justice Douglas appears to
have had such considerations in mind when, briefly approving the
scienter requirement, he stated: "What the Court does today may
568. Id. at 155-60.
569. Id. at 170.
570. Id. at 152.
571. The Court recognized doubts expressed by a commentator as to the
effectiveness of strict criminal liability statutes in promoting caution. See
id. at 153 n.8.
572. Id. at 154.
573. See text accompanying notes 24-36 supra.
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possibly provide some small degree of safeguard to booksellers
by making those who patrol bookstalls proceed less highhandedly
than has been their custom. 574
In the majority opinion Mr. Justice Brennan made no effort to
determine just "what sort of mental element" is required to satisfy
the constitutional requirement.5 He recognized that proof of ac-
tual perusal of a book was not necessary to prove awareness of
its contents, and that circumstances could justify an inference of
such awareness. 78 But he explicitly left open two questions: (1)
Are there circumstances under which a state could require a book-
seller to investigate further or place upon him the burden of ex-
plaining why he did not do so?577 (2) Is an honest mistake as to
whether the known contents of a book constituted obscenity an
excuse?578 Not being faced with a case raising such questions, he
limited the majority opinion to the broad ruling that a criminal
obscenity statute cannot eliminate "all mental elements from the
crime." '579 But in a separate concurring opinion Mr. Justice Frank-
furter protested this failure "to give some indication of the scope
and quality of scienter that is required."" 0 He was not satisfied
with the majority's "unguiding, vague standard for establishing
'awareness' by the bookseller of the contents of a challenged book
... ," Apparently, he would have preferred that the Court
indicate, at the very least, that "a bookseller may, of course, be
well aware of the nature of a book and its appeal without having
opened its cover, or, in any true sense, having knowledge of the
book.""Ssm His concern was that the majority opinion had not
made it clear that "the Court's decision, in its practical effect, is
not intended to nullify the conceded power of the State to prohibit
booksellers from trafficking in obscene literature."' We are not
persuaded by Mr. Justice Frankfurter's reason for desiring some
advance guidance as to what the Court might consider necessary
to satisfy the scienter requirement of "awareness." In view of the
574. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 169 (1959).
575. Id. at 154.
576. Ibid. This suggestion was followed in People v. Schenkman, 195
N.Y.S.2d 570 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1960), where the court inferred knowledge
of the pornographic nature of material from the played-up five-dollar
price for small paper-bound books with suggestive blurbs on the covers.
Cf. United States v. Hochman, 175 F. Supp. 881 (E.D. Wis.), afrd, 277
F.2d 631 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 837 (1960); Alexander v. United
States, 271 F.2d 140 (8th Cir. 1959).
577. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 154 (1959).
578. Ibid.
579. Id. at 155.
580. Id. at 162.
581. Id. at 164.
582. Ibid.
583. Id. at 162.
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widespread pressures for censorship," 4 there is little danger that
the Smith decision will deter obscenity prosecutions where there
is a reasonable basis for contending that a bookseller was aware
of the nature of the challenged book. We can foresee no dearth of
cases through which a sound concept of scienter may be developed
in the context of concrete situations that will point up the true
nature of the problem.
The other question left open by the Court is whether a book-
seller's honest but mistaken belief that the known contents of a
book are not obscene constitutes a defense. 85 The strong public
interest in encouraging dissemination of non-obscene literature,
which motivated the imposition of the scienter requirement, dic-
tates an affirmative answer. In the case of blatantly hard-core
pornography, such a defense would obviously be rejected as un-
true. But the character of many books is such that it will be im-
possible, under evolving constitutional standards, to determine in
advance of a judicial ruling whether a book is "obscene," even
with the best legal advice. To require that a bookseller sell such
a book at his peril would constitute a substantial deterrent to the
sale of significant literature that is not obscene, for it would result
in the very "self-censorship . . . privately administered" and "ti-
midity in the face of absolute criminal liability" that the Court
sought to avoid by imposing the scienter requirement.5 0
If there were no way to control the sale of obscene literature ex-
cept to prove that the bookseller knew, before adjudication, that
the literature was "obscene" under the constitutional standard, the
Court would be faced with a difficult dilemma. To rule that a
bookseller's honest mistake as to obscenity is a defense would seri-
ously hamper effective state control over the distribution of ob-
scene literature, other than the obviously hard-core pornography
about which no bookseller could honestly claim mistake. On the
other hand, to rule that an honest mistake is not a defense would
hamper the distribution of constitutionally protected literature by
placing the risk of mistake on the bookseller. But the Court need
not choose between these two undesirable alternatives, for an al-
ternative solution is readily at hand that adequately protects both
interests.
Adjudications that a book is obscene can readily be obtained
under statutes authorizing declaratory judgment or book libel pro-
ceedings, or under the growing volume of statutes authorizing
584. See text accompanying notes 7-43 supra.
585. This was held not to be a valid defense in a recent municipal court
decision. See City of Cincinnati v. King, 168 N.E.2d 633 (Cincinnati Munic.
Ct. 1960).
586. See text accompanying note 572 supra.
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injunctions against the sale of particular obscene material." Af-
ter such. an adjudication, or after a successful prosecution which
has-resulted in a finding that a book is obscene, each bookseller
within the state could readily be given notice of the decision,
which would constitute adequate proof of scienter. In this man-
ner, the state's interest in effective control over distribution of ob-
scene literature could be protected without subjecting booksellers
to the hazard of selling at their peril when they have no depend-
able way to ascertain whether a particular book may be held ob-
scene. In view of the availability of this practical means of estab-
lishing scienter, we believe the Court should rule that the scienter
requirement has not been met if, absent such adjudication and
notice, the seller honestly believed that the book was not obscene.=
Of course the trial court need not accept as true the seller's pro-
fession of belief that the book is not obscene. In any case in which
the seller had good reason to know that the book was obscene, the
trial court can conclude that he did, in fact, believe it to be ob-
scene. For example, after several publications of the same nature
as the one in question, marketed in the same manner, have been
found obscene in well-publicized prosecutions or book proceed-
ings, a trial court would be justified in concluding that when a
seller is chargeable with knowledge of the contents of the publica-
tion he must also be charged with knowledge of its obscene na-
ture.
One remaining question is whether the bookseller's honest belief
that the material he sells is not obscene must also be reasonable
in order to avoid a finding that the scienter requirement has been
satisfied. We doubt that a reasonable belief should be required. In
view of the uncompromising certainty with which some courts
have asserted that anyone can recognize obscenity,"5 9 we fear
587. For examples of statutes authorizing declaratory judgment or book
libel proceedings, see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 847.01(c) (Supp. 1959);
MAss. ANN.LAws ch. 272, § 28C (1956); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.1410(1)(Supp. 1959); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 269.565 (Supp. 1960). See proposals re-
lating to such a statute in Lockhart & McClure, Obscenity in the Courts,
20 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 587, 607 (1955); KILPATMCK, THE SNUT
PEDDLERS 270-72 (1960).
For examples of statutes authorizing injunctions, see, e.g., GA. CODE ANN.
§ 26-6306(a) (Supp. 1958); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-1510 (Supp. 1959);
MicH. STAT. ANN. § 27.1410(1) (Supp. 1959); Omo REv. CODE ANN.
§ 2905.343 (Page Supp. 1960); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3832.1 (Supp.
1959); R. L GE.N LAws ANN. ch. 11, § 31-13 (Supp. 1959). The New
York statute authorizing such an injunction was sustained in Kingsley
Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957). See text accompanying notes
141-47 supra.
588- But-compare Professor Kalven's suggestion that such a ruling would,
in effect, revive by way of the scienter requirement the previously rejected
vagueness objection to obscenity legislation. See Kalven, supra note 5, at 37.
589. See Lockhart & McClure, supra note 1, at 348.
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that too many courts will automatically find unreasonable any be-
lief contrary to their conclusion that a book is obscene. If book-
sellers are subject to such a risk, they are likely to take off the
market those books which they anticipate may give rise to a rea-
sonable difference of opinion regarding obscenity. Yet these are
the very books which should be the subject of a judicial determi-
nation of obscenity, without prior private suppression. Booksellers,
understandably, are more interested in protecting themselves from
criminal prosecution than in vindicating the public interest in
freedom of expression.
The foregoing analysis is equally applicable whether the Court
follows the constant or the variable obscenity concepts. For what-
ever the concept of obscenity, there will be doubtful cases in which
no bookseller could predict with any confidence whether a particu-
lar book may be found obscene or entitled to constitutional pro-
tection. But the variable obscenity concept would make it easier
for the state to satisfy the scienter requirement, for when a book
is marketed in a manner that appeals to the erotic fantasies of a
sexually immature primary audience, the bookseller can scarcely
deny that he knew the true nature of the appeal.
While this discussion has been centered on books and book-
sellers, the scienter requirement is equally applicable to other
types of material. All of the considerations applicable to books are
equally applicable to magazines. But the requirement of scienter
could be given a more limited application in prosecuting motion
picture exhibitors, for exhibitors can reasonably be required to
know the content of a motion picture before exhibiting it. In
contrast to the impracticability of expecting a bookseller to ascer-
tain the contents of all his books, it is a simple matter to preview a
motion picture before exhibition, and in many theaters this is the
usual practice. On the other hand, knowledge of the content of a
motion picture will not enable an exhibitor to forecast a court
decision in debatable cases. To require him to do so at his peril
would make him a self-censor no less than it would the bookseller,
and thereby tend to deprive the public of significant motion pic-
tures that a court might well find constitutionally protected. In this
respect, the considerations raised by application of the scienter re-
quirement to booksellers are equally applicable to motion picture
exhibitors, who have no greater liking for criminal prosecution.
H. CONTEMPORARY COMMUNITY STANDARDS
Since June 24, 1957, the Supreme Court has disappointed the
proponents of censorship by making it clear that the decisions ren-
dered on that date59" did not proclaim a field day for censorship
590. See pp. 18-32 supra, for accounts of the decisions of that date.
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of obscenity, but in fact placed very tight limits on what may con-
stitutionally be censored as obscene.59' Censorship proponents
have now pinned their hopes on the Court's statement in the
Roth-Alberts opinion that material may constitutionally be judged
for obscenity by the application of "contemporary community
standards."' ' Assuming that this phrase referred to the con-
temporary standards of state or local communities,593 the Post
Office and Justice Departments secured federal legislation au-
thorizing obscenity prosecutions at any place through which mail
passes or at the place of its receipt," in the hope that convic-
tions could be more easily obtained in the hinterlands than in some
of the more sophisticated metropolitan communities where mate-
rial is mailed.595 At trials in more straight-laced communities,
the government could make particularly effective use of such trial
tactics as refusing to consent to waivers of jury trials; '9 and then,
591. See pp. 32-36. 39-42, 58-60 vupra.
592. 354 U.S. at 489. The full text of the test for obscenity approved
in that opinion was "whether to the average person, applying contemporary
community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole
appeals to prurient interest." Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
593. Some courts and other persons jumped to this conclusion. See
United States v. Frew, 187 F. Supp. 500, 506 (E.D. Mich. 1960); Four
Star Publications, Inc. v. Erbe, 181 F. Supp. 483, 484-85 (D. Ia. 1960);
People v. Smith, 161 Cal. App. 2d 860, 862, 327 P.2d 636, 638, rev'd
sub nom. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959); People v. Brooklyn
News Co., 12 Misc. 2d 768, 771-72, 174 N.Y.S.2d 813, 817-18 (County
Ct. 1958); Hearings, supra note 38, at 63-66.
594. See text accompanying notes 175-179 supra.
595. And they did not overlook the fact that a trial far from the de-
fendant's home and place of business would make it inconvenient for him
to defend himself. See note 178 supra. Of this practice, Mr. Justice Frank-
furter said in United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273 (1944):
Aware of the unfairness and hardship to which trial in an environ-
ment alien to the accused exposes him, the Framers wrote into the
Constitution that "The Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be held in the
State where the said Crimes shall have been committed . . ." Article
III, § 2, cl. 3. As though to underscore the importance of this safe-
guard, it was reinforced by the provision of the Bill of Rights requir-
ing trial "by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed." Sixth Amendment. By utilizing the
doctrine of a continuing offense, Congress may, to be sure, provide
that the locality of a crime shall extend over the whole area through
which force propelled by an offender operates. Thus, an illegal use of
the mails or of other instruments of commerce may subject the user
to prosecution in the district where he sent the goods, or in the dis-
trict of their arrival, or in any intervening district. Plainly enough, such
leeway not only opens the door to needless hardship to an accused by
prosecution remote from home and from appropriate facilities for de-fense. It also leads to the appearance of abuses, if not to abuses, in
the selection of what may be deemed a tribunal favorable to the pros-
ecution.
Id. at 275. (Emphasis added.) Cf. Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347,
386-87 (1912) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
596. FED. R. CrM. P. 23. Defendants in obscenity cases almost invari-
ably try to avoid trial by jury. Bromberg, supra note 341, at 418.
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having insisted on jury trials, it could peremptorily challenge the
most literate and best-educated jurors.59" 7 If "contemporary com-
munity standards" has reference to the standards of state or local
communities, and if those standards are to be applied by a jury,
then these tactics will enable the government to secure convic-
tions which heretofore would have been difficult or impossible to
obtain.
But we doubt the validity of the assumption that the phrase
"contemporary community standards" refers to the standards of
state or local communities. The idea embodied in that phrase
seems to have originated with Judge Learned Hand's celebrated
opinion in United States v. Kennerley.-9 In protesting the old
Hicklin rule, which he then felt obligated to follow, Judge Hand
said:
Yet, if the time is not yet when men think innocent all that which is
honestly germane to a pure subject, however little it may mince its
words, still I scarcely think that they would forbid all which might
corrupt the most corruptible, or that society is prepared to accept for
its own limitations those which may perhaps be necessary to the weak-
est of its members. If there be no abstract definition, such as I have
suggested, should not the word "obscene" be allowed to indicate the
present critical point in the compromise between candor and shame at
which the community may have arrived here and now? . . . To put
thought in leash to the average conscience of the time is perhaps toler-
able, but to fetter it by the necessities of the lowest and least capable
seems a fatal policy. . . . Such words as these do not embalm the
precise morals of an age or place; while they presuppose that some
things will always be shocking to the public taste, the vague subject-
matter is left to the gradual development of general notions about
what is decent. 599
And it seems clear that in this passage Judge Hand was not re-
ferring to the standards of state or local communities but rather
to the standards of society as a whole.
Another reason for believing that the Court in the Roth-Alberts
opinion did not commit itself to the standards of state or local
communities lies in the Court's approval of the 13 cases it cited as
having adopted a constitutionally satisfactory test for obscenity."'0
Although two of the cases spoke of local standards at the time and
place of each alleged offense, a third emphasized the necessity for
a uniform national standard, and the concurring opinion of Judge
Jerome Frank in a fourth case referred to the attitude of the
597. This, we are informed by defense counsel, happened in the trial of
Alexander v. United States, 271 F.2d 140 (8th Cir. 1959), after an assistant
United States attorney refused to consent to Alexander's request for waiv-
er of a jury trial. See also McClure, Book Review, 59 COLUM. L. REV.
387. 404 (1959).
598. 209 Fed. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
599. id. at 121. (Emphasis added.)
600. See text accompanying notes 282-300 supra, for an analysis of the
cases.
[Vol. 45:5
CENSORSHIP OF OBSCENITY
American community in general.6"' The opinions in the remain-
ing nine cases were noncommittal on the issue.
For these reasons we believe that the Supreme Court did not, as
some of the proponents of censorship hopefully thought, approve
of the application of state or local community standards in ob-
scenity cases. Indeed, in one of its per curiam decisions after the
Roth-Alberts opinion the Court indicated that it would not tolerate
the application of restrictive local standards in obscenity censor-
ship. In Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago"0 the Court re-
versed a United States court of appeals decision upholding Chi-
cago's censorship of the motion picture The Game of Love; and it
did so upon the ground that the film was not constitutionally ob-
scene. 03 Had the Court approved of the application of local
standards in obscenity cases it would not so summarily have sub-
stituted its judgment of Chicago standards for the judgment of the
city censors and federal courts in that part of the country. 0' We
601. See note 290, supra, for citations to these cases. The American
Law Institute's Model Penal Code, which the Court also cited with apparent
approval (354 U.S. at 487, n.20), although a bit ambiguous, favors a na-
tional community standard. It defines as obscene, material that considered
as a whole predominantly appeals to prurient interest "if it goes substan-
tially beyond customary limits of candor in description or representation of
such matters" as nudity, sex, or excretion. MODEL PENAL CODE, op. cit.
supra note 314, at § 207.10(2). It also provides for the admission of evi-
dence of "the degree of public acceptance of the material in this country."
Id. at § 207.10(2) (d). In the comments, the ALI draftsmen note that "evi-
dence of 'public acceptance' in this country . .. is relevant under our
definition of obscenity to show that the material went beyond 'customary
limits of candor.' "Then they say:
For example, a book could hardly be held obscene in one county of a
state if it appeared openly on public library shelves and in book stores
throughout the state. And a tribunal in one state is entitled to know
that a moving picture or book has circulated elsewhere in the
United States, that it has been reviewed in responsible journals there,
and, perhaps, that it has been adjudicated to be or not to be obscene.
Customs do indeed vary among our states, but it would be unfortu-
nate to have no evidence on "public acceptance," in a case where ma-
terial is challenged so promptly in a particular jurisdiction that the
only opportunity to test public acceptance has been in other states.
Also the divergence of custom between one state and another is prob-
ably far less than differences between various social and religious
groups within any one state. Furthermore, since a large part of the
responsibility in this area has been assumed by the national govern-
ment enforcing federal obscenity legislation, a country-wide approach
is almost unavoidable. That which does not offend the sensibilities
of most Americans is likely to be in the area of controversial morals or
aesthetics, inappropriate for penal control.
MODEL PENAL CODE, op. cit. supra note 314, Comments at pp. 44-45.
602. 355 U.S. 35, reversing 244 F.2d 432 (7th Cir. 1957).
603. See notes 163 & 168, supra.
604. The Cnurt's decision in the Kingsley Pictures case also supports
this position. The majority rejected the state's limitation on advocacy of
"immoral" conduct, while three Justices concurring, rejected what they
viewed as a state court finding of obscenity. For an analysis of the case,
see text accompanying notes 194-221 supra.
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are confident that, when the Supreme Court is clearly presented
with the issue, the Court will resolve the issue against the applica-
tion of state and local community standards.
But if the contemporary standards of particular state and local
communities are not constitutionally applicable, whose standards
are? If we turn to the national community-the American public
in general-we find this standard illusory. Of the national com-
munity's contemporary standards we know only that contemporary
American society rejects and will not tolerate the dissemination of
hard-core pornography." 5
Beyond hard-core pornography we find ourselves without a re-
liable guide when we look to "community standards." For as Judge
Jerome Frank pointed out more than ten years ago, "we do not
know, with anything that approximates reliability, the 'average'
American public opinion on the subject of obscenity." ' And
even if we did know enough about contemporary community
standards to find a consensus on material short of hard-core por-
nography that the community will not tolerate, we would still find
ourselves in difficulty. Standards of acceptability, even when na-
tional and reasonably definite, are of dubious value in obscenity
cases. In applying them, we are in the words of Zecharia Chafee
saying, "'We will permit what we will permit,' which is going
around in a circle" and endangering daringly experimental "works
of literary and artistic distinction." ' 7 Their application also puts
us in the awkward position of having to explain the presence in
many libraries and museums of distinguished works of the past
that offend contemporary standards-an explanation that is so
hard to make that most of the time we simply look the other way
in embarrassment whenever anyone calls attention to them. 0
In our judgment contemporary community standards have little
place in obscenity censorship. If the contemporary standards are
taken as those of particular state or local communities, their ap-
plication would emasculate independent judicial review based on
federal constitutional standards governing obscenity censorship,0 0 D
Balkanize art and literature in the United States, and reduce art
605. For an analysis of hard-core pornography, see text accompanying
notes 340-64 supra.
606. Roth v. Goldman, 172 F.2d 788, 796 (2d Cir. 1949).
607. CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 209-10
(1947). See also Lockhart & McClure, supra note 1, at 335-38.
608. See Roth v. Goldman, 172 F.2d 788 (2d Cir. 1949), where the
majority ignored Judge Frank's comparison of Waggish Tales rom the
Czechv with Balzac's Droll Stories, which, he said, could be found in "al-
most any public library." Id. at 796.
The same would be true, though perhaps not in quite as many libraries,
of Ovid's Art of Love and Pietro Aretino's naughty works.
609. See pp. 114-20 infra, for our consideration of independent judicial
review of obscenity decisions.
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and literature to the levels of the most Philistine communities in
the country 1 in a manner not unlike the Michigan statute held
unconstitutional in Butler v. Michigan. 1' If, on the other hand,
the contemporary standards are taken as those of the national
community, their application to material that falls short of hard-
core pornography" would make of obscenity an intolerably
vague and indefinite concept, for there is no national consensus
beyond the consensus on hard-core pornography." And even this
broader standard would, as in the trial of the Roth case itself,
invite triers of fact to apply Philistine standards in judging mate-
rial for obscenity." Under either view there would be little
room for the concept of variable obscenity, which permits parti-
cular primary audiences of sexually mature and sophisticated adults
to have access to material that many members of the public might
regard as shockingly obscene.615
Though in our judgment "contemporary community standards",
whether local or national, have little place in obscenity cases, the
Supreme Court used the phrase in its Roth-Alberts opinion,61
and we have to make what sense of it we can. We have already
demonstrated that the Court has not accepted and will not accept
the restrictive standards of particular local communities in ob-
scenity censorship. 17 And we think the same is true of contem-
porary community standards conceived of as the contemporary
standards of the national community as a whole. It could scarcely
be said that One, The Homosexual Magazine enjoys any substantial
degree of public acceptance in the nation or that it comports with
contemporary standards of the average or majority of the national
community; yet the Supreme Court in a per curiam decision sum-
marily reversed a United States court of appeals decision affirm-
ing a district court judgment that had sustained a postal deter-
mination that the magazine was obscene.-x Consequently, we
doubt that the Supreme Court regards the contemporary standards
610. See Lockhart & McClure, supra note 1, at 314-16, for the impact
of Detroit's notorious censorship operation upon publishers of paperbound
books, one of whom succumbed to submitting manuscripts for censorship
before publication.
611. 352 U.S. 380 (1947). See text accompanying notes 44-65 supra.
612. See text following note 415 supra, and text accompanying note 439
supra, for our suggestion that the Supreme Court may limit material that
may be constitutionally censored for obscenity to hard-core pornography.
That issue, however, is still unresolved.
613. See text accompanying notes 605-06 supra. Nor is there likely to
be any consensus in state and metropolitan communities; in some small,
self-contained communities there may be.
614. See note 87 supra and accompanying text.
615. See text accompanying notes 424-25 supra.
616. See note 592 supra.
617. See text accompanying notes 602-04 supra.
618. See notes 165 & 168 supra.
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of the national community as those of the average or majority of
the populace. The application of such standards would reduce art
and literature to levels acceptable to the masses and deprive par-
ticular primary audiences of material that is of social importance
to them.
All of this, however, suggests only what the phrase "contempo-
rary community standards" does not mean; it tells us nothing of
what it does mean. As before, we are brought to the conclusion
that the Court was here using a positive form of statement to ex-
press its disapproval of the negative side of the coin.6"' In the
context in which the Court employed the phrase, the Court was
rejecting the Victorian standards embodied in the Hicklin test for
obscenity which, as interpreted by some American courts, judged
material by the effect of its parts upon particularly susceptible per-
sons. 620 It seems likely that the Court used the phrase as a means
of expressing its disapproval of the application of Victorian stand-
ards today. Thus interpreted, the phrase "contemporary community
standards" would free art and literature in the United States from
standards set by those who little understand them or appreciate
their values. Such an interpretation would also eliminate from ob-
scenity cases any consideration of such dangerously expansive
concepts as "local community standards" and should lead to great-
er concentration upon more precise tools for determining obscen-
ity.621
I. INDEPENDENT JUDICIAL REVIEW
In our opinion, an independent review of the questioned ma-
terial to determine whether it is "obscene" within the constitutional
requirements is now the obligation of every judge and appellate
court before whom the constitutional issue is raised, subject to ul-
timate review in appropriate cases by the Supreme Court. Before
Roth-Alberts, some appellate courts tended to look upon a find-
ing of obscenity in the trial court as a factual finding, subject to
reversal only if the decision could not reasonably be reached on
the "evidence"--ordinarily only the book itself. 22 In Roth-Al-
berts, Mr. Justice Harlan in a concurring opinion expressed the
fear that formulating constitutional requirements in terms of "ob-
scenity" could make the issue of suppressing a book "a mere mat-
ter of classification, of 'fact,' to be entrusted to a factfinder and
619. See text accompanying notes 403-04 supra.
620. See text accompanying notes 299-300 supra.
621. We have suggested some of these tools at pp. 57-67, 77-87 supra.
622. See, e.g., People v. Wepplo, 78 Cal. App. 2d 959, 178 P.2d 853
(1947); Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 62 N.E.2d 840 (1945);
People v. Pesky, 254 N.Y. 373, 173 N.E. 227 (1930).
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insulated from independent constitutional judgment."0' m Indeed,
even after Roth-Alberts, the Postmaster General contended, with-
out success, that his finding of obscenity was conclusive if sup-
ported by substantial evidence." 4 But now that censorship for
obscenity is subject to constitutional limitations, every judge faced
with a censorship issue has an obligation to make an independent
determination of the constitutional issue, which he cannot properly
avoid by classifying "obscenity" as only a factual question.
The Supreme Court has made it abundantly clear that where
constitutional rights are at stake it will not be bound by the factual
determinations of lower courts." 5 Ordinarily, if the facts are in
dispute, the Supreme Court accepts the state courts' findings onthe disputed facts, 6 6 though it retains freedom to review the evi-
dence and reach different conclusions in appropriate cases.M
But in applying constitutional standards to the factual findings be-
low, or to the undisputed facts, the Supreme Court exercises an
independent judgment on the constitutional issue, even though it is
couched in terms of a factual finding.°2 The rationale of such
623. 354 U.S. at 497.
624. Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry, 276 F.2d 433, 435-36 (2d
Cir.), affirming 175 F. Supp. 488, 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), considered p.
117 infra.
625. E.g., Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 271 (1959); Kern-Limerick,
Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110, 112 (1954); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340
U.S. 268, 271 (1951); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 371-72 (1947);
Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 335 (1946); Hooven & Allison Co. v.
Evatt, 324 U.S. 652, 659 (1945); United Gas Co. v. Texas, 313 U.S. 123,
143 (1938); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 590 (1935). See generally 4
DAvis, AnMINIsATvE LAw § 29:08 (1958); Berman, Supreme Court
Review of State Court Findings of Fact in Certain Criminal Cases: The
Fact-Law Dichotomy in a Narrow Area, 23 So. CALIF. L. REv. 334
(1950); Mishkin, The Federal Question in District Courts, 53 CoLUM. L
REv. 157, 173 (1953); Supreme Court Review of State Court Findings of
Fact, 55 HARv. L. REv. 644, 647-50 (1942).
626. E.g., Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 61 (1951); Pennekamp v.
Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 335 (1946); Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324
U.S. 652, 659 (1945); Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 602 (1944).
627. E.g., Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 271 (1959); Niemotko v.
Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 271 (1951); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367,
371-72 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, supra note 626, at 335; Hooven &
Allison Co. v. Evatt, supra note 626, at 659. The Supreme Court has fre-
quently said it will review the findings of fact by a state court (1) where
a federal right has been denied as the result of a finding shown by the
record to be without evidence to support it, and (2) where a conclusion of
law as to a federal right and findings of fact are so intermingled as to
make it necessary, in order to pass on the federal question to analyze
the facts. E.g., United Gas Co. v. Texas, 303 U.S. 123, 143 (1938); Norris
v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 590 (1935).
628. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 271 (1959) (did prosecutor's know-
ing use of false testimony have effect on jury so as to deny due process?);
Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 61 (1951) (was confession "volun-
tary"?); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 271 (1951) (did talk on
Bible in park constitute "disorderly conduct"?); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S.
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cases was well stated by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Watts v. Indi-
ana."9 After referring to the usual deference to state court de-
terminations on issues of fact, he stated:
But "issue of fact" is a coat of many colors. It does not cover a conclu-
sion drawn from uncontroverted happenings, when that conclusion in-
corporates standards of conduct or criteria for judgment which in them-
selves are decisive of constitutional rights. Such standards and criteria,
measured against the requirements drawn from constitutional provi-
sions, and their proper applications, are issues for this Court's adjudi-
cation. . . . Especially in cases arising under the Due Process Clause
is it important to distinguish between issues of fact that are here fore-
closed and issues which, though cast in the form of determinations of
fact, are the very issues to review which this court sits.0 30
This obligation-to reach an independent judgment in applying
constitutional standards and criteria to constitutional issues that
may be cast by lower courts "in the form of determinations of
fact"---appears fully applicable to findings of obscenity by juries,
trial courts, and administrative agencies. The Supreme Court is
subject to that obligation, as is every court before which the con-
stitutional issue is raised.
Obscenity cases seldom involve factual disputes relating to the
obscenity issue. Occasionally a factual issue may be raised by the
testimony of literary experts, or by evidence relating to the audi-
ence and method of marketing or to scienter and the knowledge
of the seller. 3' In such cases the Supreme Court and other appel-
late courts should show proper deference to factual findings, though
where a finding affects a claim of constitutional right the Supreme
Court retains the power to determine whether the evidence supports
the findings. But most cases involve no factual dispute relating to
obscenity; the only issues are whether the questioned material-
the book, magazine, or film-satisfies the statutory requirements
and can be forbidden under the constitutional standards estab-
lished by the Supreme Court. The application of the constitutional
standards to the material itself, in the light of any factual findings
supported by evidence, is a question of law upon which each
court faced with the constitutional issue must exercise an inde-
pendent judgment.
49, 51 (1949) (was confession "voluntary"?); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S.
367, 371-72 (1947) (did newspaper comment on pending case create
clear and present danger to administration of justice?); Pennekamp v.
Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 335 (1946) (same); Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S.
596, 602 (1944) (was confession "voluntary"?); Lisenba v. California, 314
U.S. 219, 238 (1941) (same).
629. 338 U.S. 49 (1949).
630. Id. at 51.
631. If the Court moves to the concept of variable obscenity, more fac-
tual issues will arise than under the constant obscenity concept. See dis-
cussion of this problem in text accompanying notes 442-50 supra.
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Since Roth, some reviewing courts have exercised an inde-
pendent judgment on the constitutional standard,' but others
,have gone astray.6 The issue was squarely raised when the Post-
master General insisted that his finding that the unexpurgated
edition of Lady Chatterley's Lover was obscene had to be sus-
tained if supported by substantial evidence. Both Judge Bryan in
the federal district court 4 and Judge Clark for the court of ap-
peals" rejected this position and, after independent review, found
the novel not obscene under the Roth constitutional standards.
Judge Clark reasoned that, because the Post Office Department
"considered only the novel itself . .. and declined to consider
the expert evidence proffered by the plaintiff," the question was
"one starkly of law": 36
Moreover, the plaintiffs raised the constitutional issue of freedom of
expression .... Even factual matters must be reviewed on appeal
against a claim of denial of a constitutional right.... Both legally
and practically the claim of final censorship powers here made for
the Postmaster General is extreme. Indeed it has received an incisive
answer in the public press thus: "And courts, not post offices, are the
proper places for a determination of what is and what is not protected
by the Constitution."637
There is no reason to believe that the Supreme Court will take
a different view.38 When faced with similar problems in freedom
of expression cases not relating to obscenity, it has taken a strong
position concerning its obligation to exercise an independent judg-
ment in the application of constitutional standards, 9 even to
the point of a re-examination of the evidentiary basis for state
court findings.640 And when faced with lower courts' findings
of obscenity, the Supreme Court summarily reversed the findings
632. E.g., United States v. Keller, 259 F.2d 54 (3d Cir. 1958); Capitol
Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 260 F.2d 670 (7th Cir. 1958); Com-
monwealth v. Moniz, 338 Mass. 442, 155 N.E.2d 762 (1959).
633. Alexander v. United States, 271 F.2d 140 (8th Cir. 1959); Big
Table, Inc. v. Schroeder, 186 F. Supp. 254 (N.D. IIl. 1960); In re Search
Warrant of Property at 5 W. 12th St. v. Marcus, 334 S.W.2d 119 (Mo.
1960). Cf. Volanski v. United States, 246 F.2d 842 (6th Cir. 1957) (before
Roth-Alberts); State v. Clein, 93 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 1957) (same).
634. Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry, 175 F. Supp. 488, 496 (S.D.
N.Y. 1959).
635. Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry, 276 F.2d 433, 435-36 (2d Cir.
1960).
636. Ibid.
637. Id. at 436.
638. If we are right, the Postmaster General's efforts to secure legis-
lation to insulate his obscenity decisions from effective judicial review will
prove abortive, whatever the result in Congress. See pp. 37-38 supra.
639. Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 271 (1951); Craig v. Har-
ney, 331 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331,
335 (1946).
640. See cases cited note 639 supra.
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in three of the four per curiam decisions following Roth-Al-
berts.6 4' In Kingsley Pictures, Justices Harlan, Frankfurter and
Whittaker not only made an independent appraisal of the film to
find it not obscene under the constitutional standards, 42 but em-
phasized the "necessity for individualized adjudication" so long as
the Court stops "short of holding that all state 'censorship' laws
are constitutionally impermissible. ' '143 While the majority in Kings-
ley Pictures made no independent judgment on the film because
they found the statute itself unconstitutional, nothing in their opin-
ion suggests any doubt about the propriety of an independent
judicial review when obscenity under the constitutional stand-
ards is an issue.
While Justices Black and Douglas would hold all obscenity cen-
sorship unconstitutional, 44 and do not relish seeing the Supreme
Court assume the role of "Supreme Board of Censors," '45 Mr.
Justice Douglas reluctantly recognized that "we must perform" that
role under the prevailing constitutional standards. 40 Only Mr.
Justice Black stands in adamant opposition to the role play-
ed by the Supreme Court in reviewing individual censorship rul-
ings. He almost seems, in Kingsley Pictures, to take the position
that the Court should not make such individualized judgments if
"despite the Constitution, this Nation is to embark on the danger-
ous road of censorship." 4 7 But in view of Mr. Justice Black's con-
641. See discussion in notes 163, 165, 166 & 168 supra and accom-
panying text. Judge Bryan noted this significance of the per curiam deci-
sions in his ruling on this issue. See Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry,
175 F. Supp. 488, 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
642. Kingsley Int'l Pictures, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 360
U.S. 684, 707-08 (1959).
643. Id. at 708. In his separate opinion Mr. Justice Frankfurter also
pointed out that the Court cannot "escape the task of deciding whether a
particular picture is entitled to the protection of expression under the
Fourteenth Amendment," just as the Court has had to proceed "case-by-
case" in the other due process cases. Id. at 696-97.
644. See dissenting opinion, Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 508
(1957); concurring opinions, Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 155, 168,
169 (1959).
645. See Mr. Justice Black's concurring opinions in Kingsley Int'l Pic-
tures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 691 (1959),
and Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 159 (1959), and Mr. Justice Doug-
las' concurring opinion in Smith v. California, supra at 168. Compare Mr.
Justice Jackson's expression of apprehension in the Doubleday argument
that the Court might become the "High Court of Obscenity." 17 U.S.L.
WEEK 3119 (1948).
646. Concurring in Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 169 (1959).
647. He does not quite say so. What he says is that if the nation is to
embark on censorship, despite the Constitution, "this Court is about the most
inappropriate Supreme Board of Censors that could be found," is "un-
suited to make the kind of value judgments . . . which the concurring
opinions appear to require," and "this Court should not permit itself to get
into the very center of such policy controversies, which have so little in
common with lawsuits." 360 U.S. at 690-91.
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sistent opposition to all interference with freedom of expression, it
is safe to assume that he will vote to reject any form of censorship,
even though he may decline to participate in appraising the ma-
terial in the light of constitutional standards.
The importance of independent judicial review of obscenity
findings for the preservation of freedom of expression is self-evi-
dent. The constitutional standards would mean little if their only
effective application were by administrators like the Postmaster
General, vested with responsibility to censor, or by local adminis-
trators, judges, or juries, who are subject to the influence of local
pressures and community sentiment stirred up by propaganda
groups.' Neither professional government censors nor local ju-
ries are likely to be sensitive to the basic values of freedom of ex-
pression that gave rise to the constitutional standards-values that
must enter into applying those standards. It may be true, as sug-
gested by Mr. Justice Black, that judges "possess no special ex-
pertise" qualifying them "to supervise the private morals of the
Nation" or to decide "what movies are good or bad for local com-
munities."" 9 But they do have a far keener understanding of the
importance of free expression than do most government adminis-
trators or jurors, and they have had considerable experience in
making value judgments of the type required by the constitutional
standards for obscenity. If freedom is to be preserved, neither gov-
ernment censorship experts nor juries can be left to make the final
effective decisions restraining free expression. Their decisions must
be subject to effective, independent review, and we know of no
group better qualified for that review than the appellate judges
of this country under the guidance of the Supreme Court.
This does not mean that the Supreme Court need be overwhelm-
ed with review of censorship cases. Once it has made its standards
reasonably clear, it can depend upon state appellate courts and
lower federal courts to apply those standards with fidelity and
understanding, just as they apply constitutional standards in oth-
er equally important situations. Only an occasional review by the
Supreme Court should be needed to clarify the standards and to
keep the administration of obscenity laws in line with constitutional
requirements.
Would acceptance of the variable obscenity concept"' jeopar-
dize effective judicial review of obscenity convictions? We think
not. Under the variable obscenity concept, the determination of
the audience to which the material is primarily directed and of the
648. See text accompanying notes 24-28 supra.
649. Concurring in Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ.
of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 690 (1959).
650. See pp. 77-88 supra.
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marketing methods aiming the material at that audience would be
factual findings ordinarily accepted by the reviewing court. But
a determination of the nature of the appeal to that audience would
require application of the constitutional standards, subject to in-
dependent judicial review. In actual practice what would this mean?
In a case tried to a judge without a jury, the judge would ordinarily
make findings as to the primary audience, perhaps the methods
of marketing, and finally the appeal of the material to that audi-
ence. The reviewing court would accept the findings as to the
primary audience and the methods of marketing, if supported by
evidence, but would independently review the findings with respect
to the nature of the appeal of the material to its audience, for that
finding would result from an application of the constitutional
standards-whether couched in terms of appeal to prurient inter-
est or appeal to erotic fantasy. Similarly, if a jury were to reach a
verdict of guilty, the reviewing court would accept that version of
the evidence relating to the audience and marketing methods most
favorable to the verdict, but would independently review whether
the nature of the appeal to the audience satisfied the constitutional
standards.
While the variable obscenity concept would thus introduce into
obscenity adjudication two closely related factual determinations
ordinarily beyond the reach of the reviewing court-the audience
and the methods of marketing-it would not interfere with inde-
pendent review of the critical constitutional question. The deter-
mination of whether particular material satisfies the constitutional
standards for obscenity, as applied to a particular audience and
a particular method of marketing, would still be subject to effec-
tive judicial review.
CONCLUSION
In the past three years the Supreme Court has made substantial
progress toward developing constitutional standards for obscenity
censorship, but difficult problems must still be faced. The Court
has made it quite clear, both in words and in deeds, that consti-
tutional freedom of expression applies to literature, art, and scien-
tific works dealing with sex. It has established several significant
constitutional limitations on obscenity censorship, all designed to
prevent serious inroads on freedom in this area, though the full
scope of these limitations has yet to be charted by the Court. But
the Court has not yet struggled in its opinions with the core prob-
lem of obscenity censorship-how to draw the line between con-
stitutionally protected material dealing with sex and material prop-
erly censorable as "obscene." It has thus far made no effort to
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clarify the brief, inadequate, and somewhat misleading Roth-Al-
berts verbal formulation relating to this core problem. 1
It is important for the Supreme Court to give guidance to the
lower courts on this core problem of obscenity censorship, but
we do not criticize the Court for its delay thus far. On the
contrary, we believe the Court has been wise to avoid an attempt
in these first few years to verbalize the basis for its conclusions
that obscenity findings in several cases violated constitutional re-
quirements. 2 The Court is charting a new course here, and it is
far more likely to chart a true course that will avoid dangerous
shoals in the future if it gains substantial experience in dealing
with these difficult cases before it makes any effort to generalize
its constitutional standards for obscenity through a verbal formu-
lation. 3 But soon it will have to formulate guide lines for the
lower courts. When that time comes, we hope that our analysis
will prove useful to counsel and to the Court.
651. Discussed at pp. 49-57, 72-73 supra.
652. On several occasions the full Court or individual Justices have
reached this conclusion in reversing obscenity findings, but have offered
no explanation for their conclusion. See per curiam decisions, note 168
supra and accompanying text; separate concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Harlan in Kingsley Pictures, considered in text accompanying notes 216-
21 supra.
653. Compare Thurman Arnold's suggestion in a brief filed with the Su-
preme Court of Vermont that the Supreme Court's refusal to write opinions
in the per curiam cases was "exceedingly wise," because "no one can reason
why anything is or is not obscene .... The Court evidently concluded
that its actions must speak for themselves in this field. This may be an un-
conventional way of making law, but in the field of pornography it is cer-
tainly sound judicial common sense." See Kalven, supra note 5, at 43-45,
where a more complete statement of the Arnold argument may be found.
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